Final Status Plan for Kosovo Stirs Up Whirlwind of Reactions

By Peter Lippman


	Anti-riot police units in Kosovo use tear gas to disperse some 2,000 ethnic Albanians protesting Feb. 10 in the capital city of Pristina against a U.N. plan on the future status of Serbia’s province (AFP photo/Ermal Meta).

A MOMENT all of Kosovo and Serbia have been waiting for has arrived—and no one is satisfied. At the beginning of February Martti Ahtisaari, United Nations envoy and mediator for final status of Kosovo, announced his proposal for the post-war relationship between that province and Serbia. In all but name, Ahtisaari’s plan means independence for Kosovo.

Since Kosovo was wrested away from the Ottoman Empire just before World War I, the territory has been under the turbulent rule of Serbia. After World War II Kosovo’s population, today around two million, became approximately 90 percent Albanian. Following a period of harsh treatment under former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, a three-month intervention by NATO in the spring of 1999 expelled Serbian forces from the province. Before and during this intervention, Serbian forces killed around 10,000 Kosovo Albanians and expelled more than 800,000. At the end of the hostilities Kosovo became a U.N. protectorate, as stipulated under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244.

The U.N. mediator’s final status proposal would annul Resolution 1244 and, in place of the protectorate, establish an “International Civilian Representative” (ICR) of the European Union. The ICR’s role would be to assist in implementation of the final status settlement, alongside an EU mission that would focus on security and rule of law. Meanwhile, Kosovo would adopt its own constitution and receive the right to negotiate international agreements and join international organizations. It would create its own flag and anthem, and establish a lightly armed security force.

Ahtisaari’s proposal further stipulates that Kosovo not join with any other country or territories, and that the rights of ethnic minorities residing in Kosovo be protected. In effect, it abolishes Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo in favor of “supervised statehood.” Nowhere does the plan use the word “independence,” but it is clear that this is the intent. Both Albanian and Serb representatives have recognized it as such, though with opposing responses.

Indeed, the proposal’s release has stirred up a whirlwind of reactions from Kosovar Albanians, the Serbian government, Western Europe and the United States, and from Russia. How the desires and intentions of these varied players interact in the next few months will determine whether there is to be peace or turmoil in Kosovo and its surroundings.

Ahtisaari’s proposal was supposed to be released by November of 2006, but was held up due to a political process taking place in Serbia. There, political forces align along a spectrum ranging from extreme “anti-European” nationalists who threaten to fight to hold onto Kosovo, to “pro-European” groups who are willing, albeit reluctantly, to relinquish the province in favor of cooperation with the West and eventual admission into the EU. Almost no Serbian politician, however, has been willing publicly to acknowledge loss of Kosovo, as doing so would probably mean the end of his or her political career.

In a move calculated to head off the growing popularity of the nationalist Serbian Radical Party, in October 2006 Serbia’s more moderate politicians hastily promulgated a new constitution, the preamble of which declared that Kosovo was to remain part of Serbia forever. This move was the first step in a parliamentary election campaign which, in January of this year, saw the Radicals nevertheless win a plurality (28 percent) of votes. The Europe-oriented parties of current President Dusko Tadic and Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica together won a majority, and are in position to form a coalition government. However, after the release of Ahtisaari’s final status proposal, Kostunica, the more nationalist of the two leaders, declared that he would not form a coalition with any party that recognizes Kosovo’s independence, and is even calling for Belgrade to sever diplomatic relations with any state that recognizes Kosovo.

Some Responses

In the most extreme eventuality, Kostunica’s party could form a coalition with the Radicals. Such a move would drastically isolate Serbia, as all but one member of the Kosovo Contact Group already have approved Ahtisaari’s proposal. Italy, Germany, France, Great Britain and the United States are positioned against Russia, which insists that no decision not satisfactory to both parties should be imposed upon Serbia. Russia could blockade the process by using its veto when the issue arrives for discussion at the U.N. Security Council, but it has been broadly hinted that Moscow will be offered some kind of deal, or be subjected to pressure, to allow the proposal to be approved.

On the other side, there is a large measure of dissatisfaction and impatience among the Albanians because the final status proposal does not completely fulfill their national aspirations. While most Albanians recognize the need for an international security presence for an extended period, they are unhappy about provisions in Ahtisaari’s proposal which are seen as too great a concession to Serb demands. Among these are the creation of a Serb-dominated municipality in the northern city of Mitrovica, and the formation of numerous other new Serb municipalities that would put Albanian residents at a disadvantage.

The grassroots Albanian activist organization Vetevendosje (“Self-determination”) has proclaimed that the decentralization outlined in Ahtisaari’s proposal will lead to Serbian secession—something mentioned by local Serb leaders as well—and that this means war. Both Vetevendosje and Serbs in northern Kosovo already have organized demonstrations against the plan, and Vetevendosje has vowed to act to prevent its implementation. A week after release of the final status plan several thousand Serbs demonstrated in Mitrovica carrying banners that read, “No to Independent Kosovo” and “Kosovo is the Soul of Serbia.”

The next day Vetevendosje led several thousand Albanians in protest of Ahtisaari’s plan, in a demonstration that was attacked by U.N. police. Their use of rubber bullets and tear gas resulted in the death of two demonstrators, and over 70 were injured. Afterward Kosovo’s interior minister resigned, as did the U.N.’s international police commissioner. A few days later, in retaliation for the killings, an unidentified Albanian group set off a bomb under several U.N. vehicles. Vetevendosje has called for further demonstrations in early March.

Meanwhile, a leader of the Radicals in Serbia proper has promised that should Kosovo receive independence, his party will “see that it lasts as short as possible.” But Kostunica and Tadic, compelled to be more realistic because of their established positions in power and the resulting necessity to accommodate reality, have ruled out use of force to retain Kosovo.

The coming months will show whether the calmer heads will prevail. There are possibilities for violence by fearful Kosovo Serbs who do not wish to live under Albanian rule. The head of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo has threatened that imposition of the final status plan would destabilize the entire Balkan region. Albanians who are frustrated with what they consider a tentative, partial step toward independence could also foment unrest.

On the other hand, Kosovo’s Albanian political leaders at present seem to be united in the desire to go along with Ahtisaari’s proposal and take it as far as they can go toward independence. Agim Ceku, former guerrilla leader and Kosovo’s current prime minister, declared that Kosovo would become an independent state.

Final negotiations between Albanian and Serbian representatives to tweak Ahtisaari’s proposal should conclude by early March, though there is no promise that they will be any more fruitful than last year’s talks. Prior to the Feb. 21 opening of final talks, the Serbian parliament overwhelmingly voted to reject the proposal. Going into the negotiations, Ahtisaari predicted a stalemate, saying, “I have my doubts and I do not believe in miracles.”

Ahtisaari intends to present his proposal to the U.N. Security Council by April, where Western governments will probably find a way to push it through. The Security Council does not have the power to create a new country, but with the annulment of Resolution 1244 Kosovo will be free to declare independence—in which case it is most likely that the majority of the world will recognize Kosovo’s statehood.

With Kosovo’s economy stagnant and unemployment estimated at between 35 and 50 percent, an independence that leads to political stability would be good news for the province, as it would be likely to encourage an influx of foreign investment. This, together with new development aid, would spur economic improvement and prosperity for the first time in many years. But first, the fractious population of Kosovo will have to show that it can live in peace.

Peter Lippman is an independent human rights activist based in Seattle.