Obstacles and Optimism as Turkey Embarks on EU Accession Talks

By Jon Gorvett

For many Turks this year, Ramadan started in a more celebratory mood than usual, as news came that European Union accession talks finally had begun—46 years after Turkey first applied.

“Thanks be to God,” Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said as he boarded the plane to Luxembourg to meet his 25 waiting EU opposite numbers, anxious to start accession talks with Turkey before a midnight Oct. 3 deadline. The next day, at dusk, the Ramadan fast began.

Yet such a collocation of Islamic references would probably come as deeply alarming to many in Europe.

Gul’s “ilhamdul-il-allah” and statement that “God has spoken” resonated particularly frighteningly among some of those who had opposed Turkey’s EU path—even if many of those also were members of religiously denominated parties themselves, such as Germany’s Christian Democrats. According to a BBC poll, only Hungary had anything like a majority in favor of Turkey joining, while many EU countries recorded strong opposition to the whole idea.

Yet meanwhile, back in Ankara and Istanbul, there were also some searching questions to be asked about just how popular EU membership is now among ordinary Turks themselves.

A poll back in the summer by local Turkish papers showed support for membership at just 57 percent, a huge decline from the figures regularly returned in previous years. Throughout the 1990s and early 21st century, support hovered comfortably around 70-80 percent. Aside from the far left and right, the desirability of EU membership seemed to be the one thing on which most Turks could agree.

Was this just a case of pre-wedding nerves? The metaphor of marriage was used extensively by many an exhausted newspaper columnist reporting the talks, with some unclear just who was giving away whom, while others fought bitterly over the size of the dowry—and just who should be invited to the reception.

Certainly, regarding the latter, the Greek Cypriots were difficult guests for many in Ankara to contemplate. Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus, which it sees as a Greek Cypriot institution unjustly masquerading as the representative of the whole island. Instead, Turkey recognizes the otherwise internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), where most of the island’s Turkish Cypriots live.

The Greek Cypriots now are represented on all EU bodies.

This created a major problem, however, when the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU in May 2004. The Greek Cypriots now are represented on all EU bodies and will have a crucial say in the progress of Turkey’s own EU accession. In particular, Turkey had to include the Republic in the terms of its customs union with the EU, meaning that there should be no barrier to the flow of goods and services between the two states.

Yet Turkey refuses to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot-registered shipping, or ships that have last called at a Greek Cypriot port. This, Ankara argues, is in response to the embargo brought in by the Greek Cypriots after 1974—which is observed by all other states—banning ships that have used Turkish Cypriot ports. Now, however, as accession talks begin, there is much talk in Nicosia and Limassol of fitting out a freighter and sending it to a Turkish port in order to provoke a response. Would the Turks stop the boat, fire across its bow—or let it through? Others suggest a Chinese-flagged vessel might, come November, try and do the same thing, having just called at a Greek Cypriot port.

Clearly this potential nightmare also has occurred to Ankara. Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan appeared to make some conciliatory remarks on this score a week after Oct. 3, saying that he would open Turkish ports if the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots was “eased.” Many see this as a request for some kind of face-saver, however, as opening the ports would be a difficult move to sell politically back in Turkey.

There are plenty of ways in which such an easing could occur. Currently, some 250 million euros of EU aid to the Turkish Cypriots—promised after the last U.N. referendum on reunification was approved by the Turkish Cypriots and rejected by the Greeks—is being held up in Brussels by Greek Cypriot objections. There is also an embargo against direct flights to the TRNC, along with direct sailings—produce bound for the TRNC currently must go first through a Turkish port, then be re-exported.

Yet much of this would rely on the Republic of Cyprus leadership allowing such a move. Since it is by no means clear whether the current leadership would be inclined to do this, once again the Cyprus issue is likely to require some forceful arm-twisting from the EU’s Great Powers if the issue is not to very rapidly derail Turkey’s accession talks.

Cyprus is not the only fruit, however. There are also a number of major domestic Turkish issues that are likely to be major obstacles to EU membership.

Number one of these is agriculture. Some 40 percent of Turkey’s population still works on the land, most of them on small holdings and under-mechanized cooperatives. A system of price supports and import barriers has long given them some protection from the ravages of the world market. These are gradually being removed as part of the country’s International Monetary Fund-backed economic restructuring program, but the nightmare in Brussels is that, even so, how will such a large population be brought into the already-creaky Common Agricultural Policy? While a country such as Poland also had a large agricultural community, the overall population numbers were smaller—Turkey’s population currently is 70 million, and with 26 percent of the population under 15 years of age, this is set to boom over the next decade or two.

Then there is the environment. EU regulations require a huge investment by Turkish private sector firms in improving their environmental standards. While the EU will grant some money for pre-accession changes, this will likely be only around 10 percent of what most analysts figure is necessary for Turkish companies to come up to scratch. Where the remaining money will come from remains highly unclear.

Then there is the property issue. In Istanbul, the once large Greek and Armenian communities protest that much of their people’s real estate has been swallowed up by the state over the years, and claims for some form of restitution are likely to start flowing once the accession talks get under way. Demands for the reopening of closed Orthodox religious seminaries, such as that on Heybeliyada Island off Istanbul, are also sometimes put in this context.

Foreign policy is another complication. Turkey’s commitments to the European Neighborhood Policy mean normalizing relations with all the countries surrounding it—a policy with particular relevance to Greece, with whom Turkey still has outstanding disputes over Aegean Sea air and sea limits, and Armenia, with whom Turkey has a border closed by the Turks in response to Armenia’s conflict over Nagorna Kharabakh with Turkish ally Azerbaijan.

The Optimists’ Argument

Yet, optimists argue, however awesome these issues may be, resolving them is not impossible—and, indeed, there are already indications that a serious attempt is being made to address them.

In late September, Turkey held its first-ever conference on the 1915 Armenian genocide, which, while protested by radical nationalists, nonetheless received official backing from the government itself. At the same time, the government has made positive noises on the Heybeliada seminary. Meanwhile, despite the rhetoric, in many ways the Cyprus issue continues to resolve itself, as trade and movement between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot sides of the island is nowadays basically unfettered, and the “land restitution” issue gets solved by main street real estate brokers, if not by governments.

As for agriculture, that will be politically painful for the government, but the overall demographic trend is encouraging. Ten years ago, some 60 percent of the population worked on the land. A decade from now—and no one thinks the accession talks will go any faster than that—it may not be such a major issue as people now think. As for the environment, the time issue is also important, as standards will not have to be improved overnight.

At the same time, there is also a long list of things on the upside about Turkey’s accession. Not the least is that it strengthens the hand of those pushing for more reform and democratization in the country. It is also positive for the EU’s stock in the Muslim world, and in other border regions such as Ukraine and the Caucasus. After all, perhaps the only really effective foreign policy instrument the EU has is the promise that if you follow its rules, one day you, too, can join. With Turkey at the accession table, the game of reform, in other words, is still on.

Jon Gorvett is a free-lance writer based in Istanbul.

SIDEBAR

Cyprus Reaches Out By Republic of Cyprus Ambassador Euripides L. Evriviades

Since last December’s European Council meeting in Brussels, when Cyprus joined its European partners in offering Turkey a specific date for the commencement of EU accession negotiations, I have been asked time and again if my country regretted that decision and whether Cyprus would stay the course. I am frequently asked, “Why not block Turkey?”

There are many reasons that could have forced Cyprus to exercise its veto against the commencement of Turkey’s EU accession talks. Turkey continues to maintain more than 35,000 troops in a hostile occupation of more than one-third of my country’s territory with all the human-rights violations associated with it. Turkey constantly blocks Cyprus’s membership in a wide range of international organizations. And Ankara still refuses to allow our ships to berth in its ports or our airplanes to land in or overfly its territory.

Since the December 2004 decision, the relationship between Cyprus and Turkey has, unfortunately, continued on its rocky course. Just recently, Turkey disclaimed any recognition of Cyprus. More specifically, on July 29, 2005, when the Turkish government signed a protocol expanding the Ankara Agreement (providing for a customs union) to cover all the EU members, it simultaneously issued a provocative declaration that said that it does not recognize Cyprus, showing clearly that it has no intention of implementing the accord.

Turkey’s attempt to unilaterally modify the terms of its accession forced the European Union to issue a counterstatement reiterating that, “Recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process,” and flatly saying of Turkey, “Failure to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the negotiations.” Just last month, the prime minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said that he would only accept a solution leading to the permanent division of Cyprus. “One state in the north, one state in the south and a confederation...this is what [Cyprus President] Papadopoulos should accept, otherwise we cannot reach an agreement,” Mr. Erdogan stated.

Because of these and a host of other provocations, some have suggested that Cyprus should abandon its decision to support Turkey’s bid for accession.

But notwithstanding these provocations, Cyprus this week chose to stay the course toward a peaceful solution to the division of Cyprus based on the rule of law. My country extended once again the hand of friendship to Turkey.

Eight days ago, the EU ratified its decision to begin accession talks with Turkey. The 25 EU member states—including Cyprus—agreed on a “negotiation framework” for Turkey’s accession. Cyprus’ reasons for continuing on its course remain the same as they were last year.

First, the prospect of EU membership is important to Turkey’s development and can potentially foster a more secure and economically robust Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Second, Cyprus shares the view of its allies—our European partners, as well as the United States and Canada—regarding the benefits of Turkey joining the EU. And perhaps most importantly, Cyprus supported Turkey’s bid because its accession process continues to offer the most promising path to resolving the longstanding division of my country.

The EU accession process that Turkey will now undertake requires the resolution of outstanding issues, including the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, the normalization of bilateral relations between the two countries and the removal of all Turkish occupying troops from Cyprus. It is simply inconsistent with the values that bind EU partners for an acceding EU country to have an occupying force in the territory of another and to fail to recognize its sovereignty.

Cyprus’s positive decision on Monday demonstrates what my government has long said: All Cypriots, whether of Greek or Turkish ancestry, strive for a genuine reunification of the island on the right terms. The government of Cyprus has been taking steps to integrate the two communities. Eight million incident-free visits have taken place across the shameful line that divides our country. We look forward to the day that all the people of Cyprus are reunited and living under a bizonal, bicommunal federal solution.

Cyprus had many issues to look past when deciding twice in favor of Turkey’s EU bid. But we are committed to reaching out to Turkey in constructive ways. It is now Turkey’s turn to prove that it takes its commitments seriously by fully complying with EU requirements.

Euripides L. Evriviades has been the ambassador of Cyprus to the United States since 2003. This op-ed first appeared in The Washington Times Oct. 11, 2005. Reprinted with permission.