Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January-February 2009, pages 31, 49

Special Report

To the Detriment of Its Citizens, Bosnia’s Politicians Continue to Play Nationalist Cards

By Peter Lippman

	Against a background showing the red, blue and white colors of the Republika Srpska, a campaign poster in the Serb-controlled city of Prijedor reads, “Decisively for Srpska!” and (at bottom left) “A Promise Is a Promise” (Photo P. Lippman).

IN EARLY October, rumors circulated around Bosnia that the international community’s supervisor, or High Representative, in Bosnia was going to remove Milorad Dodik. This rumor surfaced amid a spike in the waves of tension that had begun during the run-up to Oct. 5, 2008 nationwide municipal elections.

Dodik, who is prime minister of the Serb-controlled Republika Srpska (one of Bosnia’s two “entities,” along with the Croat- and Muslim-controlled Federation), went into those elections as Bosnia-Herzegovina’s most powerful politician, and came out even stronger. Although his own seat was not contested, Dodik’s party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), was involved in dozens of municipal elections throughout the Republika Srpska (RS). Winning handily in a majority of races, its victories constituted a vote of confidence among Bosnian Serbs in the policies of Dodik and SNSD.

The nationalist card which Dodik plays keeps his fellow Serbs lined up behind him—and encourages a similar nationalist demagoguery among the leaders of the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Croats. By no means is he the only politician responsible for Bosnia’s ethnic polarization. Indeed, Dodik would not be able to operate so successfully without the de facto collaboration of his “best enemy” (as Bosnian commentators like to call him), Haris Silajdzic. In recent months, Silajdzic has constantly furnished provocative statements that the nationalist Serbs can use as ammunition in their rhetorical war.

The conflict between Bosnia’s nationalist leaders escalated after Silajdzic, the Bosniak member of the country’s three-part presidency, gave a speech before the United Nations late in September. There, he called on the U.N. to “reverse the recognition of the Republika Srpska,” which he described as a “genocidal creation.”

This speech, and a similar one Silajdzic subsequently gave before the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, caused an outcry from Dodik and his spokesmen. Always quick to respond to any perceived call to abolish the Republika Srpska, Dodik’s followers voiced their oft-repeated threat to call a referendum, to be held in the RS only, on the question of secession from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This back-and-forth verbal warfare was of great use to the nationalist parties during the election campaign. It worked to reinforce the voters’ perception that they could only identify as members of one ethnicity or another, rather than as citizens with common interests. As such, they could vote only for the candidates who said that they held their constituents’ “national interests” at heart—even though what the definition of a “national interest” is, and why it always takes precedence over the needs of all citizens for stability and economic recovery, have never been clarified.

Post-Election Rhetoric

The rhetoric continued even after the election results were tallied. It was at this point that the rumors of Dodik’s impending removal—and possibly that of Silajdzic as well—surfaced. Dodik then announced that if he were removed by the U.N.’s Office of the High Representative (OHR), he would call the Republika Srpska parliament into session outside of the RS government building. He outlined a scenario wherein the RS parliament would “suspend all laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina,” and he would then create a “non-governmental organization,” which would lead the RS to independence. “If someone wants to play,” Dodik warned, “let them play.”

In the background of this entire drama hangs the question of Bosnia’s eventual admission to the European Union. In order to be eligible for EU membership, Bosnia must implement a large number of reforms that will rationalize its state functions. One of the major reforms called for is increased centralization of the state, so that decision-making powers do not primarily reside in the two entities. Dodik has been resisting this trend, working actively to restore competencies that were removed from the RS and given to the central government. This gives the impression that Dodik is indeed working toward independence for his para-state.

This writer has been told by people who are involved in Bosnian politics that Dodik is sincere about the secession option. But he must know that no government in the region—not even Belgrade at this point—would recognize the RS as an independent state. The trend in the region is toward cooperation with the EU, and unification, rather than opposition and polarization.

So what does Dodik want, besides using nationalist incitement to garner support among his constituency? A recent investigation of crooked privatization and suspiciously funded building projects, in which Dodik is involved, could point to the answer. The SNSD leader’s participation in illicit dealings is secret to no one in Bosnia. Given this, his proven tactic of side-tracking and confounding domestic rivals and international officials alike makes sense, as a way to evade prosecution and to maintain control of his own position. So far, Dodik’s continuous maneuvering to establish de facto sovereignty in the RS has proven to be effective.

However, in a surprise “turnaround” during this period of heightened tension, a recent meeting between Dodik and top Croat and Bosniak leaders Dragan Covic and Sulejman Tihic led to a compromise agreement to move forward on certain constitutional reforms. Officials from the international community greeted this as an unparalleled step to break the logjam preventing progress toward Bosnia’s accession to the EU—but Haris Silajdzic vowed to oppose the agreement.

As is often the case, Silajdzic probably is correct in observing that the compromise is a veiled maneuver to cement Dodik’s power. And, also as usual, Silajdzic lacks any practical counter-proposal.

Given the repetitive spectacle of high-level political manipulation that never improves the lives of ordinary Bosnians or moves Bosnia closer to European Union membership, what happened next was no surprise. At the end of November the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the international body that oversees the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement, met to discuss developments in Bosnia and to consider its next moves. An important step in Bosnian accession to the EU involves abolition of the OHR in favor of a similar, but less powerful, European supervisory body. At its November meeting, however, the PIC decided to delay the abolition of the OHR, probably at least through 2009. It simply is too soon for the international community to leave Bosnia to drift along a rudderless course.

Unfortunately for Bosnia, the international officials involved suffer from the same lack of effective practical solutions as does Haris Silajdzic.

Peter Lippman is an independent human rights activist based in Seattle.