Do Arms Cutback, Description of Israel as “Terrorist State” Signal Change in Ankara?

By Jon Gorvett

With Turkey’s prime minister reportedly declaring Israel a “terrorist state” and Foreign Ministry chiefs in Ankara mulling over whether to recall their ambassador to Tel Aviv, May seemed to be a bad month for Turkish-Israeli friendship. A major cutback in Ankara’s arms procurement plans also seemed to hit Israel’s hopes of modernizing Turkey’s army—yet may have cast more light on the continuing tensions between Turkey’s government and its powerful military.

Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan reportedly made his remarks during a May 25 meeting in Ankara with Israeli Infrastructure Minister Joseph Paritsky, who told reporters afterward that he had been “astonished” by the Turkish leader’s comment.

But the following day, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul appeared to follow up by suggesting that Turkey might recall its ambassador in Tel Aviv “for consultations,” while boosting its representation with the Palestinian Authority by appointing a diplomat with ambassador status to Turkey’s consulate in Jerusalem.

Erdogan then backed up his earlier comments, telling the Israeli paper Haaretz on June 3 that the Sharon government’s actions agains the Palestinians constituted “state terrorism.” This was despite a stern rebuke from the Israeli Foreign Ministry for his earlier remarks.

With nightly portrayals of Israeli brutality in Gaza and the West Bank showing on Turkish TV screens, such moves by the government undoubtedly strike a major chord with Turkish public opinion.

Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has pro-Islamist roots, is also more keenly aware than many parties that the close ties forged over the years between Israel and Turkey rest uneasily in the minds of Turkish voters.

As a result, the AKP has tried publicly to disassociate itself from Israel as much as possible. Recently, this was demonstrated by the water issue. Ankara has continuously postponed longstanding plans to supply Israel with fresh water from Turkey’s Manavgat River—despite repeated claims from Israel that a deal has been agreed to.

In this, however, Erdogan’s government is none too different from previous Turkish administrations. All recent governments in Ankara have felt uneasy about the relationship with Israel.

“They’ve all denounced Israel at some point or other,” noted Ferhat Erkmen, a Middle Eastern analyst with the Ankara-based policy think tank, AVSAM. “But then they don’t really do very much,” he added. “Any actions they do take aren’t designed to have any real effect.”

Most analysts see something similar this time. As an example, the meeting at which Erdogan made his denunciation also saw the signing of an $800 million deal between Israel’s Dorad Energies and Turkey’s Zorlu Holding for the construction of three natural gas power stations in Israel.

The close ties forged over the years between Israel and Turkey rest uneasily in the minds of Turkish voters.

Behind much of this relationship lies the fact that Turkey long has eyed its Arab neighbors with suspicion. In the past, it has with some justification accused countries such as Syria of supporting Turkey’s Kurdish separatist guerrillas. Ankara also has disputes over water with both Damascus and, in the past, Baghdad. Iran also long has been seen as a source of extreme Islamist influence and as a rival in the Caucasus. All this has made Israel a natural regional ally for Turkey.

The question now, however, is whether all this is changing. Certainly, one event during May seems to indicate that it is. This was the dramatic slashing of Turkey’s military procurement budget.

This $11 billion scheme to modernize the country’s armed forces originally had included a planned purchase of 1,000 Main Battle Tanks and 145 attack helicopters. Russian, U.S., German and Israeli firms competed in bidding for these. AWACS airborne surveillance aircraft and eight submarines also were listed, although the military did eventually drop plans for several aircraft carriers.

But this enormous arms program met its Waterloo mid-May in the form of the Justice and Development Party government, which had earlier passed constitutional amendments requiring—for the first time ever—that the military account for its budget. The government announced that the procurement had been slashed down to $5 billion, with only 250 tanks and 50 attack helicopters up for bid. The AWACS and submarine plans also were reportedly under review.

Of two widely drawn conclusions, the first was that this was evidence of a major rethinking of the country’s strategic situation. Traditionally, Turkey has seen every country with which it has borders as a potential aggressor. Yet now, this position has grown quite untenable. The collapse of the Soviet Union, rapprochement with Greece, Syria’s efforts to mend fences with Ankara, Iran’s internal weaknesses and the collapse of the Saddam regime have left Turkey with no conceivable threats on its frontiers. It is hard to think of any other time in Turkey’s history when this has been true.

Under these changed circumstances—or, more specifically, given the fact that these changed circumstances finally have been recognized—the government also may be reconsidering how much it really needs its Israeli alliance.

Neighborly Overtures

Already, Ankara has been attempting to make overtures to its Arab neighbors, with major diplomatic initiatives undertaken both prior to and after the invasion of Iraq last year. So far, these have been fairly fruitless—yet for many the perception is that this is the direction in which the government would like to go, if only the Arab states would respond in the way Ankara would wish.

The other conclusion drawn from the military cutbacks was that the government once again was flexing its political muscles against the politically powerful generals. In this, the timing of the announcement was significant, coming a few days after the military had hit out at government plans to introduce a new education law.

The proposed law would have ended discrimination against graduates from religious high schools in the country’s university entrance exams. While this may seem a minor adjustment, it was widely interpreted as a major challenge to the nature of Turkey’s secular state. It also prompted a stern warning from the generals.

“Circles and institutions which are undoubtedly loyal to the basic characteristics of the Republic should not be expected to adopt this draft [law],” read an early May statement from the General Staff.

The statement caused a slump in Turkey’s currency and stock markets, with university rectors protesting that the law would lead to the country’s campuses being flooded with religiously minded students.

The bill was, however, passed by parliament—but then vetoed by the president. In the meantime, the government had come eyeball-to-eyeball with the military, a position both have been at pains to avoid until now. As June began, Erdogan signaled that he would go no further with the issue for now, but would return to it in the fall.

Many things have changed since the last time a government and the military clashed over education. That was back in 1997, when the religious high schools became a trigger for that year’s “soft coup.” Back then, the AKP’s pro-Islamist predecessor, the Welfare Party, had been ejected from office in a military-organized political coup.

Few expected anything similar this time around, although education remains a crucial “line in the sand” for the country’s secularists. On this issue—as with many others—it may well be that by the time it is returned to, additional reforms will have further weakened the military and establishment base. This may be good news for Turkey’s European Union membership bid—but also may be bad news for the long-term outlook of Turkish-Israeli relations.

Jon Gorvett is a free-lance journalist bassed in Istanbul.