Bosnian Crisis and Resolution: A Turn-around At Last, or More Chaos Ahead?

By Peter Lippman


	As Bosnia’s three rotating presidents (at rear, l-r) Zeljko Komsic, Haris Silajdzic and Nebojsa Radmanovic) watch, EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn (seated l) and Nikola Spiric, chairman of Bosnia’s central government, initial a Stabilization and Association Agreement in Sarajevo, Dec. 4, 2007 (AFP photo Elvis Barukcic).

IN THE COURSE of its post-war struggle to become a functioning state, Bosnia has lurched from one governmental crisis to the next. The most recent chaotic episode, which took place last October and November, was the most wrenching crisis since the 1995 signing of the Dayton peace agreement. It ended unexpectedly—and, perhaps, happily—with the opposing sides backing down, and with international officials approving the initialing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), a first step toward eventual Bosnian accession to European Union membership. However, it remains to be seen how much this seemingly positive development is merely a virtual event, and how much it can lead to improvement in the lives of ordinary Bosnians.

More than 12 years after the end of the war, Bosnia remains near the bottom of European countries in income, production, employment and various other indices of well-being. Straightening out this economic mess is not the top priority of the country’s domestic leaders, and international officials in the Dayton-established Office of the High Representative (OHR), charged with steering the country toward statehood, appear at a loss to make effective changes.

The legal culprit in this muddle is the Dayton constitution, which recognized the wartime division of Bosnia into ethnic enclaves, and legalized the establishment of two “entities,” the Serb-controlled Republika Srpska (RS) and the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim)- and Croat-controlled Federation. Ever since then, Bosnia’s political functions have been implemented along separatist lines, corralling voters together in ethnic groupings rather than allowing them to act and vote across ethnic lines, as citizens with common interests. The war created this situation; the international community sanctioned it in order to stop the war; and Bosnian politicians, predominantly leftover wartime leaders or their ideological descendents, work overtime to maintain their artificially created constituencies. It is, after all, the only way they have of staying in power.

Dayton was designed to end the war—but not to create the peace. The result of the frozen war-drawn lines of separation has been political and economic stagnation, a situation where high officials of Bosnia have constantly worked against actual statehood for their country, favoring the de facto statehood of the entities.

The OHR is presently being led by its sixth High Representative, Slovak diplomat Miroslav Lajcak. Over time, the OHR has tried various strategies—sometimes stricter, other times more lenient—to push Bosnia’s leaders into strengthening the central powers of the state. In recent years this pressure has taken the form of the transferral of certain competencies to the state level—the greatest accomplishment along these lines being the 2004 consolidation of one Bosnian army, where there previously had been three separate forces.

The ultimate goal is for Bosnia to become a functioning state whose resulting stability will attract foreign investments and allow citizens to thrive. With Bosnia’s laws conforming to European standards and its leaders cooperating with each other, the OHR should be able to disband and go home, and Bosnia should be able to move closer to EU accession, as all its ex-Yugoslav neighbor republics are doing. But significant hurdles remain, the most significant one being the establishment of a state-level police directorate coordinating police functions for the entire country. To date, efforts to centralize the police have resulted in spectacular failure.

After a measure to introduce sweeping changes to the Dayton constitution was narrowly defeated in spring 2006, further discussions on centralization were delayed until well into 2007. When a renewed attempt to consolidate police functions was in the works last September, High Representative Lajcak warned that there would be “consequences” if the initiative failed. He did not specify what these might be, but earlier High Representatives had, on various occasions, removed uncooperative officials by the dozens, including several entity- and state-level presidents.

Upon yet another defeat of police reform measures, in mid-October Lajcak introduced procedural reforms streamlining parliamentary and ministerial voting processes, and giving the relevant bodies until Dec. 1 to pass the reforms; otherwise, he said, he would decree them law. The proposed new measures simplified the quotas needed to vote on any law, effectively nullifying any representative’s power to blockade governmental functions by boycotting meetings. This tactic had been particularly popular among Serb politicians, who used it to block progress on any reform they felt would weaken the autonomy of the Republika Srpska. Lajcak’s reforms did not revoke the Serb officials’ power to represent their constituency, but simply prevented them exercising that power if they boycotted meetings, clearing away a means of obstructing the central government’s functions.

Lajcak’s move precipitated what came to be called the “worst crisis since Dayton,” with the Serb prime minister at the state level resigning in protest, and other Serb officials all the way up to Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik threatening to resign as well.

Tensions heightened throughout November, with officials from neighboring Serbia expressing verbal support of Dodik; the Bosniak state-level president responding belligerently to this stance; Russian ambassadors criticizing the OHR as “anti-democratic”; local commentators calling this the “end times” for Bosnia; and ordinary Bosnians looking for their passports. With nearby Kosovo moving toward secession from Serbia and a unilateral declaration of independence, officials in the Republika Srpska found ways to hint at a referendum for secession of that entity, although this is prohibited by Dayton.

A tense atmosphere suggesting war prevailed. However, in a surprise turnaround just before Lajcak’s Dec. 1 deadline, the opposing sides softened their positions and arrived at a compromise. The OHR provided assurances that Serb officials would not be outvoted, and the Serb representatives consented to the quota reforms. In retrospect, the entire controversy was one dramatic way of playing out tensions between an uncooperative Serb-controlled entity that ultimately wishes to secede, and a relatively new and assertive High Representative determined to see progress in the creation of a functioning Bosnian state.

Another encouraging development was in store. Immediately upon resolution of the crisis, the European Union Enlargement Commission approved the initialing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement for Bosnia, the last post-Yugoslav country to thus enter the foyer of the EU. The initialing was approved on the basis of an “action plan” drafted by Bosnia’s leading parties in the fall of 2007, an agreement that could point the way toward a compromise on police reform. The EU Commission, apparently hoping to encourage Bosnian leaders after their recent brush with chaos, chose to view this agreement as sufficient progress on reform. But the real work remains to be done. Currently, Bosnian officials are predicting success in this project by mid-February, whereupon the SAA could be signed by springtime.

The year 2007 thus ended on a positive note for Bosnia—at least in the declarative realm. On the other hand, the crisis and denouement did not result in the hiring of more workers, an increase in pensions, or a decrease in soaring food prices. And obstreperous domestic officials—not only the Serbs—remain defiant of each other.

Meanwhile, the movement toward independence in Kosovo could re-ignite instability in Bosnia. The coming months will be a fateful time for this country.

Peter Lippman is an independent human rights activist based in Seattle.