Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May 2004, pages
13, 94
Special Report
Israel’s Failed Assassination Attempt on U.S.
Ambassador Documented
By Andrew I. KillgoreHad Mossad, Israel’s secret intelligence organization, succeeded,
it would have been the perfect crime—the crime of the century. The
plan was breathtaking in concept: to assassinate the American ambassador
to Lebanon, in Lebanon, with American weapons, intended for Israeli’s
defense only. Everything about it would point to Lebanon as the culprit.
But fate intervened, and things went wrong. The tires on Ambassador
John Gunther Dean’s limousine automatically reinflated when they
were shot out in 1979 (see November 2002 Washington Report, p.
15). The light tank shell simply bounced off the car’s armor. And,
horror of horrors, Lebanese intelligence had retrieved the empty
shell casing on which was written, “Made in the United States of
America.”
Mossad’s specialty was dirty tricks, even if (or perhaps because)
it was not very good as an intelligence organization. Its modus
operandi had always been the same: pull off a dirty trick but
make it appear somebody else had done it. An early example was
the Lavon Affair, named for Pinhas Lavon, Israel’s minister of
defense back in 1953. This Mossad operation persuaded some Jewish
men in Egypt to burn U.S. Information Service libraries on the
assumption that Egyptian President Jamal Abdul Nasser would be
blamed. But one of the incendiary devices went off prematurely,
and the young spies were caught. Some of them were executed. This
provoked a scandal in Israel, and in the ensuing investigation
it eventually turned out that Lavon’s signature authorizing the
operation had been forged at the behest of Prime Minister David
Ben-Gurion. A dirty trick within a dirty trick!
Then came the June 8, 1967 attack on the USS Liberty,
killing 34 Americans and wounding 171. Perpetrated by the Israeli
air force and navy, this was not a Mossad operation, but it was
suffused by the same spirit of stealth and trickery. During the
Arab-Israeli war of 1967, unmarked Israeli jets raked the all-but-unarmed
spy ship Liberty, steaming slowly off Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula,
with napalm and machine gunfire.
The Liberty was flying a large American flag, and the
ship’s designation, in English, was clearly visible on a cloudless
day. But Israel said it thought it was attacking an Egyptian transport
ship. Israel pleaded “a tragic accident” and still pleads that
miserable lie today.
Now, thanks to Ambassador John Gunther Dean, the full taste of
Mossad’s evil will be available at former President Jimmy Carter’s
Presidential Library in Atlanta, Georgia. A part of the National
Archives, the Carter Center will contain 42 files on Dean’s service
as ambassador to Lebanon. The overwhelming majority of the material
is unclassified and thus readily available to researchers, scholars
and journalists.
The Dean papers—which include documents, messages, reports and
telegrams—constitute hard evidence on the stultifying influence
of the Israeli lobby as Dean tried to get answers from the Department
of State on the Israeli assassination failure. Nobody was willing
to talk with him because the subject was just too “sensitive.”
The papers include documentation of efforts by the Palestinians
to help the U.S. with the American hostages in Iran. They demonstrate
that, unlike today, the United States administration considered
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) “valid interlocutors” in
the search for a negotiated settlement of the Palestine-Israel
conflict. In fact, PLO leader Yasser Arafat and an assistant made
a special visit to Iran, where they succeeded in gaining the immediate
freedom of several of the American diplomatic hostages. Arafat
performed a real favor for the United States for which he never
received any thanks—perhaps because, once again, it would have
been too “sensitive.”
By June 2004 all other papers in Dean’s possession will be housed
in the National Archives. Among the information they will contain
will be the role of certain congressmen with respect to nuclear
proliferation. Some of the American legislators struck Dean as
motivated more by fear of Pakistan obtaining “the Islamic bomb” than
they were by defending U.S. policy of preventing the proliferation
of arms.
Andrew I. Killgore, a retired foreign service officer and
former U.S. ambassador to Qatar, is publisher of the Washington
Report. |