Conviction of Balinese Bomber Amrozi Recalls Rabin Assassin Yigal Amir

By John Gee

Amrozi Nurhasyim, the first of the Bali bombers to be captured and tried, was convicted for his role in the murder of 202 people and sentenced to death on Aug. 7. It is not certain, however, when or even if he will face a firing squad: it is not uncommon for Indonesians convicted of offenses carrying capital punishment to wait a decade and more before being executed. Amrozi is reported to welcome the prospect of "martyrdom," but years spent cooling his heels in prison while the world moves on may take away its appeal.

Amrozi wore an inane grin when he was first paraded in front of the press, and he was wearing the same grin when he was sentenced to death. His look was reminiscent of that on the face of another killer half a world away: Yigal Amir, the law student who assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on Nov. 4, 1995, also wore a silly grin during his public appearances following his arrest. But more than an expression links the two men. Though coming from different religious backgrounds, they are united by an outlook. The grin comes from their absolute assurance that they are right and that they have their vindication in their professed religious belief. Amir could disregard the civil law of the State of Israel and kill its political leader because he believed that Jewish religious law has a higher value and that it mandated that Rabin should be killed because he endangered Jewish lives. Amrozi and his co-conspirators think that Islamic law takes precedence over that of the Indonesian state and that it obliges them to murder those they perceive as enemies in furtherance of a higher good.

In both cases, the killers were nurtured in an artificial environment of religious extremism, comparable to that of cults that do all they can to ensure that the minds of their devotees are monopolized by their prescribed views. Amir was educated in Israel's religious school system and attended the religious Bar Ilan University. These are breeding places of extreme nationalism, with a religious coloring. From this environment sprang the rabbis who gave the religious opinion that Rabin and Peres were deserving of the fate of a rodef (one pursuing Jews) or a moser (one who hands over Jews to non-Jews), upon which Amir based his claim to religious support. His closest companions were West Bank settlers and their supporters. As a young man, Amrozi's main interests were girls and his motorbike, but he later became religious.

That much is not unusual in Indonesia, but Amrozi attended a Javanese religious school established by Abu Bakar Bashir, now accused of being the intellectual leader of the Jemaah Islamiah terrorist group. From there, he went to Ulu Tiram in Malaysia from 1992 to 1995, taking Qur'an classes conducted by Bashir, who had fled Indonesia. Upon his return home, Amrozi chose to associate largely with people who shared his newfound extremist perspective.

It is not known whether Amrozi shares Amir's delusion that his action had the overwhelming support of public opinion in his country, and that he was striking a blow for them, as well as for God, but he certainly partakes of Amir's belief that he will inspire others: "I'll be happy to die a martyr," he said when facing judgment. "After me, there will be a million more Amrozis."

But he's wrong. While there will be those who choose to imitate him, the overall impact of the Bali bombing and a number of other attacks ascribed to the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) network in recent months has undermined the organization's goal of establishing an Islamic state in the predominantly Muslim areas of Southeast Asia (Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, southern Thailand, and the southern Philippines).

The uncovering of the network and its ties to al-Qaeda encouraged greater regional co-operation between the security forces of the states in the region. The biggest change occured in Indonesia, where the government long had denied that a JI terrorist network existed, leaving its supporters to recruit and train with impunity. The Bali blast led to an abrupt about-face, with anti-terrorist legislation rushed through and a determined police drive to round up the perpetrators and their associates.

More significantly for the long term, the Indonesian authorities' moves were made in the context of widespread public condemnation of the Bali bombing and other JI attacks. All the major Muslim organizations in the country, as well as non-religious bodies and parties, condemned them. Among activists who have pushed for wider application of Islamic law, there is a feeling that their cause has been harmed: even though they are not organizationally tied to the JI terrorist network, there is a "guilt by association" effect.

The Aug. 5 bomb attack on the Jakarta Marriott merely emphasized the division between the JI and the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims. There was speculation in the media that the attack was timed to come just before the verdict on Amrozi was delivered, as a pre-emptive retaliatory action. On the face of it, this was a blow against a symbol of U.S. global business power, but of the 10 people confirmed as having been killed in the blast, nine were poor Indonesians. Four were taxi-drivers, waiting to pick up fares: each had young children to support. Others were incapacitated by injury.

The Indonesian economy had been performing well in the months leading up to the bombing—although quite why is something of a mystery. Following the Jakarta Marriott attack, there were fears that an economic setback would ensue, which also would fall hardest upon Indonesia's poor.

Amrozi might yet have the grin wiped off his face when he sees how the actions he and his associates have carried out backfire and lead to them being isolated and defeated. Amir, unfortunately, still has plenty to smile about: the settlers whose cause he espoused still sit upon occupied Palestinian land, their interests defended by a government composed mainly of political leaders who could not stomach the limited concessions Rabin made to the Palestinians while he was alive. Meanwhile, Israel's chief supporter—Washington—has yet to show that it is ready to put decisive pressure upon the Jewish state to withdraw—in contrast to the attitude it showed toward Indonesia when its government was still dilly-dallying over combatting terrorists organizing within its borders.

An East Asian Casualty

The war on Iraq has had many consequences that its architects and supporters did not anticipate. By pushing for international backing for the war in the teeth of public opposition, the Bush and Blair administrations widened breeches in many countries between democratically elected governments and citizens sick of unaccountable politicians who do what they choose irrespective of their peoples' will. American neoconservatives, who supposedly favor democratization worldwide, thus pursued a course in furtherance of their goals in Iraq which encouraged disenchantment with the process of democratic government in places where it already exists.

In East Asia, one consequence of the war has been the subversion of the Japanese constitution. It was adopted when Japan was still under U.S. occupation following the Second World War. Article IX renounced war as a "sovereign right of the nation" and pledged that Japan would never maintain "land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential." The intention was to reassure other countries—not least neighboring Korea and China—that Japan had turned its back on the militarism which had led its army into occupying the former and waging a long and bitter war to impose its rule on the latter. In the entire course of the Sino-Japanese war, as many as 30 million Chinese may have died, thus making China's losses even greater than those of the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1945.

The "pacifist constitution" was diluted, in effect, following the restoration of Japan's sovereignty in 1952. A Defense Agency was established, but its armed personnel were still meant to serve only in the direct defense of Japan. Although relations with China and South Korea were sometimes prickly, those countries were reassured to a large extent that Japan did not pose a military threat to them. For its part, Japan benefitted by keeping its military spending to 1 percent of its GNP, relying chiefly on the U.S. for its defense. Such was the growth of the Japanese economy over the next 50 years that that 1 percent could pay for a highly efficient and well-armed force.

The low-level war in Iraq that continued after President George W. Bush announced the end of major hostilities May 1 impelled Washington to seek to share the burden of occupation. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi saw advantages in pushing for Japanese troops to be sent to Iraq: the move would certainly be welcomed in Washington, but it also would open the way to further overseas deployments in the future. After heated debate—not to mention fisticuffs—a bill to allow the sending of Japanese troops for non-combat duties in Iraq was passed through parliament. Defense Agency officials already had said that they were considering running Arabic-language statements on television and radio stations available in Iraq to try to win Iraqi sympathy for the deployment of Japanese troops. The government is worried that, if there are Japanese casualties in Iraq, it will rebound very badly for it.

Korean and Chinese fears of Japanese militarism may seem to be exaggerated and unwarranted, but they are nonetheless real. The Bush administration's determination to go to war in Iraq may thus have indirectly contributed to a heightening of tensions in East Asia.

Tempting Fate?

Over in Singapore, we get the television show "Smallville," about Superman's teen-age years, later than Americans, of course. I was a little surprised recently to find myself viewing an episode that came close to home. In "Visage," Lana Lang's ex-boyfriend, who left Smallville to join the army, is seen on patrol in a foreign land. His unit comes under fire and he is cut down by an explosion. According to the subtitles, he is in Aceh, in Indonesia.

OK: I shouldn't take this too seriously, but why, even in "Smallville," send U.S. soldiers to fight in Aceh?

John Gee, a free-lance journalist based in Singapore, is the author of Unequal Conflict: the Palestinians and Israel, available from the AET Book Club.