Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September/October
2006, pages 20-21
Special Report
Breaching Borders: The Role of Water In The Middle East Conflict
By Isabelle Humphries
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Israel makes the most of water resources
at the site of the destroyed village of Al Hamma in the occupied
Syrian Golan Heights
(Photo I. Humphries). |
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IN MONTHS when Israel is not pounding the life out of its Lebanese
neighbors, a tourist to Israel may hire a car and drive around
the beautiful northern regions of former mandate Palestine and
Syria. Here one may look around at the stunningly green surroundings,
go kayaking in the Jordan River, admire the beautiful waterfalls
at ancient Banyas in the Golan, or dip one’s feet in the
waters of the Sea of the Galilee. Those feeling adventurous may
hand over their passports at the gate, enter the Israeli-occupied
Alawite village of Ghajar, and look down at the little stream of
the Wazzani in the small valley below.
Israel has not ensconced itself in the Golan Heights for mere
tourism opportunities, however. The Israeli media machine would
have one believe that the country is engaged in a struggle to protect
its very existence against imaginary Arab military giants. Yet
a trip around the places in which it chooses to maintain its borders
is far more revealing of the root of conflict with its Arab neighbors—water.
Israel has no plans to make peace with Syria and return the Golan
Heights, because by doing so it would give up its control of springs,
rivers and the Sea of Galilee. Nor will it hand over any significant
West Bank land to Palestinians, for in doing so Israel would have
to abandon lush aquifers (underground water reserves), key access
to the Dead Sea, the Jordan River, and surrounding fertile plains.
Division and distribution of a static resource such as land is
difficult enough, but problems are magnified when the resource
is able to flow across international boundaries. Take the Israeli
furor over Lebanon’s installation of new pumping facilities
on the Wazzani River in the fall of 2002. Despite the fact that
the activity took place entirely on Lebanese land, Israel raised
a ruckus because the Wazzani is a key tributary of the Hasbani
River. And although the Hasbani flows for 25 miles inside Lebanon,
it crosses into the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan, feeding into
the Banias and Dan Rivers, which in turn flow into the Jordan—ultimately
providing water to the rapidly reducing Sea of Galilee, Israel’s
largest source of fresh water.
While Beirut stated that it was Lebanon’s internationally
recognized right to pump Wazzani waters for surrounding low-income
Shi’i villages, Israel objected, claiming, as usual, that
the “terrorist” entities of Syria and Hezbollah were
behind the development plan. Lebanon retorted by pointing out that,
even after pump installation, it would be taking only 10 million
cubic meters annually—while Israel, on the other hand, uses
some 150 million cubic meters a year from the Wazzani and Hasbani.
That particular episode of the water conflict did not erupt into
full-scale war, but at other times water has provided the trigger.
In his memoirs, Ariel Sharon claimed that the 1967 war (resulting
in Israeli occupation of the Golan and prevention of Syrian access
to the Sea of Galilee) was launched as an unavoidable response
to Syrian attempts three years earlier to divert the headwaters
of the Jordan.
The Historical Evidence
An analysis of historical evidence, however, provides a very different
story of the events leading to the 1967 war. It was Israel, in
fact, which first made moves to divert the headwaters, provoking
an international crisis, yet convincing many that Syria was the
aggressor. Israeli historian Avi Shlaim dates Israel’s first
attempt to divert the Jordan River to as early as 1953, when Syria
responded not by attacking the Jewish state, but complaining to
the U.N., which eventually put a halt to the Israeli plan the following
year. Ten years later however, Israel began to pump water from
the Sea of Galilee into its National Water Carrier—a grave
threat to vital Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian water sources (see
also Benny Morris). It was in response to this Israeli move that
Syria planned to divert Jordan water into its own territory.
Remaining in control of the Golan Heights today allows Israel
to irrigate settlements as far as the Negev desert through its
National Water Carrier pipeline. The diversion of waters to this
artificial carrier has grave implications, resulting in the depletion
and salinization of the Jordan River south of the Sea of Galilee,
and devastating agriculture on the Jordanian side of the river.
The Jordanian government’s diversion of the Yarmuk cannot
adequately compensate for this loss.
Israeli control of water is as much of a concern for Palestinians
as it is for Arab neighbors. Whether for the few Palestinian farmers
remaining inside the Israeli state, or those in the West Bank and
Gaza, Israeli water policy is directed at destroying any remaining
Palestinian agriculture. The million Palestinians inside Israel
are primarily a flexible manual labor force for Jewish industry,
as are—when curfews allow—1967 Palestinians. Even where
Palestinians remain in control of small pieces of land, Israeli
water policy usually sees to it that there is not enough water
to grow crops.
Situated above the mountain aquifer, central West Bank towns such
as Qalqilya and Nablus have traditionally exported crops across
the Middle East. Yet today, despite the availability of sophisticated
technology, Israeli policy means that many Palestinians do not
have enough water even for themselves, let alone to irrigate the
few fields that have not yet been confiscated.
Palestinians should have ready access to water from the mountain
aquifer (divided into three), the Jordan River basin and the Gazan
coastal aquifer. Aquifers are replenished through rainwater seeping
through the ground, and water accessible via wells and springs.
According to Oslo, two West Bank aquifers are to be shared between
Israelis and Palestinians, leaving the Gazan coastal and the third
West Bank aquifer solely to Palestinians. (Palestinians, of course,
have no access to the Sea of Galilee—their share having been
taken in 1948). According to Oslo, Syrians, Jordanians, Palestinians
and Israelis all have a share in the Jordan River system (although
97 percent of the river passes through areas only occupied by Israel
since 1967). Currently Israel has assured that its citizens have
the highest per capita water consumption in the entire Middle East—and
four times as much as the Palestinians among whom they live.
International law clearly states that Israel should not be taking
water from areas occupied in 1967. Yet even if Oslo had been followed
to the letter, it assured inequality by giving Israeli water authorities
overall control of water resources. Palestinians may not drill
for water without Israeli approval, yet Israel can pump as much
water as it likes into its illegal settlements. More than 80 percent
of West Bank water is taken by Israelis on both sides of the 1967
line.
Israeli occupation has prevented the development of a Palestinian
water infrastructure which would make maximum use of the minimum
resources. Some 200,000 West Bankers do not even have access to
piped water systems, while the settlements around them are kept
green with lawn sprinklers. Palestinians living under occupation
are forced to rely on expensive private water tankers, which of
course cannot reach them in times of closure. Ironically, some
of the water is bought directly from Israelis at inflated prices,
despite the fact that the water originates in the West Bank.
In contravention of Oslo, Israel continues to pump from the Gaza
coastal aquifer—which, as levels fall dangerously low, draws
in salt water from the Mediterranean. Two-thirds of water is used
for the Israeli agricultural sector, which represents only 3 percent
of Israel’s annual GDP, while the greater percentage of
Palestinian farmers must rely on insufficient sources of rainwater for 90 percent
of their agricultural activity. Desperate for water, Gazans also are overpumping
this source, as their inadequate sewage networks continue to leak raw sewage
into the supply. Medical sources in Gaza note an increase in kidney disease
and other dangerous water-related illnesses. The U.N. estimates that in less
than 15 years Gazans will not have access to drinkable water.
What little Palestinian water infrastructure there is falls regular
victim to Israeli military assault. From the destruction of 140
wells in the 1967 war, to soldiers sniping at water tanks on family
homes, to settlers vandalizing and polluting watercourses, to confiscation
of wells for the building of “security” walls, Palestinians
have no chance to improve their situation.
In July, Israel again launched a ground offensive into southern
Lebanon. Is this another attempt to access the vital asset of the
Litani River high on the agenda? (See box above.)
What is certain is that there will be no long-term security for
any resident of the Middle East without fair distribution and a
just solution to the sharing of water resources. Without regional
cooperation on protecting rapidly depleting resources such as the
Jordan River and the Dead Sea, not even Israel can count on secure
water forever.
Isabelle Humphries is conducting Ph.D. research on the Palestinian
refugee community inside Israel’s 1948 borders. She can be
reached at <isabellebh2004@yahoo.co.uk>.
SIDEBAR
For Israel, Southern Lebanon Means the Litani River
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The Zionist map
presented to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. |
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When Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion attended the
1919 Paris Peace Conference ending World War I, they presented
a map containing the boundaries of their hoped-for Jewish
state. The map included what is now Lebanon’s Litani
River (see top right of map).
Weizmann went on to become Israel’s first president,
and Ben-Gurion its first prime minister, when that country
was established in 1948. While the two had achieved great
success in international geopolitics, they had failed to
garner the Litani for Israel. The reason for their failure
was the secret Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1915, under which
Britain and France already had fixed the border between
Lebanon and Palestine. At France’s insistence, Sykes-Picot
was upheld at the Paris conference, and the Litani went
to Lebanon.
Israel dubbed its March 14, 1978 invasion of southern
Lebanon “Operation Litani,” with the stated
objective of clearing out Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) bases south of the Litani River in order to secure
northern Israel. Its 1982 invasion of Lebanon had the added
goal of gaining access to the waters of the Litani. To
end the Israeli siege of Beirut, the PLO was rapidly evacuated
to Tunisia, and Israel eventually retreated from the Lebanese
capital. Yet it never fully withdrew from southern Lebanon
until 2000, under pressure from Hezbollah—and 22
years after being ordered to do so by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 425.
Even after it withdrew, however, Israel remained determined
to eventually seize the Litani River waters—as attested
to by the Jewish state’s latest attempt to ethnically
cleanse the land between the Litani and Israel’s
northern border.
—Andrew
I. Killgore |
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