Pakistan’s Heavy Burden and Other Ramifications of the Afghan War

By M.M. Ali

There is never a good time for tragedy, large or small. There are occasions, however, when disasters are better managed than at other times. Given Pakistan’s internal political dynamics, a more well-constructed government could not have been in power to brave the multitude of crises suddenly facing it after Sept. 11than the one headed by Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Nevertheless, it cannot be overemphasized that while the current regime in Pakistan may be stable, it is not invincible. Washington, which has launched a military campaign against Osama bin Laden, his al-Qaeda network and the ruling Taliban, and expressed some regret for abandoning Afghanistan after the 1989 defeat of the Soviet Union, needs to be sensitive to Pakistan’s present worries as well.

For just as the U.S. keeps repeating—understandably—that it is at war with the “terrorists,” and not with “Muslims” or “Islam,” Musharraf must reiterate to his countrymen that his support of the U.S. coalition is purely “logistical.”

Despite the best intentions, however, wars and military actions often tend to obliterate lines—moral and legalistic—drawn in the sand. Ignoring claims of artificial intelligence and ballistic precision, a 5,000 pound “smart” bomb fired from 250 miles away or dropped from more than a mile above can miss its intended target and kill hundreds of innocent civilians. Similarly, a “search and rescue” mission undertaken in a war zone can encounter belligerent fire and be forced to defend itself militarily. These incidents already have taken place in the current U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan. They seriously compromise the rules of a “just war” and call into question as well the terms of coalition alliances.

A Three-Pronged Campaign

Given the plethora of competing interest groups within and outside of Afghanistan, the U.S. must proceed carefully—and simultaneously—on three fronts: military, political and humanitarian. The military campaign currently underway may be designed to produce quick results. Undue haste in this regard, however, runs the risk of reactivating simmering civil war rivalries. Already the U.S.- and Russia-assisted Northern Alliance, comprising primarily Tajiks and the Uzbecks, is itching to reoccupy Mazar-e-Sharif, to be followed by Herat and Kabul. The Iran-backed Hazaras are equally interested in sharing the loot. And, of course, the Taliban, who are primarily Pashtuns, the country’s largest ethnic group, and occupy more than 90 percent of Afghan territory—and who until recently were backed by Pakistan, the Saudis and the UAE—are determined to hold on to what they have.

Clearly, a mutually acceptable political solution is the country’s best hope. Given the powerful conflicting interests at work, however, a political solution will not be easy to achieve—especially in the present fluid war environment within a destabilized tribal society. While the timetable of the air and ground campaign may be controllable, moreover, political developments can defy the best military strategy.

The third plank of the effort to rid the country of its terrorist network and return it to a semblance of normalcy is to provide immediate humanitarian aid to the suffering and starving Afghans. The severe winter, with its annual shoulder-high snowfall, is just around the corner. Refugees are fleeing their homes and hearths to escape the American bombing, so food and shelter is the need of the hour—if not the minute. Humanitarian assistance is required immediately, and in increasingly large quantities: aerial drops alone are woefully insufficient.

Neighboring Pakistan—in addition to facing a myriad of domestic uncertainties—has been under pressure to receive the Afghan refugees once again gathering on its borders. Islamabad’s ability to handle this additional burden is very limited, and would add to the high costs it incurred in the 1980s and ’90s, when over five million Afghans crossed into Pakistan.

Inside the country, political pressure on the Musharraf government will continue to mount as long as the military action continues and reports of civilian casualties keep coming in. Musharraf, it must be remembered, does not have carte blanche from his people to cooperate with the U.S.-led coalition. The decision to support the U.S. “war against terrorism” was neither a simple nor an easy one for Musharraf. By instituting changes in the top military brass, however, the former general has shown a degree of self-confidence in his leadership—for, while Pakistan’s army is a disciplined outfit, its ethnic composition and the religious make-up of the officers’ cadre make rapid change dangerous. Nevertheless, Musharraf has agreed to place Pakistan under an undeserved burden for good reasons.

It is true that he may not be indispensable in the eyes of Washington. Any mid-stream change of horses, however, could seriously destabilize Pakistan and lead to uncontrollable regional consequences. Much to the chagrin of Indian Prime Minister Attal Bihari Vajpayee and his Sang Pariwar (cohorts), therefore, Pervez Musharraf remains the man of the hour.

A Hidden Agenda?

One month into the military campaign in Afghanistan, word was that the U.S.-British bombardment had not produced the anticipated results. Not only was there no sign of surrender, but there were no visible defections from Taliban ranks. The Taliban have been schooled in the conviction that they are fighting for a religious cause and that anyone who opposes them—including Ahmed Shah Masoud or Abdul Haq—is an “infidel” deserving of death. To hope that any Talib will join the U.S. coalition, then—at least in the present climate—is to live in a fool’s paradise. The Taliban will not surrender to their enemy or to a foreign power unless that power genuinely presents itself as a friend. They have lived for years in near total devastation caused by alien occupation or deadly internecine feuds, and are used to surviving under extreme hardship. Many of them, in fact, have known nothing but war their entire lives.

There has been speculation in the region that the Washington-London axis seized the disaster of Sept. 11 as an excuse to embark on its Central-South Asia policy for the 21st century. Afghanistan, of course, is right in the middle of that critical geopolitical zone. In recent years the U.S. and Europe have been encountering difficulties in obtaining oil and gas from the Middle East, where those resources have been depleting rapidly and unsolved disputes—most notably the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—have added to the region’s instability.

The Central Asian republics bordering Afghanistan abound in huge oil and gas reserves. They are landlocked, however, as is Afghanistan. American multinational corporations have been hoping to construct a pipeline across Afghanistan and Pakistan to carry the oil and gas to ports on the Indian Ocean, but the continued unrest in Afghanistan has been an insurmountable obstacle. Not only would such a pipeline provide unobstructed oil supplies to the West for the foreseeable future, it also could bring tremendous development and revenues to the region. The potential of a consortium larger than Aramco emerging out of such an effort is not out of the question. Therefore, political pundits argue, current military operations may continue for at least two more years until the entire area is ready to comply with U.S.-British plans. Tony Blair, the thinking goes, is not playing second fiddle for nothing.

If, on the other hand, the pipeline is only an incidental objective and the task at hand, as stated, is to flatten the Taliban strongholds, capture or kill Osama bin Laden and dismantle the al-Qaeda training camps, the estimated timeframe is a few months of military action (the British indicate that the job can be done faster than do their American counterparts). In either case, however, an extended military action is bound to create a lot of civilian casualties and cause serious consternation in the Muslim world.

Whichever way the war game is played out, it is being further suggested that the American presence will be significant because the region shares its northern border with China. No wonder Russia is anxious to join the coalition. Nor need India feel left out. Once the basic pieces have been put in place, New Delhi may be invited back to play its part, whatever that may be. Kashmiris may also find some recognition of their cause once the issue at hand—terrorism stemming from Afghanistan—is settled. The next few years clearly will be tumultuous ones in Central and South Asia. Indeed, the die already has been cast.

First Things First

But before one reaches second base one must round first. If the above configuration is correct, Osama may have to be found. That can wait, however. The Taliban certainly need to be subdued, if not totally defeated. But a too hasty demolition has the potential of erupting into larger chaos, and Washington would do well to remember its previous experiences with the law of unintended consequences.

As mentioned above, the Taliban are members of the majority Pashtuns, who constitute 60 percent of the Afghan population. The opposition Northern Alliance, on the other hand, comprises Uzbeks, Tajiks, the Hazaras and other sub-sects, all of which are small minorities. Any attempt to foist the Northern Alliance on the whole of Afghanistan, therefore, would be a sure recipe for future trouble.

Because tribal loyalties are by far the strongest bond among the Afghans, it was a mistake to announce that an “agreement” had been reached between representatives of the Northern Alliance and former King Zahir Shah, currently in exile in Italy. Zahir Shah is a Pashtun, and could serve as a unifying force in a sharply divided tribal society. His reported willingness to join hands with the Northern Alliance, however, has compromised the independent and neutral stature he previously had enjoyed.

The prospects of organizing a Loya Jirga, or grand assembly of tribal chiefs, under the leadership of Zahir Shah seems to be on hold, then. The death of Abdul Haq at the hands of Taliban, moreover, has shown that even the most sophisticated intelligence was not good enough in an unsophisticated environment. Not only is Afghanistan still littered with thousands of land mines left behind by Soviet troops, but it is full of political land mines as well that must be carefully avoided when seeking a solution. Most importantly, a lasting solution can only emerge from within Afghan society. It is this message that President Musharraf has been emphasizing almost daily in his counsel to Washington.

It is essential, therefore, that the schedule for the military campaign in Afghanistan be in sync with the political formulations that are to follow. Any precipitous military move could give an undue edge to one faction over another, engulf the country in yet another bloody civil war and destroy the best-laid plans. Nor, as already indicated, would Pakistan be immune from the resulting instability.

The Home Front

Needless to say, the Sept. 11 attacks have had a devastating impact on the United States. The land of the free, the land of opportunity is still, of course, very much alive, but an element of fear has been added—at least for the time being. In addition to the human tragedy of more than 5,000 people killed or missing, estimates of the material loss are colossal. According to official figures, the Pentagon sustained $1 billion in damage; New York’s property loss is placed at $34 billion and the loss to businesses totals at least $21 billion. These do not include the billions of dollars in lost revenue suffered by the airline industry and its support services.

To all this must be added the cost of conducting the war on Afghanistan. Not including logistical expenses and the cost of military deployment and maneuvers, the arsenal used in the first three weeks of the military campaign, according to the Oct. 28 Washington Post, includes “50 Tomahawk cruise missiles…at the cost of $1 million apiece. [The military] has dropped more than 3,000 bombs—including $25,000-a-pop smart bombs that rely on the Global Positioning System and $18,000-a-pop laser-guided bombs…the Pentagon has spent more than $4 billion on spare parts, medical stocks, [and] logistical support…it has also received $3.5 billion for increased ‘situational awareness,’ a euphemism for classified intelligence spending.”

The Post went on to predict that, if results of the first three weeks were any guide, the campaign is going to be “long and difficult.” And increasingly expensive.

Only a week earlier, Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, had observed that if the war is stretched out, it would exact “an escalating price in the Muslim world,” with the U.S. seen as “a high-tech bully.” This could be the greatest cost of all.

Prof. M.M. Ali is a Washington, DC-based consultant with the United Nations Development Program and a specialist on South Asia.