Bush at War Provides New Look at Bush Administration From Powell’s Perspective

By Richard H. Curtiss

Bob Woodward’s new best-selling book, Bush at War, provides a new basis for evaluating the entire U.S. administration during the first 16 months of George W. Bush’s presidency. Over the years Woodward, a longtime writer for The Washington Post, has produced many controversial best sellers. All the President’s Men, the book about the Watergate scandal he co-authored with fellow reporter Carl Bernstein, was based on interviews with “Deep Throat,” who may or may not have existed. Some believe that Woodward used Deep Throat to express the words of various off-the-record sources. With or without attribution, Deep Throat’s information on the Watergate break-in and cover-up brought down the presidency of Richard Nixon.

In another famous book, Veil: the Secret Wars of the C.I.A, 1981-1987, Woodward claimed to have interviewed CIA Director Bill Casey in 1987 as he was dying following surgery for brain cancer. Woodward asserted Casey had dictated the material, but no one else will testify that Casey was not comatose and able to tell the author about CIA covert operations during the Reagan years.

There is no question of attribution in Bush at War, however, because President George W. Bush gave Woodward an extremely frank four-and-a-half-hour interview.

The results, based not only on Bush’s viewpoint but on interviews with at least half a dozen other members of the Bush administration, reveal a totally new side of the administration’s first two years.

Obviously, the book’s two major subjects are the war on terrorism and the battle to eject the Taliban from Afghanistan. Woodward also provides penetrating insights into the ongoing saga of Iraq, a conflict that threatens to destabilize the entire Middle East.

Clearly, the definitive book on Iraq has yet to be written, but the insights in Bush at War make for fascinating reading. The book also makes the administration’s ultimate choices regarding Iraq much clearer.

The book’s most interesting subtexts deal with four major administration players besides Bush himself. These are Secretary of State Colin Powell on one side, versus Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on the other. In the middle is National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, who appears determined to do precisely what a national security adviser is supposed to: make sure that all sides of an issue are painstakingly aired. In addition, there is some indication that a fifth person not directly involved, CIA Director George Tenet, seems to share the same general instincts as Powell.

Honesty requires this writer to point out that the secretary of state is a considerably more sympathetic character than either the vice president or the secretary of defense. For whatever reason, neither Cheney nor Rumsfeld was particularly cooperative in developing the narrative.

IV Saddam Hussain is acting in good faith, this will be a case of a major war averted.

In a way, Condoleezza Rice, who has an extremely frank and open relationship with the president, may seem the most enigmatic character of all. Whether or not she would deny it, however, she did her very best to ensure that the secretary of state found his way to a much better relationship with Bush than at first appeared.

Initially, it was assumed that Bush needed Powell more than Powell needed Bush. An authentic war hero, Powell expected his voice to be heard and his opinions respected as a matter of right. That did not happen, however, due mostly to the overwhelming presence of Rumsfeld and, to a slightly lesser extent, Cheney. Both Rumsfeld and Cheney, close colleagues over a very long period of time, are considerably older and more politically experienced than the secretary of state.

For whatever reason, Powell did not feel comfortable around Bush. He was aware, however, that if he did not speak up there would be serious mistakes made due to the other administration members’ lack of war experience.

As the administration became more involved on both the political and foreign affairs fronts, Rice realized that Powell had to get over his awe of the older members of the Bush administration. At that point, Powell learned that, in addition to the regular upper-level cabinet meetings, Rumsfeld had asked for individual “face time” with Bush. Powell wisely requested and was granted the same privilege.

Between extended cabinet meetings and the additional “face time,” Powell began to make his sorely needed mark on the team. By the time the problem of Iraqi President Saddam Hussain came up for careful scrutiny, Powell was convinced that the administration was overlooking a chance to get United Nations support and avoid altogether the problems a unilateral strike would entail.

Powell belatedly convinced President Bush that there were grave problems involved in a unilateral strike, and further convinced the president that it would be neither necessary nor desirable to go it alone. At this point, the surface unanimity between Powell on the one side and Cheney-Rumsfeld on the other grew increasingly acrimonious, and sometimes even openly heated. For whatever reason, Bush decided to go along with Powell, much to the relief of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage.

Interestingly enough, Armitage initially was up for the position of deputy secretary of defense. Powell, however, already had his eye on Armitage for the State Department—a position that Armitage preferred. The alliance of Powell and long-term political operator Armitage turned out to be an extremely useful arrangement for both.

Powell’s Remarkable Influence

Once Powell was given the president’s go-ahead, the secretary of state’s international influence was remarkable. This was partly because diplomats all over the world were sincerely wary of Bush, who, with his lack of patience and his inexperience in bringing other nations along, tends to overdo things a bit. Even British Prime Minister Tony Blair seemed somewhat put off by Bush’s impatient tactics. Once Powell asserted himself, however, Blair wholeheartedly agreed with the U.S. point of view. On Nov. 8, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved a new resolution ordering Iraq to admit weapons inspectors.

From that point on, it was no longer a question of “saddling up and going for the guns,” as the Pentagon’s civilian contingent wanted, but instead one of working along a diplomatic track. Military units being prepared for deployment in a war against Saddam Hussain were rescheduled to stay in the United States. At this writing, units actually ready to leave the country are still in the U.S.

Since the narrative of Woodward’s book stops at this point, the rest will have to be written by some future historian. Clearly, if Saddam Hussain is acting in bad faith, Powell’s diplomatic coup will turn out to be only a bump in the road toward war. If, on the other hand, the Iraqi president is acting in good faith—and, given his unpredictability, no one can really say—this will be a case of a major war averted.

In the meantime, there are other problems that need to be solved urgently—specifically, the Arab-Israeli conflict. While most of the rest of the world wants it taken care of as early as possible, the Israelis do not want a solution to the problem now.

Here the volatile mix of an extremely radicalized Israel and the calculating craftiness of America’s Israel lobby will be joined in a battle that will not be resolved for a long time to come. It is particularly useful, therefore, to lay the groundwork for an Israeli-Palestinian peace as quickly as possible, and without further impediments.

Richard H. Curtiss is executive editor of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs.