Alleged al-Qaeda-Connected Groups Targeted in Malaysia and Singapore

By John Gee

Both Malaysia and Singapore recently have arrested groups of Muslim militants alleged to have carried out or planned acts of violence in the two countries. Claims were made that the militants had connections with al-Qaeda, the network responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks in the U.S.

Malaysia so far has detained 38 members of the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), an underground organization established in the 1980s. The KMM’s aim is to establish an Islamic state embracing Malaysia, Indonesia and the southern Philippines. Although based in Malaysia, its leadership apparently consists of Indonesians: one, Mohamed Iqbal, was arrested in Malaysia in June, but two more are sought by the Malaysian authorities as “directing figures” of the KMM. One is Abu Bakar Bashir, alias Abdus Samad, head of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council, which is said to link Indonesians who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet army over a decade ago. Some also suspect it, however, of being an organizational center for individuals who have trained in that country in the more recent past.

The KMM has sent its supporters to take part in actions to further its goals in Indonesia. Some have been involved in anti-Christian attacks in the Maluku islands during the past two years, and one member was caught by Indonesian security forces on Aug. 1 after a bomb he intended to plant in a Jakarta shopping mall went off prematurely. Taufik Abdul Halim and another Malaysian, Zid Sarani Mohamed Isa, subsequently told Indonesian police that they planned to bomb churches in the Indonesian capital. Twelve Indonesians associated with them also were arrested.

Within Malaysia, KMM activists robbed a mini-market and a bank to raise money; more seriously, they carried out an armed attack on a police station, exploded a bomb in a Hindu temple and murdered Joe Fernandez, a member of the elected assembly of the state of Kedah. Fernandez, a Catholic, was killed following the spreading of rumors that he had tried to persuade Muslims to convert to Christianity.

Like al-Qaeda, the KMM did not issue communiqués claiming responsibility for these attacks, but stayed silent regarding its connections to them. It got away with its activities until May 2001, when a security guard opened fire on men fleeing from a bank robbery in the western Malaysian town of Petaling Jaya. The guard injured two, who were then captured by the police. Their capture gave the authorities leads to other members of the network. Twenty-five were rounded up in May and June. A further 13 men belonging to a newer KMM network were arrested this past December and January. Malaysian police linked this group to Zacarias Moussaoui, the French citizen charged with being the intended 20th hijacker of the U.S. planes seized on Sept. 11. Moussaoui was alleged to have been involved in establishing the group while on a visit to Malaysia.

Like al-Qaeda, the KMM stayed silent regarding its connections to attacks.

Following the arrests and the discovery of KMM documents, a picture emerged of how it intended to attain its goal. The group sought to recruit supporters among Muslim extremists by carrying out attacks on non-Muslim targets, as well as upon Muslims who were deemed to be deviating from KMM’s own narrow interpretation of Islam. It aimed to polarize opinion and destroy any basis for ideas for which it had contempt, including pluralism, tolerance and democracy. It saw the existing governments of predominantly Muslim Malaysia and Indonesia as enemies to be overthrown.

Embarassingly for the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), a leading figure among the first KMM detainees was Nik Adli Nik Aziz, son of the chief minister of the PAS-run state of Kelantan. The Malaysian government has made use of this fact to suggest a link between PAS and the KMM, but it has produced no concrete evidence that an organizational tie does exist. PAS, for its part, has not only tried to distance itself from the KMM, but has argued that, having made significant gains through electoral politics, it is not in its interests to involve itself in the kind of violent activities that most Malaysian Muslims would find repugnant.

Singapore’s Internal Security Department arrested 15 people between Dec. 9 and 24, although the arrests were only made public on Jan. 5. All those held were Singaporeans, except for one man who held Malaysian citizenship. They were said to have been planning terrorist attacks on American and other targets in Singapore, including the U.S. Embassy and commercial institutions. Initial reports said that 13 of the 15 were members of a group called Jemaah Islamiah, but the affiliations of the remaining two had not then been confirmed. In response to questions from the media, Ministry of Home Affairs spokeswoman Ong Chew Peck Wan said that the Singaporean group had links with both the KMM and al-Qaeda. Although she did not say as much, “Jemaah Islamiah” may well be the name used by the KMM in Singapore. Local Muslim groups were quick to support the authorities’ moves and to stress that the small group of individuals who had been detained were not representative of the Muslim community as a whole.

A different response came from Indonesia, where the two largest Muslim organizations in the country, the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah, which are regarded as politically moderate, criticized the arrests, saying that they were part of a U.S. campaign against Islam. At the governmental level, Indonesia’s response was cautious. While it accepted that Malaysia and Singapore had the right to defend their security if they felt it was in jeopardy, Jakarta plainly felt very uncomfortable about claims that Indonesians played a leading role in the KMM, and strong hints in the Malaysian newspaper Berita Harian that KMM members had received military training in secret camps in Indonesia.

While the latest arrests were occurring, a Malaysian court sentenced three men to hang and 16 more to life imprisonment for undertaking an armed revolt to overthrow the Malaysian government and replace it with an Islamic state. The men were members of a group called Al-Ma’unah, which stole weapons from military stores in July 2000 and then, when cornered, brutally murdered two hostages it had been holding.

New King in Malaysia

Perhaps most people outside Asia, if asked to say what form of government they think Malaysia has, would say that it is a republic. They would be wrong. Malaysia’s head of state is a king.

Monarchy is an old and respected institution in Malaysia. Before the era of European colonial rule, the Malay peninsula was a patchwork of small states headed by sultans and rajas. When the British began to assert their control over the area in the early 19th century, they brought Malacca, Penang and Singapore under their rule as the Straits Settlements. Malay rulers, however, continued to exercise a certain authority in the rest of the region. When Malaysia became independent in 1957 (and following the withdrawal of Singapore eight years later), it consisted of 13 states, linked together in a federation. Of those states, nine were monarchies.

As no single ruling family had a superior status to the others, there was no question of one monarch being made the first of a line of hereditary kings of Malaysia. Thus an elective monarchy was established. Every five years, a conference of rulers meets and elects one of their number as king. His official title is Yang Dipertuan Agung, which is usually loosely translated as “Paramount Ruler.” Although the rulers hold a secret ballot, the result is hardly a surprise, as there is an established system of rotation.

The monarchy was in the news briefly in November, when Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah died at the age of 75. On Dec. 12, elected as his successor was Tuanku Syed Sirajuddin Syed Putra Jamalullial, the raja of Perlis, which is the smallest and most northerly of the Malaysian states.

Threatening Move in Aceh

The war between the central authorities and the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia’s westernmost province took a further menacing turn for the worse in January. The central government gave the go-ahead for the army to establish a separate military command for the province. This will mean that soldiers operating in Aceh no longer will be accountable to the army’s headquarters in Jakarta.

Despite claims to the contrary by Security Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the move probably will make little difference to the operational effectiveness of the Indonesian army in Aceh. It will, however, give troops there a clear signal that they will not be held to account for any human rights violations they commit in the province. Soldiers already experience few constraints on their behavior. In 2001, an average of four or five people were killed daily in Aceh: most were civilians killed by government forces.

Pass the Parcel

The immediate sequel to the revolt by Nur Misuari against the Philippine government (see Jan./Feb. 2002 Washington Report) was bizarre. Following the collapse of his efforts to hold on to office, the former governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao had fled to Malaysia. That country, however, did not wish to play host to him. It thus should have been a simple matter for the Philippine government to secure his surrender into its custody, but Manila was in no hurry for Malaysia to give Misuari up.

The former Moro National Liberation Front leader had been detained on Nov. 24 and so, failing his deportation, would have been due to be released one month later under Malaysia’s immigration laws. Given that his revolt had cost over 100 people their lives, the Malaysian government had thought that the Philippines would want Misuari returned quickly, but instead he was treated as a political hot potato. Manila asked that his return should be deferred for a few days until the regional elections in Mindanao were over. After that, President Gloria Arroyo sent a special envoy to Kuala Lumpur bearing a request that Malaysia hang on to Misuari until after the Christmas holidays. A presidential spokesman even suggested that the Philippines might be ready to accept the transferal of Misuari to the custody of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

Eventually, on Jan. 7, Misuari was deported to the Philippines. Arroyo critics ascribed her lack of zeal in seeking his return to indecisiveness, but supporters said that she was playing for time because of fears that a trial might lead to violent reactions from Misuari supporters.

Another Lesson in Chutzpah

China reportedly has demanded that Israel pay $1.26 billion to compensate Beijing for the cancellation, under U.S. pressure, of the Phalcon airborne early warning system deal last year. While the figure includes China’s advance payment and the interest on it, fully $1 billion of the total is compensation alone. China claims that it spent a lot of money to prepare the infrastructure for supporting the Phalcon system. In reality, however, it appears Beijing wants to make Israel pay a punitive amount of compensation to emphasize its anger and serve as a warning to any country that might seek to back out of a future deal.

Major General (retired) Amos Yaron, director general of Israel’s Defense Ministry (and one of the Israelis who played a role in the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre), visited Washington to brief the U.S. administration on the latest developments. He told American officials that Israel would not be seeking U.S. aid in footing the bill. Their reaction to this generous statement can only be guessed at, but some at least must surely have wondered about Israel’s arrogance in even suggesting that it might have been proper to approach the U.S. for assistance in this matter. It was, after all, Israel’s decision to go ahead with the Phalcon deal initially, despite knowing that the U.S. long has been against any country supplying advanced weaponry to China. If it then incurred costs as a result of Washington’s pressure upon it to cancel the deal, there is no reason why the U.S. taxpayer should foot the bill.

John Gee is a free-lance journalist based in Singapore and the author of Unequal Conflict: Israel and the Palestinians, available from the AET Book Club.