Lebanon Dodges Bullets of Another Civil War

By Sami Moubayed

More than at any other time in the past 10 years, Lebanon today seems on the verge of another sectarian outburst. Events have been in the making, more or less, since June 10, 2000—the date of Hafez Al-Assad’s passing—and in constant turmoil since then.

The late Syrian leader had helped end Lebanon’s civil war in 1990, thereby establishing a paramount influence on all aspects of Lebanese decision-making. He set up a friendly government in Beirut composed of Syrian loyalists—both Christian and Muslim—and banished all anti-Syrian elements into exile. The civil war’s still-living casualties last summer included former Maronite leaders President Amin Gemayel and Army Commander Michel Aoun in exile, and Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces, the radical Maronite militia, in jail.

Having cleared the stage of troublemakers, the Syrian regime began grooming more moderate Christian figures for leadership, and promoted Elias Hrawi, a seasoned Lebanese statesman, to the presidency in 1991. A Syrian loyalist to the end, Hrawi managed to keep the Lebanese scene under control. Striking a delicate balance between his Maronite origins and Syrian requirements, Hrawi appealed to the disgruntled Maronites as “one of them,” while remaining loyal to the Syrian establishment.

Hrawi’s successor, Gen. Emile Lahoud, failed by all measures to match Hrawi’s achievement. Lacking any power base within the Maronite community, Lahoud was snubbed by his co-religionists from day one. Unlike Hrawi, whose political career dated back to the 1960s, Lahoud was a newcomer to the scene, and could play only by Syria’s rules—thereby losing any form of legitimacy within radical Christian circles.

With Aoun and Gemayel in exile, and Lahoud unable to fulfill any of their aspirations, Christians opposed to Syria’s military presence in Lebanon began searching for a leader who would represent their cause. Amin Gemayel’s return to Lebanon last July under the auspices of current Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad apparently was not enough to quench their political thirst. They were looking for someone with enough courage to say, “We want the Syrians to leave.” Gemayel, apparently, was too weak to make such a statement. He only recently had returned from his Paris exile under Assad’s patronage, in a bid at “burying the hatchet,” and considered it too early to bite the hand that fed him.

The courage found lacking in Gemayel was eventually located in the Maronite patriarch of Lebanon, Cardinal Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir. In August 2000, the 81-year-old cleric issued a “Statement of Bishops and Cardinals” asking for Syrian troop redeployment. The statement set off a wave of emotions within Christian circles not seen since the Civil War era. Syria’s former ally Walid Jumblatt, a staunch supporter of Assad pére for 20 years, praised Sfeir’s initiative and raised the issue of Syria’s military presence during an October parliamentary session. As the Druze community’s traditional chieftain, Jumblatt easily secured the support of his men and his Socialist Progressive Party.

The U.S. had no intention of creating problems with Damascus.

Frustrated, Damascus announced that Jumblatt’s VIP status in Syria no longer was valid. That statement caused even more discontent within Druze circles, pushing them further into Sfeir’s orbit. Embarrassed by its rather unconsidered response, the Syrian regime revoked its revocation a few weeks later.

Jumblatt, seemingly pleased by the brouhaha and enjoying his new-found popularity within Maronite circles, ignored the reissued perquisite and continued to question the presence of 30,000 Syrian troops on Lebanese soil. Moreover, he continued to raise the issue of the murder of his father, Kamal Jumblatt, an anti-Syrian Lebanese warlord who was assassinated in 1976 by unknown assailants, thought to be Syrian.

This, apparently, was the final straw for Damascus. On March 20 Syrian authorities deployed troops to Jumblatt’s native Shouf district, and surrounded his village, al-Mukhtara, with armed men and vehicles. Not satisfied with annoying the Syrians, and apparently unmoved by the threats, Jumblatt kept on criticizing Syria and President Emile Lahoud, its number one ally in Beirut.

Also in March, Patriarch Sfeir embarked on a tour of North America aimed at promoting his cause abroad. Meeting with the many Lebanese who have emigrated to the U.S., he repeated his demands for Syrian troop redeployment and pan-Christian solidarity against “enemies of the nation.” His attempts to meet with U.S. President George W. Bush, however, ended in failure. The U.S. administration had no intention of creating problems with Damascus, given Syria’s crucial role in maintaining sanctions on neighboring Iraq and helping to calm the inflamed situation in Palestine.

A Hero’s Welcome

Returning to Lebanon on March 27, the patriarch received a hero’s welcome from an estimated 100,000 Maronites. Visibly absent from the ceremony were Lebanese Christians from other sects, nor were any Lebanese Muslims present. General Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement and Samir Geagea’s Lebanese Forces—longtime rivals within the Maronite community who had fought a “War of Cancellation” against one another in 1988—now were standing side-by-side, chanting anti-Syrian slogans.

In the midst of a multitude of Christian political party flags and crosses also could be found prominent members of the once vehemently anti-Syrian Phalange Party, its former President Amin Gemayel, current President Mounir al-Hajj and Vice President Kareem Bakradoni. Gemayel, who by this time had discarded his gratitude to Syria, declared, “Nothing links Syria to Lebanon except that they are both members of the Arab League.”

The crowd’s sentiment was clear when Sfeir thanked President Lahoud’s representative, who had come to welcome the patriarch home and received instead loud booing from a crowd that detested Lahoud’s Syrian connections. In contrast, when Sfeir thanked ex-President Gemayel for showing up, loud cheers were heard.

Simultaneously, on the other side of Lebanon, in the predominately Muslim district of Akkar, 600 Muslims were parading through the streets, accusing Sfeir of wanting to divide Lebanon once again into Christian and Muslim zones, and calling out for the long life of President Lahoud and Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad.

From here, Muslims who suddenly felt threatened by Sfeir’s pan-Christian tone began speaking out, defending Syria—or, more specifically, defending their own existence. To Lebanon’s Muslim religious and political leaders, the only balancing force keeping the Christians at bay and preventing them from subordinating Muslims were the Syrians. Their departure would mean a return to a Maronite dominance of Lebanon.

Two days after Sfeir’s homecoming, Mufti of Tripoli Sheik Taha al-Sabounji spoke out against the Christian mobilization. “If there is need for Muslims to make their presence felt,” he said, “they will do so and the Lebanese public will stand up to those who are determined to stir up sectarian conflict once again.”

On April 4, during a Shi’i religious holiday, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah echoed Sabounji’s claims, saying, “Those who are asking Syria to leave only represent themselves and not all of Lebanon.” A staunch Syrian supporter, Nasrallah added, “If Syria decides to pull out of Lebanon, we will tell her that it is wrong.”

Nasrallah, by far Lebanon’s most charismatic leader, appealed to his fellow Shi’i and launched a 300,000-man demonstration in Beirut defending Syria’s stance. Other pro-Syrian factions, such as the Amal Party of parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri, the Future Youth of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Harriri, and the pro-Damascus Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), immediately supported Shi’i claims. Stated senior Shi’i cleric Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, indirectly accusing the patriarch and his followers of moving Lebanon back to the tribal society of the civil war, “We do not need sectarianism anymore.”

Speaker Nabih Berri added fuel to the fire when he appeared on national television and said, “Syrian troops will stay as long as peace has not been signed.

“The question of the Syrian presence is a subject that concerns the two states alone,” Berri added. “All argument about it must cease. We are prepared to discuss every question of domestic politics except this one.”

Berri’s remarks caused Walid Jumblatt to snap back, accusing Berri of “opposing freedoms, intimidating and threatening people.” Jumblatt further charged that Berri “would not have been perched on the speaker’s chair if he were in a true democratic system”—alluding to Syria’s role in elevating Berri to his current status.

From exile, Michel Aoun repeated his claims that the current decision-makers in Lebanon were “cartoon figures” who do not represent the people, but the authorities in Damascus.

In the midst of all the uproar, some Lebanese seem to have realized that the nation was in danger of collapse if the contentious discourse were to continue. Describing this as “a return to the atmosphere of 1975” (when Maronite-Muslim hostility was at its peak), they began calling for dialogue. The once-radical Maronite Dory Chamoun, leader of the Liberal Party, argued that “confessionalism does not lead toward political stability.” If the crisis did not come to an end, he warned, “the coming summer will be a hot one for Lebanon.”

A group of moderate Maronites, who unlike President Lahoud are not creations of Damascus, began forming a new pro-Syrian Christian front. Believing that an alliance with Syria is the only way to preserve Lebanon and prevent another sectarian outburst, these men announced their coalition in March and are expected to have it ready in May. Its leaders include Health Minister Sulaiman Franjiyyeh, Telecommunications Minister Jean Louis Qurdahhi, Interior Minister Elias al-Murr, and Western Beqaa MP Robert Ghanem.

Among potential members are Defense Minister Khalil Hrawi, Industry Minister George Frem, Kiserwan MP Farid al-Khazen, and former head of the Maronite Group Pierre Helou. A possible statesman whose alliance is also currently being sought is Metn MP Nasib Lahoud, the most reasonable and influential Maronite leader of his generation, who has enough legitimacy to stand up for his sect, and enough moderation to conduct dialogue with Syria.

Pro-Syrian Christian Front

On April 7, this coalition made its first statement by attending the Damascus ceremony commemorating 54 years of the Syrian Ba’ath Party. At the event, Franjiyyeh announced that a distinction should be made between the patriarch’s followers and those he labeled “extremist Christians.” Being one of Syria’s favorites, Franjiyyeh continued by saying, “We hope that Sfeir will not provide cover for a party that caused Christians a lot of pain and is still not sorry for its suicidal attempts”—referring to the Lebanese Forces, currently rallying around Sfeir.

In opposition to this coalition, another one emerged in mid-March. Called the Democratic Forum, it is composed of political parties favoring a complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Among its members are Walid Jumblatt’s Social Progressive Party, the Free Patriotic Movement of exiled Army Commander Michel Aoun, Samir Geagea’s outlawed Lebanese Forces, and the less radical National Bloc of the late Lebanese statesman Raymond Edde.

It seemed that divisions within communities were beginning to break out all over Lebanon. Within the radical Christian movements, Phalange Party president Mounir al-Hajj disavowed the radical anti-Syrian attitude of Amin Gemayel, saying: “I recommend removing Lebanese-Syrian relations from public forums.”

Within Walid Jumblatt’s Druze community, a rift also appeared when Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Bahjat Gaith, declaring the need to “stick to the simultaneity of tracks with Syria,” contradicted Jumblatt’s policy. Another Druze leader, Emir Talal Arslan, also defied Jumblatt and rallied in support of Damascus.

In the Shi’i community, despite Nasrallah’s vehemently pro-Syrian tone, former parliamentary speaker Kamel al-Assad delivered remarks supporting Syrian troop redeployment and eventual withdrawal.

For its part, Beirut, remembering only too clearly the atmosphere that led to the outbreak of the civil war in 1975, vowed to safeguard unity and strike with force if necessary to end all disturbances. President Lahoud declared, “We won’t allow any adventure to take the country back to the atmosphere of chaos that marked the war.”

An April 11 parade by all anti-Syrian elements commemorating the war’s beginning was cancelled at the last moment, after threats by Army Commander Michel Sulaiman to suppress all civil disturbances. Although parades were called off, anti-Syrian students staged sit-ins, and one act of terror was recorded in the mountain resort of Aley. There a parcel bomb was delivered to a relative of Aley MP Akram Chayeb. The lady who received the bomb, and was severely injured, was also related to Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, leading observers to note that the move was a warning to Jumblatt about his anti-Syrian and sectarian tone. One year earlier, to the day, a similar bomb had been delivered to two Christian students at St. Joseph University, killing them both.

Another act of terror—this time arson—took place at former Beirut MP Najah Wakkim’s office, which unknown men entered at night and set on fire. Wakkim, leader of the People’s Movement, also was vehemently anti-Syrian.

Vowing to hold things together, the state began a crackdown on disturbances, outlawing rallies, preventing protest marches and, in a nonpublic move, withdrawing the passport of Samir al-Kassir, a journalist at the anti-Syrian newspaper al-Nahar.

Several Lebanese leaders are attempting to mediate among Lahoud, Assad and Sfeir. Heading the diplomatic talks are ex-Minister Fouad Butros, Metn MP Lahoud, Health Minister Franjiyyieh, parliamentary speaker Berri, former parliamentary speaker Hussein al-Husseini, former Prime Minister Omar Karami, former President Hrawi, Emir Talal Arslan, and Interior Minister Elias al-Murr. Observers in Beirut, however, claim that the prospects of reconciliation are slim to none.

The looming question remains: where will all this lead? In 1988, American University of Beirut psychology professor Richard Day was asked what kind of psychological revolution was needed to bring peace to Lebanon. His response: “When the Lebanese start loving their children more than they hate one another.”

The Lebanese are still far from that situation today. The country’s recent hostilities have taken on new dimensions, beyond simply a conflict between pro- and anti-Syrian advocates. Once again, to the horror of many, the showdown is Muslim vs. Christian. On a more micro level, the crisis is evolving into Christian vs. Christian, Shi’i vs. Druze, Druze vs. Sunni, and so on.

At the moment, the conflict is over whether or not Syria will leave. If it does leave, however, who will the sects have to fight except each other? Currently—just as in 1975—the Muslims and Shi’i are defending Syria because Damascus is a manifestation of their power. If the Syrians leave, Lebanon’s Maronites will seek revenge for their decade of powerlessness.

Evidently, the only solution to another war is a strong and decisive state willing to use force in the interest of stability. If Beirut falters, Lebanon will fall. And if it falls, Syria will be dragged into a conflict once again. Today, however, there is no Hafez Al-Assad to resolve the problem and, with Ariel Sharon in power next door, the results on every scale, for both Beirut and Damascus, might be catastrophic.

Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.