Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May - June 2001,
page 30
Islam and the Middle East in the Far East
Reminder of the Arab Presence in Singapore
By John Gee
A move by Singapore’s government to lift rent controls beginning
April 1 created alarm among shopkeepers in the older parts of the
central city. Many of those who rent their premises said they would
be unable to pay the commercial rates that their landlords are likely
to demand. Not surprisingly, those renting out property take a different
view, and among the owners who are happy about the change are those
who manage waqf (or as they are known locally, wakaf)
properties.
According to a recent report in the local Sunday Times,
the current value of wakaf properties is Singapore $208 million,
about US$130 million. Wakaf administrators hope that those
shophouses—typical of older parts of Singapore, and consisting of
a shop at ground level and two or three stories of dwelling rooms
above—from which they draw rents may now begin to yield returns
three or four times what they have done until now. This will be
of considerable benefit to a range of Muslim institutions in Singapore.
The endowment of awqaf is a practice going back to the
very beginnings of Islam. A person of wealth could put a property
in trust for religious or charitable purposes and designate what
those purposes were. Income generated from a waqf might,
for example, be dedicated to the provision of education, or the
maintenance of a mosque. Those entrusted with the administration
of a waqf have the duty to maintain it in perpetuity and
ensure that its proceeds are used for the purposes intended.
Some of Singapore’s 90 wakafs (to revert to the local term)
were dedicated by Indian and Malay Muslims, but a large proportion
were established by prominent members of Singapore’s Arab community,
notably from the Alsagoff, Aljunied and Alkaff families. Syed Haroon
Aljunied is secretary of the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore,
which administers 53 of the wakafs, and other Arabs still
play a prominent, if diminished role in Muslim affairs in the island
state.
When the British took control of Singapore in 1819 and founded
the modern city, among the first people to settle there were Muhammad
bin Harun Aljunied and his nephew, both of whom were Arab merchants
who had previously lived in Sumatra, in present-day Indonesia. When,
in 1822, a committee was formed to plan the development of Singapore,
one of its members was an Arab, as it was anticipated that a large
number of Arabs would come to settle in Singapore. Various areas
were designated to be developed for specific communities, including
one for Arabs, but although settlers did come, it was not in the
numbers anticipated. Nevertheless, they made their mark on Singapore.
By the 1930s, the Arabs were the wealthiest community
in Singapore.
Most of the Arab community came from the Hadhramaut, in the southeast
of Yemen. Merchants from this area had established an extensive
trade network in Southeast Asia as early as the 9th century C.E.
and been instrumental in the introduction of Islam. Some took up
permanent residence in the region, but maintained close ties with
the Hadhramaut. They not only played a major role in Southeast Asian
trade, but were very prominent in Muslim community affairs.
In Singapore, Arabs who had built their fortunes on trade often
diversified into property, and some made highly astute investments
in land at a time when it still could be acquired for very low prices.
By the 1930s, the Arabs were the wealthiest community in Singapore,
mainly as a result of a sharp rise in land values following the
First World War.
Over the years, rich individuals converted sizeable pieces of
the lands they owned into wakafs, which not only supported
local Muslim projects but, in some instances, institutions in the
Hadhramaut. They supported the building of mosques and the establishment
of madrasas, or schools: the Aljunied and Alsagoff madrasas
still work to meet a demand from Muslim parents. Some were also
known as generous benefactors outside the Muslim population: Muhammad
bin Ahmad bin Abdul Rahman Alsagoff made a hefty contribution to
the construction of the Victoria Memorial Hall, to this day Singapore’s
chief concert venue.
The interwar years proved to be a high point for Singapore’s Arabs.
Then business competition intensifiedand property did not prove
to be the secure investment that had been anticipated. To alleviate
widespread hardship in post-World War II Singapore, the British
introduced rent controls in 1947. These resulted in a long-term
fall in real income for private Arab landlords and for most wakafs.
As a result, the latter have tended to provide a dwindling proportion
of the income of institutions which they were set up to support:
for example, in the past two decades, less than 10 percent of the
income of the Alsagoff school has come from the wakaf established
to support it.
Since Singapore’s independence, the government has made compulsory
purchases of large areas of privately owned land in order to use
them for public purposes, including construction of housing, roads
and institutions. Arabs being among the largest landowners, as a
community they were disproportionately affected. They complain that
the price they were paid was considerably less than the land’s value.
Finally, there has been some loss of community identity—or rather,
it might be argued, visibility—as Arabs have intermarried with other
Muslims, and Malay and Indian Muslims have played a growing part
in institutions which once were almost an Arab preserve.
Traces of the Arab role in Singapore remain visible: some notable
Arabs are acknowledged in the country’s history books; the streets
in the area once designated for development as an Arab community
retain their old names, although few Arabs still live and do business
there—Arab Street, Muscat Street, Baghdad Street and others. The
Arab Association of Singapore believes that the Arab population
numbers about 10,000 people in all. Links with the Middle East are
very much alive. As Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh commented
during his visit to Singapore in 1999, “The majority of the Arabs
in Singapore are from Yemen. Many of these Arab Singaporeans still
maintain close contacts with their relatives in Yemen.”
Better Luck This Time?
The new president of the Philippines, Gloria Arroyo, has said that
she wants to try to reach negotiated settlements to the two armed
insurgencies in her country—one by the armed wing of the communist-led
National Democratic Front and the other by Muslim rebels in the
islands of the south. Following talks in Kuala Lumpur between representatives
of the Manila government and those of the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), the MILF declared an indefinite suspension of offensive
operations, beginning on April 3.
The MILF is estimated to have some 15,000 men under arms. It broke
off talks with the government of Arroyo’s predecessor, Joseph Estrada,
after he ordered the Philippine army to launch an all-out offensive
against it. The army succeeded in capturing all the MILF’s main
military bases but, despite then-Secretary of Defence Orlando Mercado’s
declaration that “our military operations are now in the last stage,”
the MILF was far from crushed.
Eid Kabalu, a spokesman for the MILF, said, “Mrs. Arroyo is the
third president we’ll face in the talks, and we hope this will be
it.”
It was reported by the Philippine Daily Inquirer that Saudi
Arabia had approved a contribution of $100 million to help with
the development of Mindanao, the island where the MILF is based.
Most will be spent on infrastructure projects, but 20 percent is
to be devoted to the rehabilitation of Camp Abubakar, the MILF’s
biggest base before its capture by the army. “Camp” is a bit of
a misnomer for the base, however, as it encompassed three towns,
and had farms, schools, a sawmill, weapons-making facilities and
a mosque.
Malaysia Denies Clashes Were Ethnic
Six people died and over 40 were injured during clashes in and
around Petaling Jaya, near the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur.
Trouble began March 4, when participants in a Malay wedding party
and an Indian funeral crossed paths and ended up coming to blows.
A few days later, more serious violence flared up after a Malay
man tried to settle an argument between a group of Indians. Rumors
spread through the local communities that fighting was taking place,
sparking the worst violence.
Details remain vague. There were claims that a large Malay gang
from outside the area came in and started beating up Indians and
slashing at them with knives and parangs (a cutting implement
somewhat like a machete). Certainly, most of those killed and injured
were Indians and most of the people arrested by police were Malays.
The toll might have been worse if a number of local Malays had not
given shelter and protection to Indians threatened by gangs. The
clashes caused serious alarm in the government, which tries to keep
inter-communal conflicts in check. “This was not a clash between
Malays and Indians,” said Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.
“It could be that rumors were spread deliberately by irresponsible
people who wanted to take advantage of the situation.”
On a visit to the area where the clashes took place, he reminded
locals of the communal violence of 1969 between Chinese and Malays,
which had a very damaging impact upon Malaysia. It is not the kind
of event that the government, or the major opposition parties, want
to see occurring again—although that did not prevent Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamed from making an entirely unsubstantiated claim that
opposition parties had a hand in the trouble.
The violence took place within a small area, where most people
are very poor and there are serious crime problems. Most local commentators
see the violence as a product of strictly local conditions, rather
than a reflection of any wider Indian-Malay tensions.
Many local people believe that the trouble might have been contained
more quickly had the police intervened strongly when the first clashes
broke out. As it is, most of them are wary of doing anything that
would further inflame the situation, and want to get their lives
back to normal.
Indonesian Solution in Sight?
President Abdurrahman Wahid appeared before the Indonesian parliament
on March 28 to respond to corruption charges. Instead of appearing
contrite and conciliatory, however, he brushed aside the accusations
made against him and labeled “illegal” the team responsible for
investigating them.
This made his critics even more determined to press ahead with
a second motion of censure and to demand his resignation, but still
they fear a violent reaction by his supporters. Both parliament
speaker Akbar Tandjung and the president suggested that one way
out of the running crisis would be for the latter to hand over much
of his power to Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri—although they
certainly disagree about exactly what that would mean.
There are a number of difficulties with this suggestion. Some
parliamentarians feel that it would be wrong to accept a compromise
when there are questions of integrity involved. Others are skeptical
about the president’s ability to honor an agreement to yield many
of his powers: he once before committed himself to giving a much
larger role to Megawati, but did not do so. Nevertheless, some see
the proposal as a way of allowing the president to retire gracefully
and for Megawati to take over in practice, if not in name.
It is an idea that her own political organization, the Indonesian
Democratic Party-Struggle rejected immediately, seeing the suggestion
as a tactic by the president to buy time. It believes that he intends
to cling to power for as long as he can.
Megawati herself has been more cautious in her pronouncements
than some of her party members, and well she might be. She is acutely
aware of the danger of large-scale street violence breaking out
between supporters and opponents of the president, but she must
also bear in mind the character of the different forces that now
say they support her taking over the presidency. When she originally
ran for the post, a number of Muslim parties (including the United
Development Party, which won 39 parliamentary seats, but not Abdurrahman
Wahid’s own National Awakening Party, which has 51 seats) claimed
that a woman could not be elected president of a predominantly Muslim
country. They now seem to have forgotten about this “position of
principle.” Likewise, most members of the former government party,
GOLKAR, also opposed her at that time. Megawati knows that what
draws them together is only their determination to remove Abdurrahman
Wahid from power. She must wonder if, having got rid of him, they
will then direct their fire at her.
John Gee is a free-lance journalist based in Singapore and
the author of Unequal Conflict: Israel and the Palestinians,
available from the AET Book Club. |