Half a Century Ago, It Was Washington Restraining France

By Donald Neff

Nearly half a century ago—47 years, to be exact—the United States and France found themselves in completely opposite positions about waging war than they are today. In the summer of 1956, France was determined to go to war and the United States was adamantly opposed. By another strange twist, Britain also was anxious to go to war, as was another U.S. friend, Israel.

Their common foe was Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser.

The spark that inflamed war fever was Nasser’s July 26 nationalization of the Suez Canal. The dramatic action infuriated Britain and France, which were heavily dependent on the canal, and frightened Israel.

There were deeper reasons than Nasser’s nationalization that motivated Britain, France and Israel, however. The takeover of the canal, though legal, was another painful reminder to British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and French Prime Minister Guy Mollet of the end of their countries’ empires.

Britain at that moment was in the midst of withdrawing the last of 80,000 of its troops from the Suez, where they had been stationed since 1882. France was entangled in trying to repress a bloody rebellion in Algeria, its largest remaining colony in Africa.

Israel’s Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was deeply disturbed by the withdrawal of British troops along the Suez Canal, since the force served as a deterrent to an Egyptian attack across the Sinai Peninsula. Moreover, he feared a French defeat in Algeria would increase Arab power and weaken France, which at the time was Israel’s major supplier of weapons.

Mainly, however, Ben-Gurion feared the rising popularity and power of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Israeli leader publicly expressed his concern about Nasser in early 1956:

“I always feared that a personality might rise such as arose among the Arab rulers in the seventh century or like Kemal Ataturk, who rose in Turkey after its defeat in the First World War. He raised their spirits, changed their character, and turned them into a fighting nation. There was and still is a danger that Nasser is this man.”

A basic problem confronted the British and French: their bellicose protests against Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal had no legal standing. The nationalization was legal under international law, and Egypt was meticulously abiding by the provisions of the 1880 Convention of Constantinople, which called for unimpeded passage of all ships through the canal.

Behind Washington’s back, the three countries secretly colluded during the summer of 1956 to attack Egypt and get rid of Nasser.

A Minor Role for Iraq

At this point, Iraq even played a minor role in the 1956 drama, unbeknownst to itself. When U.S. intelligence detected Israeli forces secretly mobilizing for war, Israel tried to deceive Washington about its true aims. Tel Aviv claimed it was calling up reserves because it believed Iraqi forces were preparing to move into Jordan. When Secretary of State John Foster Dulles directly asked Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban about Israel’s actions, Eban insisted Israel’s concern was Iraq, not Egypt. In fact, Eban told Dulles he regretted that “the United States government has not shown a greater degree of faith in Israel’s basic intentions.”

Iraq at the time remained a puppet state of Britain, which had carved Iraq out of the Turkish Empire at the end of World War I. It certainly offered no danger to Israel.

Disagreements Kept Secret

In striking contrast to the current contretemps, the dispute between allies in 1956 took place largely in secret. So quiet was the disagreement kept that it remained largely unknown to the public for another decade. This was mainly because President Dwight D. Eisenhower valued U.S. allies—particularly Britain and its leader, Eden, with whom he had worked closely in World War II—and wanted to keep the Soviet Union ignorant of disarray during the Cold War.

As late as Oct. 14, just weeks before war, Ike was still unaware of its approach. Instead he celebrated his 66th birthday, with a warm note from Eden. The president replied: “I know that nothing can ever seriously mar either our personal friendship or the respect that our government and peoples have for each other.”

How wrong he was.

Dual Crises

In another eerie parallel to today’s simultaneous crises with both Iraq and North Korea, there arose dual crises during the Suez. This one occurred in Hungary on Oct. 24, 1956, when Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest to suppress a popular uprising. Five days later Israeli troops sped across the Sinai to attack the Suez Canal. Offshore from Egypt’s Port Said was gathered a massive armada of Anglo-French warships.

The world now seemed about as confused and in as much disarray as possible.

Though still unknown in Washington, the scheme cooked up by the trio of colluders was for Israel to occupy the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. Britain and France would then demand that both sides accept a ceasefire, or they would attack at the canal to stop the fighting. In reality, regardless of what Egypt did, the colluders had agreed among themselves that Israel would refuse a ceasefire, thus giving justification for intervention. The big secret was that the big powers would attack only the Egyptians.

In the event, Israel double-crossed its fellow schemers. During its thrust across the Sinai it had captured several choice sites in Sinai, and Israel was content to retain them. Thus it, too, accepted a cease-fire, much to the chagrin of Britain and France. When Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan informed representatives of Britain and France of Israel’s decision, he later recalled, they “almost jumped out of their skins.”

Any justification for war had now disappeared. But Eden and Mollet were so intent on getting rid of Nasser that they attacked anyway. Anglo-French air raids began Nov. 1, followed by parachute drops, naval bombardment and finally, on Nov. 6, invasion. In retaliation, Nasser ordered ships sunk in the canal, completely blocking it. Now the reason Britain and France were using publicly to explain their attack—the continued operation of the canal—was gone.

A Reckless Collusion

President Eisenhower was stunned by the recklessness of the Anglo-French collusion, particularly because it came at the same time that the Soviet Union was losing support around the world due to its brutal actions in Hungary. He forcefully applied pressure to stop the attack, as did the United Nations Security Council and widespread public protests.

So great was the opposition in Washington and the world community that Britain and France ceased their aggression the day after the Nov. 6 invasion. Within a month all British and French troops were gone from Egyptian soil.

But not Israeli troops. In fact, Ben-Gurion gave an exultant “victory” speech at the end of the fighting, declaring that Israel now controlled all of the Sinai and had no intention of returning it to Egypt.

Now it was Eisenhower who almost jumped out of his skin. “This is terrible,” he exclaimed. The president ordered Herbert Hoover Jr., son of the former president and now under secretary of state, to read the riot act to Israel. Hoover warned Israel that it risked losing “all United States government and private aid” as well as “eventual expulsion from the United Nations.”

The next day Ben-Gurion personally assured Eisenhower, “We never planned to annex the Sinai desert.”

His actions, however, proved different.

Over the next four months, Israel repeatedly announced withdrawal and just as repeatedly failed to move beyond minor surrenders of territory. What Ben-Gurion was after was retention of the Gaza Strip, with its lush citrus groves, and of Sharm el Sheikh, the choke point of the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel launched a highly successful public relations campaign among its supporters in the United States to counter Eisenhower’s opposition.

Israel gained the support of such important figures as Senate leaders Lyndon Johnson and William Knowland, Franklin Roosevelt’s widow, Eleanor, and former President Harry S. Truman. New York Senator Jacob Javits organized a group of 20 senators to back Israel’s position. Henry Luce, owner of Time Inc., was also enlisted.

Ben-Gurion’s continued refusal to withdraw caused Eisenhower to send him another personal message on Feb. 11, 1957, demanding “prompt and unconditional” withdrawal. Again, Ben-Gurion refused. It was galling enough to face such obstinacy from a small country. The frustration was exacerbated when such a prominent figure as Luce called Dulles to plead the Israeli case. Dulles exploded:

“I am aware how almost impossible it is in this country to carry out a foreign policy not approved by the Jews....I am going to try to have one. This does not mean I am anti-Jewish, but I believe in what George Washington said in his Farewell Address that an emotional attachment to another country should not interfere.”

At about the same time, perhaps thinking of Luce’s call, Dulles remarked to a friend about “the terrific control the Jews have over the news media.”

With such support, Ben-Gurion continued his defiance. Eisenhower and Dulles grew increasingly frustrated. Dulles complained to another friend:

“I am very much concerned over the fact that the Jewish influence here is completely dominating the scene and making it almost impossible to get Congress to do anything they don’t approve of. The Israeli Embassy is practically dictating to Congress through influential Jewish people in the country.”

Eisenhower decided to confront congressional leaders personally. On Feb. 20, he met with leaders of both parties and asked them to oppose Israel’s occupation. They refused.

In complete frustration, Eisenhower sent another letter to Ben-Gurion, warning that the United States could cut off private assistance to Israel, which would be a severe blow to the Jewish state. At the time Americans privately donated annually to Israel $40 million, all of it tax deductible, and bought $60 million in Israeli bonds.

That same night Eisenhower went on national television to explain to Americans why he opposed Israel’s attempt to retain Egypt’s Sinai peninsula:

“If the United Nations once admits that international disputes can be settled by using force, then we will have destroyed the very foundation of the organization and our best hope of establishing world order....I believe that in the interests of peace the United Nations has no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions.”

Ben-Gurion defiantly snapped back the next day: “Every attempt to impose on us perverted justice and a regime of discrimination will encounter unshrinking opposition from the Israeli people. No matter what may happen, Israel will not submit to the restoration of the status quo in the Strip.”

Finally, six Muslim nations, goaded by America’s weakness and Israel’s intransigence, that same day introduced a strong resolution in the U.N. General Assembly demanding an end to all aid to Israel if it did not withdraw. Buffeted by these various pressures, Israel finally withdrew on March 17, ending what became known to history as the Suez Crisis.

Paying the Price

Among the leaders, Anthony Eden paid most for the unsavory affair. Though the basic facts of the collusion still remained hidden in secrecy at the time, the media and Parliament were rife with speculation about the degree of Eden’s role as the chief colluder. He publicly lied about his role but could not escape public blame. Public opprobrium was so great that on Jan. 9 Eden resigned, never to return to power.

When Eden died in 1977, his obituary in The Times of London read: “He was the last prime minister to believe Britain was a great power and the first to confront a crisis which proved she was not.”

Mollet and France, still mired in a bloody war to retain its Algerian colony, displayed Gallic sangfroid by greeting the affair with a cynical shrug. Nonetheless, his party was voted out of power in May 1957, ending Mollet’s premiership.

Among the colluders, only Ben-Gurion emerged from the debacle with spoils. Postwar negotiations with the United Nations forced Egypt to open the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and U.N. peacekeepers were stationed between Egypt and Israel to prevent Egyptian fedayeen raids.

Ben-Gurion, ignoring the ill will his intransigence over withdrawing caused in the Eisenhower administration, claimed that Israel was a winner. In a speech, he said that “this campaign diminished the stature of the Egyptian dictator and I don’t want you or the entire people to underestimate the importance of this fact.”

In reality, Nasser emerged from the crisis far stronger than ever. He was widely hailed in the Arab and Third World as a hero who had stood up to the great powers of Britain and France and won U.S. support while doing it—quite a political feat.

The New York Times editorialized that Nasser had “pulled a political victory out of his military defeat. He had gained strength in the Arab world instead of losing it....The balance of this month’s events seems to show an irrevocable loss of prestige and friendship by the British and French.”

The greatest winner turned out to be the most reluctant participant, Dwight David Eisenhower. The U.S. president’s principled stand against aggression won him high praise around the world.His U.N. ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, reported that he was deluged by other U.N. members with congratulations about America’s conduct. From Cairo, a center of the Third World, Ambassador Raymond Hare cabled: “The U.S. has suddenly emerged as a real champion of right.”

Donald Neff is author of the Warriors trilogy, including Warriors at Suez, a history of the Suez crisis, 50 Years of Israel, and the recently updated Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy Towards Palestine and Israel Since 1945, all available through the AET Book Club.