U.N. Acts With Its Heart Following Sept. 11 Attacks On U.S.

By Ian Williams

Shortly before 9 a.m. on Sept. 11 NYPD and FBI officials turned up at U.N. headquarters in New York and did what Jesse Helms has been trying to do for some time: they closed it down. The action was a result of concern, however, rather than of senatorial rancor. The building had been mentioned as a potential target in the previous attack on the World Trade Center, and it was alleged to be on the target list this time. It was a little early for the U.N., so it was as much a case of turning staff away as evacuating the building.

The following day, with the smoke of the burning towers sharp in the air and First Avenue blocked to all traffic, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1368 expressing its horror at the events. The resolution referred to the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter,” and secondly declared that acts such as the attack on the World Trade Center were “like any act of international terrorism…a threat to international peace and security.” It then called on “all states to work together to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist acts and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable.”

The delegates, based in New York, felt the horror of other New Yorkers at what had happened within view of the headquarter’s higher floors, as well as a need to demonstrate their solidarity to their hosts. Some of them now wonder if they were not a little too reflexive in their attitude. It was not intended to do so, and the resolution was not an American initiative. In retrospect, however, it may well be one of a series of blank checks issued to the White House—and, as this is written, no one is sure who in the administration will be cashing the check.

Unlike the Gulf war resolution, 1368 did not invoke Chapter VII of the Charter, which authorizes military action and sanctions. Nevertheless, its references to self-defense will be noted. Some in Washington, in fact, already are taking them as legal cover for anything the U.S. does, since Article 51 of the Charter allows for states’ individual and collective self-defense. In this way—although more by accident than design—1368 also harmonizes with the NATO Council resolution, which reiterated that an attack on any member state was an attack on all, and therefore the attack on the U.S. was the subject of collective self-defense by the alliance.

Resolution 1368 may well be one of a series of blank checks issued to the White House.

The Security Council resolution was replicated by the General Assembly. Afghanistan, clearly already the number one target, did not oppose it. That is because, however, the Taliban government is not recognized and the seat is held by the previous government. Vindictive people in Washington were looking at the chance to hit Iraq but, since it has not paid its dues, Iraq also has no vote. (The Security Council has not allowed Baghdad to use oil-for-food funds to pay its U.N. dues.)

The real issue for the U.S., however, is not the need for a legal mandate. As a senior Western diplomat suggested, it was less a question of legality and more one of political reality that would be the important factor in Washington’s planning. The Bush administration has remained noncommittal about any need to return to the U.N. for further authorization for action or to provide identification for suspects. Some senior Western diplomats, in fact, are unconvinced that there is sufficient evidence to link Osama bin Laden directly to the Sept. 11 attacks, but Secretary of State Colin Powell promised that the evidence soon would be made available, and the administration would be throwing away a chance to win over the court of international public opinion if such evidence were not made public.

The administration already has shown that it is willing to pay a price for its new war, including tacitly condoning Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs, and—reportedly in response to Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia—putting the screws on Ariel Sharon to get a truce and talks between Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat. Sharon had annoyed the U.S. administration with a teleconference to American Jewish leaders in which he linked Osama bin Laden and Yasser Arafat as leaders of terrorist organizations that needed to be rooted out.

This is not what Washington, trying to convince a dubious Arab world to assist the American military build up, wanted to hear. The Arab world had noted that Sharon had taken the opportunity of the Western media’s concentration on New York to intensify his campaign against the territories and wanted no part of his obsessive bloodthirstiness.

Sweeping the Agenda Clean

Even if the U.N. does not concern itself directly with targets or methods, it swept the agenda clean to deal with the general issue. As the U.N. secretary-general and well meaning heads of state like French President Jacques Chirac have repeatedly stressed, the U.N. has about a dozen different conventions on different aspects of terrorism. For a long-term battle against terrorism, however defined, international cooperation is needed, and the United Nations is the only forum that can deliver that.

To begin with, the General Assembly postponed the Children’s Summit that was due to take place within a week of the attack, as well as the so-called General Debate which usually begins the last week of September, attended by the heads of state of member countries. That had the added benefit of sparing George W. Bush the shame of an American president turning up once again at the U.N. with huge arrears.

Ironically, it was Congress that, yet again, was holding payment of U.S. dues ransom—but this time to ensure that no American citizen ever would be tried by the International Criminal Court. Apparently Congress is unaware that the U.N. has no control over the ICC. Even so, the ICC would be a very convincing forum to try alleged terrorists like Bin Laden. Finally, realizing that Washington can’t expect international cooperation in a war against terrorism if U.N. dues are held ransom, Congress at the end of September released a substantial amount of the money owed.

Like most world leaders, Secretary-General Kofi Annan was too polite to tell the Americans what to do—or, more precisely what not to do—in response to the attacks on its soil. In his Sept. 24 speech to the General Assembly, he did gently remind them that their response should stay within ethical bounds. “Let us uphold our own principles and standards,” he urged, “so that we can make the difference unmistakable, for all the world to see, between those who resort to terrorism and those who fight against it.”

It would be good to think that the American administration, having discovered the uses of the U.N. following the invasion of Kuwait, might remember it again. It would be even better if Washington stayed involved afterward, as it failed to do after the Gulf war, and played a constructive role in the world community, instead of waiting for cataclysms like that of Sept. 11 to engage with its fellow nations.

Western Sahara

“You say tomayto, I say tomahto,” goes the old song. Similarly, King Mohamed of Morocco’s serenade to the Security Council might go, “You say consultations, I say I’ve won.” In an interview with Le Monde, he claimed to have settled “the question of the Sahara which has been poisoning us for 25 years…We worked hard, during 18 months and in the strictest confidentiality, in order to have 11 members of the U.N. Security Council recognize the legitimacy of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.”

Of course they did not, and have not.

Indeed, the talks with the Mauritanians, Polisario and the Algerians that former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker convened in Wyoming ended with little or no visible progress for the Baker proposal. The absence of the Morrocan delegation, in fact, tended to reinforce participants’ suspicions that Baker’s intention was a hard sell for the plan about which the king was crowing so intemperately. Even if they did not share the king’s prognosis, they certainly shared the royal view of the intended outcome of the plan to postpone the referendum for five years of “autonomy” under Moroccan tutelage—in effect, a gradual consolidation of the occupation.

Politely, none of them so far have raised any questions about the new U.S. ambassador in Rabat. Margaret Tutwiler was the gravelly voiced spokeswoman for then-Secretary of State Baker under the previous Bush administration. Of course, she could be in Morocco pressuring Rabat to carry out what numerous U.N. resolutions have called upon it to do: allow the free referendum. On the other hand, maybe she still is speaking for Baker, who is, of course, officially the U.N. secretary general’s representative.

Ian Williams is a free-lance journalist based at the United Nations.

SIDEBAR

A Letter to the President

Sept. 28, 2001

Dear President Bush:

To help advance your vital and urgent campaign against terrorism, I offer a suggestion that arises from my own 34-year examination of terrorism in the Middle East, the first 16 years as a Republican member of Congress.

I recommend that you demonstrate your concern for the well-being of Palestinians. You can best demonstrate it, I believe, by announcing U.S. support for a viable, independent Palestine.

It would cause an immediate outpouring of enthusiasm for your anti-terrorism campaign from great numbers of people worldwide, especially in the Middle East and the subcontinent of Asia where strong support for your campaign is urgently needed. These people—some of them government officials—recognize that Palestinians, long neglected and abused by history, deserve the dignity and promise of full citizenship in a state of their own. Your statement—the first such endorsement by a U.S. president—would elicit joy, even though the statehood goal may not be reached in the immediate future.

Past U.S. administrations have left the question of statehood to negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis, but the dreadful events of Sept. 11 render this policy outdated and insufficient. Your statement would immediately swell the anti-terrorism ranks, because your statement would present Palestinians with realistic hope for ultimate justice and emancipation from occupation.

Support for a viable, independent Palestine is consistent with America’s longstanding commitment to equal rights for all people and the principle of self-determination. Thoroughly merited on moral and legal grounds, the statement can also be justified as a matter of “military necessity,” the primary argument that Abraham Lincoln offered during an earlier time of great national peril when he promulgated the Emancipation Proclamation.

Presenting Palestinians with hope for tomorrow will strengthen your anti-terrorism endeavors today. In no sense could your declaration be considered “caving in to terrorists.” To the contrary, it will be saluted nearly everywhere as a timely, long overdue improvement in U.S. Middle East policy.

Your statement of support would:

1. be applauded by many Israelis—perhaps a large majority of them. By now, they realize that they can never really relax until Palestinians gain full citizenship in a truly viable state of their own.

2. reduce if not halt the scourge of lethal exchanges between Palestinians and Israelis. It would give both communities bright hope of a happier, less stressful life in which the security of both Israel and the new Palestine can, with U.S. support, be attained. There is no inconsistency between U.S. friendship and support for Israel and U.S. support for Palestinian statehood.

3. elicit rejoicing by millions of people who champion the rule of law. People of all faiths are troubled by America’s unconditional support of a government that frequently violates international law and uses military equipment we donate to gain control of territory. Every time Israel violates international law, its moral authority is diminished and, as the consequence of our perceived complicity, so is America’s. By calling for independent statehood, the United States will make a significant break from this debilitating cycle.

4. reduce hostility against America and provide an important balance to our government’s current resort to arms. The evil designs that led to the terrorist bombings of Sept. 11 are widely believed to have been prompted partly by anger over America’s role in the abuse of Palestinians.

U.S. support of Palestinian statehood is inevitable. It should be announced now when the announcement can assist our nation at a time of peril, easing dangerous passions that are rising against Arabs and Muslims in this country and against America in foreign lands.

A final note. In a private comment to me in 1962, Dwight D. Eisenhower made this profound observation, “We tend to deal with urgent matters and leave the important ones until tomorrow.” For the sake of our country, a clear recognition of Palestinian rights should not be left until tomorrow.

Mr. President, I want to help. With that in mind, I enclose a summary of my career. If you should direct a member of your staff to call me, I will be grateful.

Sincerely yours,

Paul Findley

P.S. Since leaving Congress in 1983, I have written three books that relate to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The latest is Silent No More: Confronting America’s False Images of Islam, a copy of which was presented to you during your recent visit to Washington’s Islamic Center.