Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November
2002, page 15
Special Report
American Ambassador Recalls Israeli Assassination Attempt—With
U.S. Weapons
By Andrew I. Killgore
Just before John Gunther Dean was to appear before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee for his confirmation hearing as American
ambassador to Lebanon in 1978 he received an urgent telephone call
from the office of the secretary of state. “John,” the caller said,
“we have just noticed that your mother’s [maiden] name is Ashkenaczi.
Does this make a serious problem for you?”
“Absolutely not,” the near legendary Dean replied, “my father
was Jewish, too. I represent a secular America, so that’s all there
is to it.”
In a Sept. 6 talk in Washington, DC before an audience made up
mainly of retired American diplomats, Ambassador Dean, as related
to the Washington Report by one of those in attendance, described
his three turbulent years (1978-1981) in Beirut. There he did his
courageous best to implement stated American policy goals in Lebanon:
maintaining its territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty. For
his pains, Israel tried but failed to assassinate him and his family.
In a period of brutal civil war amid more than a dozen political/religious
factions Dean, who already had held ambassadorships in Cambodia
and Denmark, traveled from one end of the country to the other,
calling personally on the leaders of every group. Israel, meanwhile,
maintained a rump state in southern Lebanon under Lebanese mercenary
Maj. Saad Haddad while encouraging unrealistic dreams of a small
Christian “Maronistan” state. As U.S. ambassador, John Gunther Dean,
renowned for his physical and moral courage, opposed Israeli machinations,
arguing that close ties to Israel would harm Christian interests
in the long run.
Ambassador Dean, who does not speak Arabic, conducted his relations
with Lebanese officials in French, then the second language of educated
Lebanese. He believed, moreover, that he could not properly operate
in the country without maintaining close relations with France and
the French Embassy. In a perhaps uniquely rare role for any U.S.
ambassador, while serving in Lebanon Dean had co-signing authority
with President Elias Sarkis on Lebanon’s hundreds of millions of
dollars deposited in Swiss banks.
John Gunther Dean sought and obtained authorization to deal with
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) if it was deemed to
be in America’s “national security interests.” When an “interlocutor”
in Washington wondered if the Palestinians could help release American
diplomatic hostages being held in Tehran, Dean sought—and received—Palestinian
help. PLO leader Yasser Arafat and his aide Abu Jihad themselves
went to Tehran in 1979 and secured the release of 13 Americans.
Never, Dean noted, did the two receive any thanks from Washington
for their efforts.
Anyone who gets between the U.S. president and the prime
minister of Israel “finds himself in trouble.”
Ambassador Dean’s diligence in knowing everybody paid off in an
astonishing incident when the ambassador of Saudi Arabia to Lebanon
was shot. As the intermediary in transferring the ambassador to
the American University of Beirut (AUB) Hospital for treatment,
John Dean reached the secretary to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, as
well as Yasser Arafat, who was able to stop the firing on the hospital
occasioned by the Saudi ambassador’s presence there.
In a prescient reference to his role in Lebanon, Dean reportedly
remarked that anyone who gets between the president of the United
States and the prime minister of Israel “finds himself in trouble.”
An amusing anecdote: Riding in his armored limousine in Beirut
with ardently pro-Israel Congressman Steve Solarz, a bullet hit
the car. “What’s that?” Solarz asked. “Just a bullet,” Dean replied,
“but don’t worry. We are armored.” Solarz insisted on returning
to the American Embassy, where he cabled home, “Arafat shot at me!”
To stress his support for the sovereignty of Lebanon Dean always
cabled protests to Tel Aviv and the State Department in Washington
whenever Israeli planes intruded—as they frequently did—into Lebanese
airspace. These reminders irritated U.S. Ambassador to Israel Sam
Lewis, with whom Dean preserved cordial relations but who suffered
to a notable degree from what the U.S. Foreign Service calls “localitis”
(not Ambassador Dean’s term). Other irritants flowed from Dean’s
urging Lebanese Christian leader Bashir Gemayel to stop seeing Israeli
Mossad officers.
Dean’s staunchly courageous defense of Lebanese (and American)
interests came to a head in the early evening of Aug. 27, 1980,
when, according to all the evidence, Mossad tried but failed to
assassinate Dean, his wife (whose French family had old business
connections in Lebanon) and their daughter. The long-rumored attempted
murder of Dean by Mossad, infamously more noted for its prowess
at assassinations than for its abilities as an intelligence agency,
was publicly confirmed for the first time in Dean’s Washington talk.
En route from his residence in Lebanon’s hills to the Beirut residence
of the AUB president, Dean’s limousine and convoy took 21 rifle
bullets. The automobile bearing the ambassador and Mrs. Dean was
also struck by two light anti-tank weapons. The shot-out tires on
the Deans’ bulletproof car automatically reinflated. The second
car, however, carrying their daughter and her fiancé, did not have
bulletproof tires and was momentarily stranded. The security guards
in the convoy’s third car pushed the daughter and her fiancé into
the Deans’ vehicle, and they sped away. Incredibly, none of the
ambassador’s party or security guards were seriously wounded. Some
shots struck where Dean was sitting, but bulletproof plastic windows
saved his life.
Picked up by Lebanese security, the anti-tank canisters had made-in-America
markings. After unanswered telegrams to the State Department and
all but silent responses to his telephone inquiries, Dean eventually
learned that the anti-tank weapons were sold and shipped to Israel
in 1974. Dean apparently mused to himself on the irony of an American
ambassador being subjected to an Israeli assassination attempt with
American weapons supplied to Israel for defense.
The Facts Speak
The ambassador did not explicitly accuse Israel of trying to assassinate
him, but let the facts as he related them speak for themselves.
But Washington’s acute unease in responding to his inquiries testifies
to the deadening influence of the Israel lobby on American diplomacy.
On the assassination of Arafat’s personal assistant, Abu Hassan,
in early 1979, Ambassador Dean was told by the Lebanese intelligence
service that three Mossad officers, bearing Belgian and Australian
passports, had come to Beirut masquerading as tourists for the purpose
of killing Abu Hassan, whose greatest “drawback,” in Dean‘s opinion,
was that he was close to the Americans.
While Ambassador Dean did not commend himself to Israel, he very
much gained the respect and affection of Lebanon which, on his departure
form Beirut, awarded him its highest decoration. And out of the
turmoil of Lebanon he also kept the confidence of the United States,
which subsequently honored him with two additional ambassadorships,
in Thailand and India.
Andrew I. Killgore, a retired foreign service officer and former
U.S. ambassador to Qatar, is publisher of the Washington Report. |