U.S. Red Lines and Bypass Roads

By Eugene Bird

Are there emerging red lines for Colin Powell and George Bush which even Israel cannot cross? That certainly seems to be the case. Some of the lines, however, appear to be elastic—a fact of which Israel is quick to take advantage.

The first indication that even this administration, reluctant as it is to get involved in any international disputes that might require more than an American airlift, might be laying down some lines came with an angered Colin Powell’s April 17 statement denouncing the first major Israeli re-occupation of a small part of the southern Gaza Strip.

Powell’s reaction came as a surprise to everyone—including congressional supporters of Israel. One of them, Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY) asked Powell in a hearing on Capitol Hill a few days later if the secretary thought it wise to make such a statement, which might encourage the Palestinians. Powell demurred, saying he had not known that the Israeli commander, who had said he was going to remain with his troops and tanks indefinitely, already had withdrawn by the time Powell reacted—thus endorsing the Israeli version of events.

The Israelis, however, read Powell’s retreat accurately. On May 11 they invaded the southern Gaza Strip and remained there for several days. Since then, Israel has established a more or less permanent presence on a small bit of Palestinian-allocated territory near Rafah in Gaza, turning it into an Israeli security zone, supposedly to shut down arms smuggling across the Egyptian border.

Since then there have been several Israeli incursions into Gaza and West Bank areas, with troops remaining for several days or weeks without U.S. protest.

On the West Bank, the Israeli takeover of Orient House came only weeks after the death of Faisal Husseini, and probably would not have occurred if he had been alive. American policymakers did manage to express once again their concerns over the takeover, describing it as a “political” action—a polite term for annexation.

The Israeli flag over Orient House came down, but Israeli troops remain in place, carting off Palestinian maps and documents, including land records and deeds of seized Palestinian property in Jerusalem. Israel, it seems clear, will continue its drang nach osten (drive to the East) on the West Bank—invading Palestinian territory, then retreating, then invading again following Palestinian gunfire or a suicide bombing.

At the same time it is criticizing Israeli actions, however, Washington also seems to be constructing a series of rhetorical bypass roads around the core issue of land-for-peace. Bypassing continuing Israeli provocations such as house demolitions, torture—even of American Palestinians—and the besieging of Palestinian cities, U.S. policy clearly has worked to the advantage of Ariel Sharon. The Israeli prime minister has not had to restrain his drive to get rid of as many Palestinians as he can by using measures just short of all out war and re-occupation of all Palestinian-controlled territory.

Setting red lines beyond which Sharon’s Israel cannot go should be Washington’s first priority. Without making some very real decisions about borders, refugees and Jerusalem, the U.S. government will be tested continuously by the Israeli prime minister on the very rational assumption that Israel will gain something out of any advance it chooses to make in the wake of bombings or other Palestinian resistance that undermines their influence with the U.S.

The dilemma for the Bush administration is that laying down such red lines violates their firmly held belief that the parties must decide these issues between themselves. But there is plenty of evidence, even from the hawkish doves in Sharon’s cabinet, that the majority of Israelis believe they in fact cannot achieve peace by themselves. Arafat, too, repeatedly has called for international and even American involvement in monitoring Israeli “provocations.”

And, of course, there is always the “Israeli-occupied” U.S. Congress and the dual loyalty radical Zionists who can kick up a political fuss and not only prevent a policy from being adopted but change how it is implemented by American diplomats on the ground.

Looking back over the last 10 years, one can appreciate the strategic savvy of Israel’s policymakers. Former Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, after being forced out of office largely through the efforts of George Bush the first, said he would have negotiated for 10 years if necessary without reaching an agreement. And the U.S., especially under the Clinton administration, allowed the peace process to grow so slowly and deferred so many decisions, seriously violating both the spirit and the specifics of land-for-peace, that it can be said to be ultimately responsible for the current intifada.

Washington twisted Arafat’s arm very hard to get him to accept the ABC map for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Congress threatened the Palestinian leader with a cutoff of American aid if he did not sign the 1994 agreement. That was the first step in the long road leading to checkpoints, bypass roads and widespread demolition of Palestinian homes in an effort to ethnically cleanse Judea and Samaria.

In the long run, it has been a very bad deal for both America and Israel. In addition to the complex terms of the withdrawal and the many unenvisioned bypass roads that worked to the detriment of Palestinians, many Israelis discovered that the Oslo agreement really did promise the Palestinians a full or near-full retreat to the 1967 Green Line. Some Israeli commentators and scholars suggested it would be a mistake to return large chunks of Palestinian territory before the subject of Jerusalem was even on the table. So Israeli voters elected two different right-wing governments to prevent implementation of withdrawal agreements and slow down the process of redeployment of Israeli troops.

Viewed from the lofty seventh floor of the Department of State, the only red line the administration can lay down to restrain Israel from taking advantage of the increasing violence to acquire more land is one that guarantees the Palestinians only five percent of the West Bank, area A. But a runaway freight train cannot be stopped with just an occasional use of brakes if the engine continues to run full-speed ahead. Without a strong and persistent deterrent, Sharon will not end his creeping annexation of East Jerusalem and large parts of the West Bank.

One has to admit, however, that it is difficult to conceive of anything strong and persistent emanating from Washington, with the Bush-Powell team having its eye on the looming and difficult 2002 mid-term elections. Given this reality, any U.S. and European initiative would have to be unveiled before Christmas.

Policy bypass roads around key issues still plague Washington’s ability to end the violence and get on with some kind of final agreement equally dissatisfying to both Israel and the Palestinians. Meanwhile, Israeli colonies continue to expand even during the intifada, the torture of young Palestinians continues despite the Israeli Supreme Court decision of two years ago, and U.S. policymakers are reduced to hand-wringing.

The only question is whether President George W. Bush intends to let the situation continue to spiral downward while he urges an end to the violence as the only solution, or whether he finally will own up to the need to lay down some strong, logical ground rules for both parties and a basis from which to resume negotiations. After all, the argument goes, if Washington does not have a plan for a final settlement that is in accord with at least a rough form of justice, how can the parties to the conflict find a solution?

The Reluctant Dragon, George W. Bush, will need something more than crisis reaction policies to end the violence. He will need to build some new policy roads straight through, not bypassing, the Final Settlement issues. It’s clear that what is needed to bring peace to the area is an end to Israeli occupation of Arab land. When the U.S. boldly indicates the parameters of a final peace, the parties may find a majority in both countries supporting this made-outside-the-Middle East solution.

In the meantime, Sharon’s policy of invasion and assassination may have the unintended consequence of pushing the U.S. to take a stand. Following Israel’s Aug. 27 assassination of PFLP head Mustafa Zibri in a building where some 20 Palestinian Americans also lived, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said that “Israel needs to understand that targeted killings of Palestinians don’t end the violence but are only inflaming an already volatile situation and making it much harder to restore calm.

“If the situation on the ground is to improve,” Boucher continued, “then Israel must also take the economic and security steps that are necessary to alleviate the pressure, the hardship and the humiliations of the Palestinian population.”

Could the Bush-Powell team be on the verge of transcending hand-wringing?

Eugene Bird, a retired foreign service officer, is president of the Council for the National Interest and diplomatic correspondent for the Washington Report.

SIDEBAR

Seven Days in August?

At his July meeting with American Secretary of State Colin Powell, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon laid down a condition for Israeli implementation of the Mitchell report: seven days of complete quiet and Palestinian observance of a cease-fire, before the six weeks of confidence-building measures, to be followed by negotiations, could be resumed as called for in the report.

State Department sources confirmed off the record that State did not see the seven days as a firm requirement. The spokesperson refused to specify, however, how many days would be needed.

But he did confirm that the seven, or perhaps fewer, days of complete calm and cease-fire was up to the Palestinians. Monitoring was not even on the agenda, he said, until Yasser Arafat actually denounced violence of all kinds, arrested the people responsible, and took measures to prevent any further bombings or other terror against Israel.

Holding the Palestinians solely responsible and refusing to adopt the European plan for putting two sets of observers in place at flash points, the Bush administration swerved toward the Israeli position on ending the intifada. Since the Palestinian street now has the bit in its mouth, however, it is seeking not just peace, but freedom and independence.

If the suicide bombings were stopped, what guarantees does the Palestinian public have that Israel would withdraw to its pre-September 2000 positions and cease firing into Palestinian territory at flash points?

“Seven Days in August,” as called for by Sharon and at least in part by Colin Powell and company, proved to be elusive, as do most oversimplifications. In mid-August Arafat resumed his earlier effort to include Hamas and the radical PFLP in his government of national unity. Members of the Palestine Legislative Council said in Washington, however, that such a government was both unlikely and would not do much to improve the situation, given the differing outlooks on the proper road to independence—via negotiation vs. guerrilla operations.

Israel’s Aug. 27 assassination of PFLP leader Mustafa Zibri, however, may have been an indication that talks on a national unity government were proceeding. It may also have pushed the various Palestinian factions closer to an agreement on the basis for such a government.

—E.B.