Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September-October 2002, pages 58, 70

Letter From the Levant

Saudi Prince Walid Ibn Talal—Lebanon’s Next Prime Minister?

By Sami Moubayed

Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri is in the hot spot once again, facing a barrage of criticism for the country’s prolonged economic stalemate. This time, however, his accusers are not members of the Lebanese opposition, but Saudi Prince Walid Ibn Talal. The prince, who is half-Lebanese—on his mother’s side—and carries a Lebanese passport, is the grandson of Lebanon’s first post-independence prime minister, Riad al-Solh. Today more than ever, Prince Walid sees himself as the political heir of his grandfather, who is known as the father of post-French Mandate Lebanon.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Riad’s daughter Alia, a journalist with the an-Nahar newspaper, became involved in the day-to-day politics of the civil war. Since then, the Solh family has distanced itself from the complex web of Lebanese politics. Recently, however, Prince Walid has given several indications that he plans to involve himself more seriously in Beirut politics. This has sent shockwaves throughout the Lebanese capital and prompted Prime Minister Hariri to fire back and defend a post he held from 1992 to 1998 and fought so dearly to regain in 2000.

Alia, Prince Walid’s aunt, established a name for herself as a fervent opponent of Syria and managed to appeal to those who shared her political vision. Prince Walid, however, is following a different strategy, presenting himself as a potential ally of Damascus and as someone who strives to resurrect Lebanon through economic, rather than political, emancipation. During the late President Hafez Al-Assad’s lifetime, Walid invested heavily in Syria, and made many friends in the secret corridors of Damascus. Following the ascendancy of President Bashar Assad in 2000, Prince Walid increased his investment in Syria and is on excellent terms with its young leader. The Saudi tycoon, ranked as the world’s fifth richest man, presides over a fortune estimated at $20 billion, and has invested heavily in Lebanon as well since the civil war ended in 1990. He rebuilt Beirut’s electricity network after the Israelis bombarded the Lebanese capital in 1999, and has invested in the reconstruction of downtown Beirut, particularly in a posh neighborhood of restaurants and cafés named after his grandfather. Throughout the 1990s, the prince described himself as a friend of Lebanon, never expressing a desire to embark on a political career there. In March 2002, however, he gave a television interview sharply critical of Prime Minister Hariri’s economic policies.

The Hariri cabinet has no economic reform plan, Walid charged, pointing out that, under Hariri, the country’s $30 billion national debt represented 170 percent of the GDP, with a budget deficit equivalent to 16.5 percent. These numbers, Walid said, were an indicator that economic reform is not working and should be altered. If Hariri continues in this direction, the prince added, foreign debt would amount to 200 percent of GDP in the very near future. “Now is the time for the current government to wake up, face the truth and be frank with itself and its people,” he said. Describing as “inadequate” Hariri’s promise that Lebanon’s economic growth rate would increase between 1 and 2 percent in 2002, Walid argued that, even if it were achieved, it would not relieve the country’s economic burdens.

Hariri’s allies snapped back that five-year plans were outdated socialist measures that cannot be applied to Lebanon. On instructions from the prime minister, they spearheaded a campaign against the prince, arguing that he had no right to interfere in Lebanese politics and that his suggestions for reform were unacceptable. They capitalized on the fact that he is a Saudi citizen and not 100 percent Lebanese, and, in the words of Finance Minister Fouad al-Siniora, charged that Walid “is a businessman of the private sector and does not know about the public one.”

Walid added insult to injury by showing up in Beirut on the eve of the Arab Summit and meeting with President Emile Lahoud, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, Sunni Mufti Rashid Qabbani and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. He snubbed the prime minister, however, refusing to pay him the customary guest call. The prince then went into closed session with President Lahoud, whose relations with Hariri also are strained, and was awarded the Lebanese Republic’s highest Order of Merit at a ceremony attended by everyone except the prime minister.

Prince Walid antagonized Hariri even further by giving a controversial interview to the Beirut newspaper al-Afkar çn which he expressed his desire to assume a position of authority in Lebanon. When asked whether he would vie for the office of prime minister, Walid replied that this would be considered in due course, “when the time is right.”

Hariri, who was expecting a firm denial from the prince, was shocked at Walid’s response. Enraging the prime minister even more, al-Afkar published a front-page photo of Walid captioned, “His Excellency Prince Walid Ibn Talal” rather than “His Highness,” as is the customary reference to royals.

Kor was Prince Walid done yet. Appealing directly to Beirut’s Sunni Muslims—1he bulk, if not all, of Hariri’s prime loyalists—the prince, who regularly contributes to a variety of charitable organizations, donated $2 million for the construction of a grand mosque in downtown Beirut. (Ironically, Hariri accused Walid of trying to buy off Beirut public opinion.)

ýhen, acknowledging the sensitive topic of Arab street opinion on Palestine, the prince promised to invest heavily in the reconstruction of the occupied territories and donate to the victims in the Jenin refugee camp. That promise sent his popularity skyrocketing in Sunni neighborhoods. Hariri, on the other hand, the usual benefactor, has failed to make such a public gesture toward Palestine.

Al-Afkar, which has turned anti-Hariri, compared those lobbying against Walid’s donations to the Zionist lobby that blocked his donations to New York following the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. The “Beiruti lobby,” according to Walid, are a “small and confused segment of society” who pursue “personal rather than nationalistic objectives” and who were pressured to speak out “by a certain party that is known to all in Lebanon.”

Before challenging Prime Minister Hariri’s authority, Prince Walid surely received a go-ahead signal from senior decision makers in Riyadh. Hariri, after all, is Saudi Arabia’s number one man in the Middle East, and a challenge to his regional authority from within the House of Saud is a dangerous precedent that cannot go unnoticed. Either the Lebanese prime minister has fallen from grace and the Saudis are starting to search for an alternative, or Prince Walid launched his campaign on his own, without prior support from Riyadh. If this is the case—which is unlikely—Walid will be pressured by his uncles to back down. If the alternative explanation is true, then Hariri’s days as prime minister of Lebanon apparently are numbered.

Walid’s allies in Saudi Arabia, however, are few. Unlike Hariri, who is ever loyal to the Saudi royals, Walid, as one of them, can speak out and voice his opinion about what he sees as wrong. He repeatedly has called for the democratization of Saudi Arabia and has criticized Saudi royals who at one point or another were business associates of Hariri. Walid’s strongest ally and patron is King Fahd, but, given Fahd’s deteriorating health, he must rely on the less visible yet equally strong backing of Crown Prince Abdullah, Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader.

The crown prince, however—who is close to Walid and has endorsed many of his projects and quests—will find himself in a tight spot between his nephew and Hariri. Abdullah, at the height of his glory today, has no time to become involved in Walid-Hariri disputes. Since his February 2002 peace initiative Abdullah has become the most strategic regional decision-maker in the Arab world. Losing Hariri at such a critical stage could hamper his efforts for peace, which need as much regional backing as possible. Abdullah cannot afford an offended Lebanon.

Nor, on the other hand, can he afford to alienate one of the royal family’s most prominent members, and one who could be of great help to his rise to power in the event of King Fahd’s passing. Therefore, Abdullah equally cannot afford an offended Prince Walid.

üt the moment, with the crisis just beginning to unfold, many options still are available to Hariri, Walid, and Crown Prince Abdullah. While the latter refused to interfere in the entire affair, Hariri has left it to his associates to defend him. Walid, however, has embarked on a public relations campaign, personally appealing to the people of Lebanon and emphasizing that he is bound to the country by patriotic, familial, and financial commitments. His vow not to step down no matter how harsh the media campaign against him recalls Hariri’s own words in 1992, when he emerged as a newcomer to Beiruti politics and marketed himself as prime minister in waiting. The real estate and development tycoon was a stranger to the Lebanese public, a nobody in the world of politics, and had lived all his life abroad. But he came at a time when the Lebanese were looking for change and desperate for an alternative.

Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.