May/June 1991, Page 11
Special Report
Reprise of the October Surprise: Is the Worst
Surprise Still to Come?
By Richard H. Curtiss
"Congress will not formally investigate charges that the
Reagan campaign stole the election in 1980, in large part because
Israel's supporters on Capitol Hill do not want to put the spotlight
on Israel's role, which during that period sold weapons to Iran
in blatant disregard of President Carter."
Prediction by Newsweek correspondent Eleanor Clift,
on the NBC television talk show The McLaughlin Group, May
12, 1991
For regular readers of this magazine, there is little that is new
in the current flurry of American media reports on the "October
Surprise" of 1980, other than the fact that Gary Sick, a retired
career Navy officer and a National Security Council Middle East
adviser in President Jimmy Carter's White House, now is writing
a book on the subject. His article in the April 15 New York Times,
and a one-hour sympathetic examination of the evidence on PBS's
"Front Line, " shown nationwide on April 16, left little
doubt among open-minded readers and viewers that Ronald Reagan campaign
officials promised arms and money to Iran to delay release of 52
American hostages until after the Nov. 4, 1980 presidential election.
The Extent of Israel's Role
What both Sick and the program skirted, however, was the extent
of Israel's role, not just as sole source of the arms shipments,
but perhaps in instigating the deal as well. And, more important,
both touched only lightly on the fact that, as "middleman"
in the 1980 deal, Israel had the subsequent power to blackmail the
Reagan administration, and did. The question this raises is whether
that vulnerability to blackmail also extends to President George
Bush, who was running as vice presidential candidate on the Reagan
ticket at the time the deal was made.
Various parts of the story were reported throughout the summer
of 1987 by, among others, Barbara Honegger in In These Times,
Christopher Hitchens in The Nation, and Alfonso Chardy
in the Miami Herald. This writer, after a September 1987
interview in Paris with Abolhassan Bani Sadr, president of Iran
while the hostages were being held and Reagan campaign aides were
meeting with Iranian Islamic Republic officials, wrote an extensive
report in the October 1987 issue of the Washington Report on
Middle East Affairs, and, most recently, in the October 1990
issue.
Background to Treason
Witnesses disagree on many details of the meetings leading up to
the deal, which can only be described as treason, but there is amazing
consistency, as Sick belatedly notes, in the broad outlines of the
story. It begins in the summer of 1980.
Ronald Reagan had been nominated as the Republican Party's presidential
candidate. He, in turn, had selected his principal Republican rival,
George Bush, as the vice presidential nominee. Inevitably, the fate
of 52 American hostages being held in the US Embassy in Tehran by
the Islamic revolutionary government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
preoccupied American voters.
When the hostages were seized in November 1979, President Jimmy
Carter had frozen $12 billion in Iranian assets deposited in US
banks before the fall of the shah. It was no secret that Carter
and Khomeini officials were negotiating the amount of funds to be
released in return for the freedom of the embassy hostages, and
the amount to be held back to settle claims against Iran by US firms
and individuals for contracts cancelled and property seized by the
revolutionary government. The Khomeini government especially wanted
the Carter administration to release for shipment to Iran arms that
had been ordered and paid for by the shah, but frozen in the procurement
pipeline by the US.
Initially, Carter had been running behind, partly because a third-party
candidacy by liberal Republican Congressman John Anderson was attracting
many Democratic voters. Polls, however, showed Carter moving up
to a dead heat with the Reagan-Bush ticket by October. Voters were
so evenly divided that almost any pre-election development could
determine the outcome.
Vice presidential candidate George Bush said publicly that the
Republicans feared "an October surprise" by the Democrats.
Privately, the Republicans had been informed, apparently by someone
on active duty in the military or in US intelligence, that Carter
planned a dramatic rescue attempt to free the hostages in Tehran,
perhaps similar to the failed "Desert I" helicopter rescue
attempt in which eight American servicemen died earlier in the year.
Retired Admiral Robert Garrick, serving in Reagan campaign headquarters,
actually coordinated the setting up of a network of active and retired
military supporters of Reagan at military bases in the US, Europe
and Asia from which such rescue activity might be launched. Members
of the volunteer network have admitted publicly that they planned
to leak stories of any unusual activity to the media and thus force
the Carter administration to give up the attempt.
Israel had the subsequent power to blackmail the
Reagan administration, and did.
Those provisions having been made, the only other way that Carter
could produce the hostages before election day, and thus create
a nationwide euphoria that could swing the election in his favor,
was through successful negotiations with the Iranians.
The Story Begins
It is here that the story of illegal dealings with Khomeini intermediaries
by Reagan campaign officials begins. Bob Woodward and Walter Pincus
of The Washington Post were the first to report that one
such meeting took place in Washington, DC. It was held Oct. 2 at
the L'Enfant Plaza Hotel. Reagan campaign participants were Richard
Allen, subsequently the Reagan administration's first national security
adviser; Marine Lt. Col. Robert (Bud) McFarlane, then an aide to
Senator John Tower but subsequently also a Reagan administration
national security adviser; and Allen aide Lawrence Silberman, who
apparently set up the meeting and who presently is a judge on the
Federal Court of Appeals in the national capital. A shadowy Iranian
Jewish arms dealer, Hushang Lavie, says he was the Iranian principal.
Allen says he was not, but that he has forgotten the name of the
Iranian they met. Silberman and McFarlane wouldn't discuss the matter
with the "Frontline" producers. All three Americans maintain,
however, that they have lost any notes they made during or after
the meeting.
Sick and the "Frontline" producers say that long before
the meeting in the L'Enfant Plaza Hotel there were others, starting
in early March of 1980, involving Reagan campaign manager William
Casey, a former OSS operative and, subsequently, Reagan's first
director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Casey's first meeting
was in Washington, DC's Mayflower Hotel with two Iranian arms dealers,
Cyrus and Jamshid Hashemi. The brothers, who also were involved
in the Iranian dealings with the Carter administration, said Casey
made it clear he wanted to prevent Carter from gaining political
advantage from freeing the hostages.
Cyrus Hashemi subsequently reported some of this to the CIA before
his sudden death in 1986, three months after cooperating with US
Customs agents in a sting operation in which Israelis, Europeans
and Americans were arrested on charges of conspiring to sell arms
illegally. Jamshid Hashemi told Sick and the "Frontline"
producers, however, that, after the Mayflower meeting, Casey and
an unnamed US intelligence officer met Mehdi Karrubi, now speaker
of the Iranian parliament, in Madrid in late July 1980, promising
arms and to unfreeze Iranian assets if release of the hostages were
delayed until after the election. The same threesome, Jamshid Hasherni
said, met again in Madrid several weeks later, and at that meeting
Karrubi agreed to cooperate with the Reagan campaign about the timing
of the hostage release.
A Third Set of Meetings
There have been many reports about a third set of meetings, between
Oct. 15 and Oct. 20, in various Paris hotels. Because literally
dozens of witnesses claim knowledge of these meetings, details as
to the participants vary. Most agree, however, that Casey was involved.
Some claim involvement by CIA agent Donald Gregg, then a Carter
administration national security aide and subsequently Vice President
George Bush's chief of staff. Gregg, now US ambassador to Korea,
says he was on vacation at a Delaware beach throughout the time
period involved. He refused to be interviewed by the "Frontline"
producers.
A few witnesses also claim to have seen George Bush in Paris, or
to have heard from others that he was in Paris at the time of the
meetings. These reports have so often and so vehemently been denied
that they seem to have no substance. In fact, it is probably the
persistence of some investigators like Barbara Honegger in advancing
the reports of Bush's involvement that has cast a shadow over the
credibility of the entire story, even as verifiable new details
of the "October Surprise" continue to surface.
Among Iranians named as participants in the Paris meetings by Americans
claiming to be witnesses were Manucher Ghorbanifar, the Iran-born
Mossad agent and arms dealer who later played a central role in
the Iranscam arms-for-hostages scandal. Former Iranian President
Bani Sadr seemed to confirm this when he told the writer that the
Iranian participant in the Washington meeting with Allen, McFarlane
and Silberman was either Ghorbanifar, Parvis Sabati, or both. Bani
Sadr also named four Iranians who backstopped the operation. They
included his successor as president of Iran, Mohammad Ali Rajai
I and the then-speaker of Parliament and now principal Iranian leader,
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
It was right after the alleged Paris meetings that some witnesses
say Israel sent, between Oct. 21 and 23, a shipment of spare parts
for F-104s to Iran, flagrantly contravening US rules requiring US
approval of any shipments of US-made arms to third parties. The
Israelis previously had sent such parts, mostly F-104 wheels, to
Iran and had been warned by the Carter administration to stop it
in the spring of 1980, according to former Israeli intelligence
agent Ari Ben Menache. He also suggested to the "Frontline"
investigators that George Bush was involved in at least one meeting
between Reagan campaign officials and Iranians. Hushang Lavie said
he had "heard" Bush was in Paris at the time of the meeting
there. This seems to make clear who it is who now hopes to implicate
Bush in the sins of the Reagan campaign officials.
On Oct. 22, the hostages were dispersed to different locations,
complicating any attempt at rescue. That indicates Iranians were
alerted during the Paris or other meetings to possible Carter plans
for a rescue operation. At the same time, Iranian Parliament members
began delaying tactics, perhaps to frustrate any financial bargain
with Carter administration officials.
The Stories Converge
From this point, all stories about the "October Surprise"
that never happened converge. Barbara Honegger, then a Reagan campaign
worker, said she was told by a fellow campaign aide that there would
be no "October surprise" because "Dick's made a deal.
" She assumes the reference was to Richard Allen, but it could
also have been to Reagan pollster Richard Wirthlin, who was persistently
warning that, in view of the dead heat in public opinion, the hostages
could make the difference either way. She has subsequently included
all of this in her book, October Surprise. Around the same
time, William Casey assured a journalist that if anything happened
to help Carter break the public opinion deadlock, it wouldn't have
anything to do with the hostages.
Reagan won the election, but Carter officials labored on to make
a deal to extricate the hostages. In late December and early January,
the Iranians finally made a sudden series of concessions and Carter
agreed to release $4 billion of Iran's $12 billion in frozen funds.
Bani Sadr's account lends further credence from the Iranian side
to the reports by American witnesses of parallel Republican and
Carter administration negotiations. The former Iranian president
told the writer that, after the Iraqi attack on Iran in September
1980, he urged the ayatollah to take whatever cash deal the Carter
administration was offering, release the hostages, and get on with
fighting the war. For a time, however, Khomeini became angry whenever
he brought up the subject, Bani Sadr said, insisting that Carter
should unfreeze US weapons in the pipeline to Iran, as well as Iran's
frozen funds.
Then, suddenly, the ayatollah lost interest in talking to Bani
Sadr about weapons, and in fact seemed reluctant to talk to him
about the deal at all. Bani Sadr is convinced that when his rivals
in the Khomeini government got the promise of arms as well as cash
from Reagan campaign officials, Khomeini lost all interest in his
government's talks with the Carter administration, and the star
of Bani Sadr, who still was pushing the Carter negotiation and still
had ties to the West, began to fall.
Carter, meanwhile, kept waiting for the prisoners to be released
in response to the cash-only deal he had made. He was still waiting
by the telephone throughout his last night in office. He gave up
at 6 am, snatched two hours of sleep, and then accompanied his successor
to the Capitol steps.
Meanwhile, at the Tehran airport, television footage shows Iranian
officials guarding the hostages listening on portable radios to
inauguration ceremonies. Exactly 15 minutes after Ronald Reagan
took the oath of office, the hostages were released and put on an
airplane to fly home. Clearly, it was a signal. At the time, however,
no one except perhaps some newly appointed Reagan officials, and
some of their Israeli equivalents, knew what it meant.
Arms Follow Hostages
The hostages came home from 444 days of captivity and a very few
weeks later in March 1981, Israel signed an agreement to ship arms
to Iran. One planeload left immediately. The Washington Post
says the shipment was authorized by then-Secretary of State
Alexander Haig and was worth $10 to $15 million. Haig denies this,
but adds, "I have a sneaking suspicion that someone in the
White House winked. " Another report says the weapons sent
to Iran were worth $53 million. Still another estimates their value
at $246 million.
One aircraft chartered in Argentina and carrying American arms
to Iran from Israel crashed in Turkey on July 18, 1981. Bani Sadr
says it was the third arms shipment by air from Israel in the first
six months of the Reagan administration. In the same month, Bani
Sadr, who had broken with the ayatollah, escaped into Turkey with
a defecting Iranian pilot in an Iranian Air Force plane. Bani Sadr
can furnish no details of further shipments. Israeli Housing Minister
and former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon has said repeatedly, however,
that all Israeli shipments of arms to Iran during its war with Iraq
were sanctioned by the US government. Then-Israeli Ambassador to
the US Moshe Arens told the Boston Globe in October 1982
that Israel's arms shipments to Iran were coordinated with the US
government "at almost the highest of levels."
A Chilling, Clinching Argument
For doubters who still find it hard to believe that Americans of
any political persuasion would, to be elected, enter into a cynical
bargain to leave American hostages at risk through the harsh Tehran
winter in an unheated embassy while Iranian mobs howled for their
blood in the streets outside, there is a chilling, clinching argument
in the report of John Anderson, the independent candidate for president
in 1980. Officials of his campaign were approached by Iranians who
offered them a deal to trade hostages for arms. The Anderson officials
said no, and complied with the law by reporting the Iranian overture
to the FBI. The FBI received no report of any kind from McFarlane,
Allen, Silberman, Casey, or Admiral Garrick, who had been designated
the sole Reagan campaign spokesman on all hostage matters.
The idea that Iranians would approach dark-horse Anderson officials,
and not approach Reagan campaign officials, is absurd. And, with
clearly documented meetings in Washington and murkily documented
meetings in Madrid and Paris, wouldn't some member of Reagan's campaign
staff have complied with the legal requirement to report to federal
authorities an illegal overture about the 52 hostages from Iran,
a country with which the US had no diplomatic relations? Perhaps
not, if the Reagan campaign staff members to whom the overture had
been made had broken the law by accepting it.
So, since there is no hard evidence that Ronald Reagan was informed
of it in anyway, what is the significance today of this violation
of the law that may have tipped the scales in favor of his election?
First, it is a very likely explanation of why, whenever the Reagan
administration and the hard-line Israeli governments of Menachem
Begin and his successors went eyeball to eyeball, it was always
the US that blinked. The US declined to press Begin on such topics
as the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, the invasion of Lebanon, the
occupation of West Beirut, the Sabra-Shatila massacres, and even
the Reagan Plan for Middle East peace. The Reagan administration
apparently was vulnerable to highly damaging Israeli blackmail,
and at least some top officials of both governments knew it.
If Israel's disinformation squad has its way, the
worst is yet to come.
It also explains how and why the Reagan administration so easily
fell into the catastrophic series of arms-for-hostages blunders,
clearly instigated as well as carried out by Israel, that became
known as Irangate, or the Iran-Contra scandal. The renewed arms
shipments in 1985 and 1986 were initiated by reopening exactly the
same channels used in 1980 and 1981 by some of the same principals
on both, sides.
The Final Significance
The final significance of the story concerns the administration
of George Bush, now clearly teetering on the edge of a major initiative
to put pressure on Israel for a land-for-peace Israeli-Palestinian
settlement. If Bush really was involved personally in illicit Reagan
campaign activities to forestall an "October surprise,"
he would now be so vulnerable to Israeli blackmail that no such
political or economic pressure on Israel would be possible, even
today. In the more likely event that Bush was not personally involved,
clever Israeli agents could work through media leaks to create doubt
about his role. This seems to be happening with the televised testimony
of Israeli agent Ari Ben Menache, and that of Hushang Lavie, the
Iranian arms dealer.
Gary Sick's book, which he expects to finish in a year, clearly
is aimed at influencing the 1992 elections in favor of Democratic
candidates. Israeli efforts to implicate Bush, however, probably
won't wait. If renewed US media attention to the "October surprise"
so far has produced no major surprises, stay tuned. If Israel's
disinformation squad has its way, the worst is yet to come.
Richard H. Curtiss, a retired US foreign service officer, is
executive editor of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs.
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