Qatar's New Ruler Breaks the GCC Policy Mold

by Richard H. Curtiss

If Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani's assumption of rule in Qatar had precedents in Gulf and Qatari history, some of the policies he has initiated do not. Critics fear the newest and youngest of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sovereigns could create dangerous fissures within the alliance of six hereditary rulers who, together, control more than a third of the world's petroleum reserves. Supporters say the policies of this first Gulf ruler who also is a member of the "successor generation" are based on post-Cold War world realities and lay the groundwork for more open rule in a region where it is overdue.

Where his father, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad, relied on Qatar's appointed Council of Advisers (Majlis al-Shura) for non-binding advice and counsel, Sheikh Hamad has sent experts to study municipal elections in other parts of the world as a prelude to experimenting with democratic self-government at the village and municipal levels. At the national level, he has invited the media to cover meetings of the advisory council.

Three months after assuming power in Qatar in June 1995, Sheikh Hamad also lifted formal press censorship, although he reportedly advised journalists to be gentle in criticizing government officials, at least initially. He also is discussing the reduction or even abolition of Qatar's Ministry of Information, which provides the radio and television programming for the Gulf state. He already has authorized the arrival of cable television, although government censors will cut excessive sexuality from its films¸an arrangement that probably would pass muster with a majority of American parents if it were tried in the United States.

In economic policy, Sheikh Hamad has waived the customary limit of 50 percent foreign ownership of joint ventures. The result should be a quickening of economic activity, even though for the moment Qatar is cash-strapped because of its succession problem. In a law aimed directly at the practice of his father, who put oil revenues in a personal account from which he funded government activities, Sheikh Hamad is drafting a law prohibiting himself and his successors from mingling personal and public bank accounts.

Even in women's affairs, where Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been the most conservative of any of the 21 Arab League members, traditions are being broken. One of Sheikh Hamad's three wives, Mouza, has lectured to women university students and, in conversations with foreign visitors, has been outspoken in favor of rapid social change.

Traditionally, Qatar's military policy was closely aligned with that of Saudi Arabia. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussain's invasion of Kuwait showed that the Saudis had to rely on the United States to protect Saudi territory from invasion and to force the Iraqis out of Kuwait, Sheikh Hamad concluded that his country should align itself much more directly with the United States than heretofore.

Where U.S. and Qatari relations were somewhat strained before the Gulf war, primarily over American suspicions that Qatar had obtained hand-held U.S. Stinger anti-aircraft missiles from the CIA-funded mujahedeen who had fought Soviet forces in Afghanistan, bilateral relations had become much closer even before the change of government in Qatar.

During the Gulf war, Qatar allowed the U.S. and other coalition forces to fly tactical missions over Kuwait from Qatari bases. Since the war, Qatar, along with Kuwait, has agreed to store weapons sufficient for a U.S. brigade on its soil, and if U.S. plans to store weapons for a third brigade in another Gulf country do not work out, Qatar has agreed to accept weapons for a second brigade.

Most astonishing and controversial of Qatar's policies, however, have been Sheikh Hamad's openings to Israel. Even before his assumption of power, Qatari journalists had visited Israel, and Israeli journalists were allowed to attend a meeting held in Qatar in conjunction with the peace process.

Since then, Qatar has entered into negotiations to supply Israel with natural gas, initially in liquified form to be supplied by ship. Eventually, if successful continuation of the peace process makes it possible, the Qataris are considering funding construction of a pipeline through neighboring countries that would bring natural gas directly to Israel.

In the meantime, the Qataris have permitted continued low-key visits by Israeli journalists and in April hosted Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres for a day in Qatar. Peres visited Muscat on the same trip, in what was seen as a U.S.-sponsored attempt to shore up the Israeli prime minister's re-election prospects by demonstrating that the Israeli Labor party's peace negotiations with the Palestinians and Jordan have enabled Israel to break out of its regional isolation. Toward the same end, in mid-March Qatar sent its 37-year-old foreign minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr Al Thani, to the regional anti-terrorism meeting sponsored by the U.S. at Sharm el-Sheikh, in Egypt.

In shoring up Peres' popular support, however, some felt Qatar's new ruler was endangering his own. A poll taken in conjunction with the Peres visit in advance of a final settlement with either Syria or the Palestinians showed that 70 percent of Qataris disapproved of it. The new emir's supporters rejoined that the fact that the poll could be taken, and the results published in Qatari newspapers, show just how serious Qatar's new ruler is about opening up the political system and abolishing press censorship.

There is no doubt that Sandhurst-educated Sheikh Hamad's policies spring from his own deeply held convictions, derived over many years as the chief executive officer in his father's government. But they are said to be refined and honed in an open and sometimes surprisingly frank running dialog between Sheikh Hamad, his brother, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Sheikh Abdullah bin Khalifa, and at least two other particularly close advisers. These include Minister of Energy and Industry Abdallah bin Hamad Al Attiyah, and strong-willed Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabr Al Thani, who previously served as Qatar's minister of municipalities.

Because of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa's openness and popularity, his Arab critics are inclined to ascribe policies they do not like to Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim rather than to the new ruler himself. Wherever they originate, Qatar's new policies are far from popular with some of the new emir's fellow GCC rulers. Kuwait accuses Sheikh Hamad of reopening lines of communication to Iraq without waiting for the departure of President Saddam Hussain. Bahrain accuses Sheikh Hamad of permitting ties between figures in his government and highly placed figures close to President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani of Iran, a country which Bahrain blames for much of the domestic unrest among its Shi'i majority. There even are rumors that Iraqi petroleum is finding is way first to Iran, then to Qatar and then into world markets, in defiance of the U.N. embargo.

Political figures in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have expressed misgivings about some of Sheikh Hamad's policies, which they see as possibly destabilizing the entire area by promoting change more rapidly than the deeply conservative residents of the region can absorb it. While there is a visible effort at the highest levels in both countries to mute such criticisms, Saudis also have interpreted Sheikh Hamad's overtures toward Israel as attempts to enlist the support of the pro-Israel administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton in any future Qatari dispute with Saudi Arabia.

It is this aspect of Sheikh Hamad's policies that draws the most criticism from Arabs inside and outside Qatar. They charge it is fundamentally inconsistent to make overtures simultaneously to Israel and to its two most outspoken Middle Eastern adversaries, Iraq and Iran. Nor, Sheikh Hamad's critics predict, will the overtures to Israel provide Qatar with more leverage in Washington.

This is because the United States considers oil-rich Saudi Arabia and populous Egypt its two most important allies in the Arab world and nothing is likely to change this in the foreseeable future. Further, Saudi Arabia is one of the best customers for American products anywhere in the world. In any showdown between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, it is hard to imagine that the United States would be willing to sacrifice its close ties with Saudi Arabia.

In free-wheeling discussions with friends and advisers, Sheikh Hamad answers all of these criticisms by saying the changes he is making are just as necessary and inevitable in the Middle East as elsewhere in the world. If conservative Arab governments do not offer their people political and social reforms voluntarily, he says, the people will take them by force.

Asked by a journalist to comment on where a Likud election victory in Israel would leave Qatar, as the Gulf country that has been most forthcoming to Israel's Labor government even before it has settled all of its problems with the Palestinians, an American diplomat replied, "Where will a Likud victory leave everyone, including the United States?" It's a question that, hopefully, will not have to be answered while Qatar's new ruler embarks on a political journey that no Arabian peninsula ruler has made before.

SIDEBAR

Qatar at a Glance

Compiled by Shawn L. Twing

Population: 533,916 (July 1995 estimate)

Capital: Doha

Religion: Muslim, 95 percent

Literacy: total population: 76 percent.
Male literacy: 77 percent.
Female literacy: 72 percent

Per Capita Income: $20,820 (1994 estimate)

Total Gross Domestic Product: $10.7 billion (1994 estimate)

Major Industries: Crude oil production and refining, fertilizers, petrochemicals, steel and cement

Chief of State: Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani

National Day: Independence Day, Sept. 3 (1971)

Transportation: Highways: 1,190 kilometers (1,030 km paved and 160 km unpaved); Pipelines: crude oil, 235 km, natural gas, 400 km; Ports: Doha, Halul Island and Umm Sa'id; Merchant marine, 19 ships (11 cargo, 3 oil tankers, 1 refrigerated cargo, 3 container and 1 combination ore/oil); Airports: 6 (1 with over 3,047 meters of paved runways).

Climate: Desert: hot and dry, humid and sultry in the summer

Geographic Features: Mostly flat and barren desert covered with loose sand and gravel

Form of Government: Traditional monarchy with a unicameral legislature (Majlis Al Shura)

Organizations: Arab League, Arab Monetary Fund, G-7, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Gulf Cooperation Council, International Atomic Energy Agency, World Bank, International Development Bank, International Labor Organization, International Monetary Fund, INTELSAT, INTERPOL, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Organization of the Islamic Conference, United Nations, United Nations Trade and Development Organization, United Nations Economic and Social Committee and World Health Organization

Defense Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force and Public Security forces

Life Expectancy: total population: 73.03 years
male: 70.45 years; female: 75.5 years

Strategic Considerations: Qatar is located in the oil-rich Persian/Arabian Gulf. It also has the third largest reserves of natural gas in the world.

Media: 5 radio stations (2 AM and 3 FM)

Communications: 110,000 telephones with a modern telecommunications system centered in Doha. International calls are accommodated by a tropospheric scatter to Bahrain, microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, submarine cable to Bahrain and the UAE, 2 INTELSAT satellites (1 for the Atlantic Ocean and 1 for the Indian Ocean) and 1 ARABSAT earth station.

Currency: Qatari riyal (QR), $1=3.64 QR (fixed rate)

State Department Restrictions: none

Top Trading Partners: Imports : Japan (16 percent), United Kingdom (11 percent), United States (11 percent), Germany (7 percent), France (5 percent); Exports: Japan (57 percent), South Korea (9 percent), Brazil (4 percent), UAE (4 percent), Singapore (3 percent). (1992 estimates).

Diplomatic Representation in U.S.: Ambassador Abd Al Rahman bin Saud bin Fahd Al Thani, 600 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Suite 1180, Washington, DC 20037. Telephone: (202) 338-0111

U.S. Diplomatic Representation in Qatar: Ambassador Patrick Theros, P.O. Box 2399, Doha, Qatar. Telephone: 011 974 864-701. Facsimile: 011 974 861-669.