Richard Schifter: Human Rights or "Population Exchange" Advocate?

By Paul D. Molineaux

Following behind President Clinton as he visited an ancient Jewish cemetery in Prague in January 1994 was a White House aide not known to the American public at large, but well known inside the capital beltway. He is Richard Schifter, Washington attorney from the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Schriver & Kampelman, and Reagan administration U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Human Rights Commission and assistant secretary of state for human rights.

Schifter is a committed Zionist who has occupied one influential federal government position after another—wherever U.S. policies toward Israel could be influenced. I first became aware of his dedicated partisanship on behalf of Israel 10 years ago, when he visited Bonn, where I was serving in the U.S. Embassy political section.

For Schifter, and other Israel-firsters in Washington, the very meaning of life seems to lie in promoting Israeli power—an end unto itself which transcends all other notions of right and wrong. A political appointee in both Republican and Democratic administrations, he argues, dissimulates, pulls rank and seeks to intimidate foreign service and civil service career officers into setting up separate standards for Israel than for the rest of the world, while posing as a defender of justice and human rights.

"My country right or wrong," said an American patriot. The great 19th century American liberal, Carl Schurz, agreed, but added:"but if wrong, I will do all I can to make it right."

Richard Schifter, according to my observations and those who have served with him, lives by another standard: Israel right or wrong; if wrong, I will do all I can to make it look right.

Schifter lost his job as assistant secretary of state for human rights during the Bush administration. After the election of Bill Clinton as president, Schifter sought help from the pro-Israel establishment to get a political appointment either as U.S. ambassador to Israel or to a new position to be created for him as undersecretary of state for democracy.

Fearing that Senate confirmation hearings would spotlight the unique ability of Israel-firsters like Schifter or State Department consultant Dennis Ross to wangle coveted political appointments from either Republican or Democratic administrations, the Clinton White House instead offered Schifter a National Security Council position that would not require Senate confirmation.

Schifter now is a special assistant on the National Security Council staff, apparently with a license to inject himself into foreign policy matters at random. He already has made himself a super-editor of that part of the annual State Department human rights report dealing with—surprise!—Israel.

I met Schifter in Bonn in October 1983, where one of my ancillary duties in the political section of the American Embassy was as human rights officer. Since he then was U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), I was tasked to arrange the schedule for his visit to Germany.

Since the official portion of his itinerary ended on Friday afternoon, but he was not to depart until Sunday, he asked for my suggestions on how he and his wife, Lilo, might pass the time on Saturday.

As it so happened, I was to speak that day at a youth center across the Rhine River in the picturesque resort town of Konigswinter. Would he be interested in hearing the political views of a group of modern young politically active Germans? Schifter, who grew up speaking German, was delighted.

My wife and I had a pleasant lunch with the Schifters that Saturday in a rustic tavern in Bad Godesberg, then proceeded via the Rhine ferry to the Adam Stegerwald Haus in Konigswinter. The program called for me to speak about German-American relations for half an hour, followed by an open-ended discussion.

After my talk and ten minutes of discussion, there was a 15-minute coffee break. Schifter volunteered his compliments on how I was handling the discussion. In 1983 the German "peace movement" was in full flower, and controversy raged about the NATO decision to deploy intermediate range missiles in West Germany. Anti-American sentiment was strong, and I regularly confronted hostile audiences; but this group was mature and the discussion, though lively, was civil.

After coffee, we resumed. As the discussion about American foreign policy broadened beyond Germany, one fellow wanted to know what I thought about U.S. policy toward the Israeli-Arab conflict.

I had served as political counselor at the American Embassy in Beirut early in Lebanon's terrible civil war. My experiences there, along with the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its tragic aftermath, in which more than 300 U.S. troops and U.S. Embassy employees were killed in Beirut, had led me to consider carefully how much of Lebanon's and America's travail derived from unconditional American support of Israel over the years.

Political officers at American embassies are free to express their personal views about policy, provided they are labeled as such. (The rules do not allow ambassadors and other official spokespersons such freedom of speech. Because people assume not unreasonably that an ambassador or State Department spokesman speaks the mind of his government, he must in fact do so, whatever his opinion.)

I said I assumed the questioner was asking what was the American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. No, he said, he wanted my personal view. I could have served up some diplomatic boilerplate about a just peace, negotiations, and U.S. support for U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Recklessly, I chose candor. I assured the young questioner that what he was about to hear was not the view of my government, but strictly my personal view. That became manifest very quickly, anyway.

As I recall, I said that the United States had little to do with the creation of Israel in 1948; but massive American military, economic and diplomatic support ever since had fed Israel's most expansive ambitions, reducing Israeli incentives to seek a land-for-peace settlement and prolonging the conflict. I became aware, as I spoke, that Richard Schifter was listening very intently to my remarks.

He said nothing during the discussion, but as I drove the Schifters back to their hotel, it became clear that he was extremely angry. He was polite to a fault, but he delivered an intense 30-minute monologue, a Zionist apologia throughout. One phrase sticks in my mind to this day: "population exchange." The solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, he maintained, was to accept the earlier "transfer" of Palestinians out, continue to "transfer" Jews from elsewhere in, and produce something like the " Allon Plan," involving chains of Israeli settlements along the heights of the West Bank and in the Jordan Valley to guarantee Israeli security.

A Correspondence Begins

Back in Washington, Schifter sent me a nice first-person thank you note for my assistance, and some enclosures. This began some correspondence between us, the flavor of which is contained in these excerpts:

October 3, 1983

Dear Paul:

... Enclosed herewith, as promised, is a copy of the speeches I delivered in Geneva ... Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of "Jerusalem."

October 20, 1983

Dear Mr. Schifter:

... While speaking with all bluntness to those German students, I could see that you were biting your tongue. I much appreciate your synopsis of your own outlook on the trip back ... the "Allon Plan" certainly does take some account of the very legitimate grievances of the Palestinians. However, whereas it takes into account the Israeli security interests in an absolute way, it allows only limited room for the legitimate interests of others.

Absolutist definitions of national security needs which trample the rights of others—whether from the Soviet Union or from Israel—do not in fact serve peace, but do lend credence to the suspicion that something else-self-aggrandizement-is in fact intended. Further, of course, the history of modern Israel—under both Labor and Likud governments—does not offer any reasonable basis on which to believe that an "Allon Plan" would be authentically respected by any Israeli government. I remain convinced that true peace between Arabs and Israelis—in which I presume Israelis have a real interest—is only achievable through the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank.

I have read your UNHRC statements, and wish I could share your belief in "my country's unswerving commitment to peace in the Middle East," but, frankly, I don't: The reason is buried in the same sentence of your statement: Resolutions 242 and 338 do not even admit the existence of a Palestinian question. How, then, can they serve peace? I read with admiration your statements on self-determination and litiman rights in Poland, Afghanistan, and the U.S.S.R., even Suriname. I trust that in the next round you will also find a kind word for the Palestinians.

December 19, 1983

Dear Paul:

... If we are of the view that the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948 was a wrong on which the statute of limitations has never run and will never run, we can arrive at the conclusion that a great many recent happenings are "the fault of Israel. " (And let me say that I can understand the arguments against the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. On the other hand, I believe that in most situations of this kind, the world ultimately ratifies the status quo, as in the case of Greece and Turkey, India and Pakistan, and even in the case of the expulsion of Germans from Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia... the number of Arabs who left Israel in 1948 is about equal to the number of Jews who moved from the Arab world to Israel in the period from 1948 to 195 1. It would seem appropriate to close the books on this population exchange.) Once we get past the year 1949, the "heart of the problem," to use that clich6, appears to me to be the failure of the Arabs to make peace...

Let me add a few words about ... a West Bank state. I happen to agree with those who say that a Palestinian Arab state now exists and that it is Jordan. . . . As I see it, the issue which is posed by the suggestion that a West Bank state be created is whether a political movement is entitled to a separate state ...

The present division, I believe, is not between Palestinians and Jordanians. It is a division created by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem more than'50 yearsago between the pro-Hashemites, who were willing to reach a modus vivendi with the Jews, and the anti-Hashemites, who were unwilling to do so. There are, of course, other examples of the creation of separate states along political lines. . . . I don't think that these examples are worth imitating, particularly when we consider that the proposal is to create a state whose very reason for existence is commitment to violent opposition to both its neighbors.

As I told you, I do not believe that the so-called settlements policy will significantly alter the demographic balance on the West Bank. I continue to believe that the incorporation of most of the West Bank and Gaza into Jordan, subject to appropriate security guarantees for Israel, is the best answer to the present situation.

February 8, 1984

Dear Mr. Schifter:

... I heartily agree that the "statute of limitations" on wrongs done during the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948 has run out. Furthermore, there now exists an entire generation of Israelis who authentically have no other "homeland. " The world does ultimately ratify the status quo, but only provided an overall peaceful solution, at least balancing the injustices if not providing full justice to all the parties, is thereby achieved. However, despite all the rhetoric and bombast (and violence), the status quo is in fact still being changed—of course, to the benefit of Israelis.

How can you describe the migration of Jews from elsewhere to Israel and the expulsion of the Palestinians as "population exchange"? "Exchange" implies a fair bargain.

You write, "As I see it, the issue which is posed by the suggestion that a West Bank state be created is whether a political movement is entitled to a separate state." I am somewhat dumbfounded that a supporter of the state of Israel could answer such a question with anything but a clarion "Yes!"

I believe you and I comprehend the political significance of the rise of Palestinian nationalism quite differently. Palestinian identity goes much deeper than mere opposition by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem to the Hashernites 50 years ago. The Jordanians are desert Arabs; the Palestinians are Mediterranean Arabs. The Palestinians are much more akin to their Jewish and Lebanese cousins than to the Bedouins of Jordan. The "Jordanian option" is just as fraught with potential conflict as was the binational (Jewish-Palestinian) Palestine for which the British worked for so long....

I fail to appreciate the analogy of "separate states" (between a West Bank Palestinian state and Jordan) with Germany, Korea or Vietnam. In the latter cases, the differences were imposed by outside forces; the sense of national identity in all three cases were not thereby disposed of. A West Bank state, being Palestinian, would differ in many fundamental ways from Jordan next door. The very fact that there could be a "civil war" in Jordan in 1970 is historical evidence of the separate identities of the two peoples.

In any event, none of these problems are apt to be solved in the foreseeable future. Nor, do I have the slightest confidence that the United States government will even begin to try."

A Serious Question

Richard Schifter was not an unreasonable man. As our exchange illustrated, he was willing to debate the issues fairly. But a closer look raises a more serious question: To what does Richard Schifter owe his primary loyalty? Consider some of his ideas:

A double standard on statehood Schifter, in 1983, trivialized the nature of the PLO. It was merely a "political movement, " and as such not " entitled to a separate state. " But what, after all, was political Zionism in 1890, or 1930, if not a "political movement"? When did Zionism become "entitled to a separate state"? And if Zionism, why not the PLO?

Israeli settlements in occupied areas don't matter. Schifter trivialized the settlements policy of the (then, 1983) Likud government: It would not "significantly alter" the West Bank. He thus begged the questions whether they were just or unjust, legal or illegal, contributions to or obstacles to peace. He ignored the possibility the Israeli government policy-that in the future they might become signifi