Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, July/August 1999, pages 49, 135

Defense & Intelligence

What the Cox Report Does and Does Not Say About Israeli Technology Transfer to China

By Shawn L. Twing

On May 25, 1999, the U.S. House of Representatives released a declassified version of its investigation into China’s illegal acquisition of U.S. nuclear and military technology. The Report of the Select Committee On U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China—called the Cox report after House Policy Committee Chairman Christopher Cox (R-CA)—details China’s multifaceted campaign to obtain U.S. military technology and hardware from the United States and third countries.

Included in the committee’s declassified findings is a brief mention of Israel’s role in providing U.S. weapons technology illegally to China. More important than what is included, however, is the volume of publicly available information, much of it from U.S. government sources, that has been left out of the report’s findings.

The Third Country

One of China’s methods used to obtain U.S. military technology, according to the Cox report, involves illegally transferring technology from third countries (p. 20). “To fill its short-term technological needs in military equipment, the PRC has made numerous purchases of foreign military systems. The chief source of these systems is Russia, but the PRC has acquired military technology from other countries as well,” the report reads (p. 24). Aside from Russia and the United States, the only other country named in the Cox report as a provider of weapons technology to China is Israel (p. 25).

The short section explaining Israel’s role in providing U.S. weapons technology to China is extraordinarily brief, lacks several important details, and excludes an enormous amount of information pertinent to the Cox report. That section reads: “Recent years have been marked by increased Sino-Israeli cooperation on military and security matters. Israel has offered significant technology cooperation to the PRC, especially in aircraft and missile development. Israel has provided both weapons and technology to the PRC, most notably to assist the PRC in developing its F-10 fighter and airborne early warning aircraft.”

The section explaining Israel’s role excludes an enormous amount of information.

The Cox report fails to mention that China’s F-10 is a nearly identical copy of Israel’s failed Lavi fighter, a project that was terminated in 1987 after receiving more than $1.5 billion from U.S. taxpayers. The Cox report also fails to mention that Israel’s transfer of Lavi technology, which now has been confirmed by the United States, China, and Israel, is a direct violation of U.S. arms export laws and dozens of U.S.-Israel agreements. Even Israeli officials have stated publicly that more than 50 percent of the Lavi is of U.S. origin—which is an exceedingly conservative estimate, considering the fact that some 730 U.S. firms contributed to the Lavi’s development. What is not stated by Israel, however, or the United States for that matter, is that all U.S.-made components and technology related to the Lavi project are protected by U.S. arms export laws that forbid the retransfer of that technology to third countries without U.S. permission, which in this case has not been given. (For more on Israel’s retransfer of the Lavi to China, see: “U.S. Military Technology Sold by Israel to China Upsets Asian Power Balance,” January 1996 Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, p. 12.)

The Cox report also fails to mention the multitude of other suspected transfers of technology from Israel to China, all of which have been reported publicly. Among those weapons systems are:

1. Cruise missile technology, including Israel’s STAR-1 cruise missile which “incorporates sensitive U.S. technology,” according to American University professor and technology retransfer specialist Duncan Clarke.
   
   
2. Air-to-air missile technology, including Israel’s Python-3 short-range air-to-air missile, which is thought to be a re-engineered version of the U.S.-made AIM-9 “Sidewinder.”
   
   
3. Anti-tactical ballistic missile technology, particularly information related to the U.S. Patriot missile. Despite a State Department investigation that could not find physical evidence to support allegations that Israel retransferred Patriot missile technology to China, it is widely believed in the U.S. intelligence community that Israel transferred technical data, but not Patriot hardware, to China, in violation of U.S. export laws. Technical modifications made to Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles fired across the Taiwan Strait in 1996 also support this allegation.
   
   
4. Laser weapons technology. The Jan. 27, 1999 Washington Times cited a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report accusing Israel of selling U.S. laser technology to China. That technology was obtained by Israel in the joint U.S.-Israeli Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) program, formerly known as Nautilus. The lion’s share of funding for the Nautilus/ THEL program has come from U.S. taxpayers. (For more on THEL/Nautilus program and the DIA report, see: “Clinton Promises Israel Additional Aid, Including Nautilus Laser System,” WRMEA, July 1996, p. 37, and “U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency Report Accuses Israel of Laser Technology Transfer to China,” WRMEA, April/May 1999, p. 44.)

The impact of China’s acquisition of an airborne early warning (AEW) system from Israel (and Russia) also is not adequately explained by the Cox report. Israel has agreed to provide its Phalcon phased-array radar system, to be mounted on a Russian transport plane, as part of a $1 billion project to outfit China with capabilities similar to those provided by American AWACS planes. China’s acquisition of this system will “significantly erode the military technical edge held by the U.S. and Taiwan that is necessary for deterring China,” according to Heritage Foundation senior analyst Richard Fisher.

With volumes of well-documented research and information related to Israel’s transfer of American technology available publicly, including exposés in publications like Foreign Policy and literally dozens of reports in the trade-weekly Defense News and the various Jane’s defense publications, the Cox report’s lack of information on Israel’s role in arming China does not reflect a lack of information elsewhere.

An alternate explanation for the deceptive brevity of the Cox report as it relates to Israel can be found on page 20 of that report. “Specific details on [China’s] acquisitions appear in the Select Committee’s classified report, but the Clinton administration has determined that they cannot be made public,” it reads.

[Author’s note: The articles from the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs cited in this article, as well as several others related to Israel’s retransfer of American technology to China and other countries, can be found in their entirety on the Washington Report’s Web site. The full text of the Cox report also is available on-line, in Adobe .pdf format, at the following address: http://www.ostgate.com/coxreptindex.html.]

Shawn L. Twing is the Web site developer for the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. He can be reached by e-mail at <stwing@washington-report.org>