Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November/December
1996, pages 11, 109,110
Special Report
Netanyahu's Resumption of Shamir's Stalling Will
Be Israel's Mistake
by Rachelle Marshall
On Oct. 31, 1991, the second day of the Madrid peace
conference, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir assured the Arab
delegates that among Israelis "There is an almost total consensus
for the need for peace." But he warned that the talks would
reach an impasse if they focused primarily on territory. Shamir
had come to the peace conference still determined to keep the West
Bank and Gaza forever under Israel's control. A year later, after
the Likud Party lost the election to Labor and Yitzhak Rabin became
prime minister, Shamir admitted to a reporter for the Israeli newspaper
Ma'ariv that he had never intended to bargain seriously over the
occupied territories, but instead planned to drag out negotiations
for 10 years. "In the meantime," he said, "we would
have settled half a million souls in Judea and Samaria."
After hearing Shamir's speech in Madrid, Palestinian
delegate Saeb Erekat asked, "If we are not going to negotiate
for an end to Israeli occupation of our lands then why are we here?"
Today, five years later, Erekat is chief negotiator for the Palestinians
and he could reasonably ask the same question. Although the intervening
years raised hopes that Palestinians might regain at least a portion
of their land, last May's elections brought the return of Shamir's
policy of intransigence, this time in more sophisticated wrapping.
Shamir's chief press spokesman in Madrid was the Westernized,
smooth talking Binyamin Netanyahu, who declared to reporters that
Israel's goal was "peace for peace." It was a phrase as
empty of meaning as his 1996 campaign slogan, "peace with security,"
designed to paper over his intent to maintain permanent Israeli
control over Palestinian land and water. By the end of his first
hundred days as prime minister Netanyahu had destroyed any hope
that he would carry out the promises made by Labor prime ministers
Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres.
Like vindictive schoolboys, members of the new government
took every opportunity to show their contempt for Yasser Arafat
and disregard for Palestinian concerns. In the short space of three
months, by means of verbal insults and heavy-handed actions, they
had left the Palestinians feeling robbed, humiliated, and betrayed.
During that time, the Likud government seized land for new roads
and settlements on the West Bank and demolished scores of Palestinian
homes. Settlers in Hebron intensified their attacks on Arab residents
and Jewish fundamentalists in Jerusalem took over houses belonging
to Palestinians, with no interference by Israeli authorities. On
the contrary, Netanyahu added to the provocations by insisting that
Jews had a right to live anywhere in "Judea and Samaria."
The Likud government's actions did not in fact depart
radically from those of the previous government. Rabin and Peres
increased the number of Israeli settlers on the West Bank by 40
percent and launched construction of a road network designed to
fragment the Palestinian population into isolated cantons. For Netanyahu,
however, the new roads and settlements were an expression of ideology,
the means of achieving the extremists' vision of a Greater Israel.
"Settlement is one of the things that determine the map of
the country," he said after his election. "Therefore if
we stop settlement activity in one place or another it means we
have surrendered that place."
The prime minister proved his commitment by appointing
Ariel Sharon to be minister of infrastructure, with control over
the roads, utilities, water resources and much of the land in the
West Bank and Gaza. Sharon, who is one of Israel's most ruthless
advocates of a Greater Israel, now has the power to implement this
vision. Israeli authorities have already approved his plans to build
thousands of new homes for Jews in the West Bank and at least two
multi-lane highways that will bisect the area. Israeli Peace Now
leader Musi Raz called the decision to build new settlements "really
madness." The Palestinians saw it as the end of the peace process.
At a meeting last fall of the joint steering committee to oversee
implementation of the Oslo agreements, Palestinian delegate Jamil
Tarifi declared, "Israel now speaks of no peace without
security,' so we are adding, no peace with settlements."
Threats to Peace
The government has posed several other threats to
peace as well by failing to withdraw from Hebron, and refusing to
release Palestinian prisoners or reopen the borders, and by continuing
to confiscate Palestinian land. The most potentially explosive issue,
however, is Israel's effort to assert sovereignty over all of Jerusalem,
including areas sacred to Muslims. Although negotiations are yet
to be held on the city's future status, Israeli authorities have
attempted to alter the face of East Jerusalem by withdrawing IDs
from Palestinian residents and carrying out a series of what The
Washington Post called "military-style operations," including
the demolition of a center for disabled youths and dozens of Palestinian
homes.
It was not surprising, therefore, that long-simmering
Palestinian anger erupted into violence on Sept. 23 when Israel
opened an exit to an archeological tunnel for tourists near the
site of Al Aqsa and other mosques. Netanyahu, who acknowledged that
the project was intended to "express our sovereignty over Jerusalem,"
was aware that the action would arouse a passionate response. The
Israelis began breaking through the final wall in the dead of night,
with heavily armed guards on hand to seal off the area.
The next day Palestinian youths in Gaza and the West
Bank responded by pelting Israeli soldiers with stones, only to
be driven back by tear gas and live bullets. The lethal response
by Israeli soldiers was in sharp contrast to the treatment given
ultra-Orthodox Jews who threw rocks and garbage at Israeli police
last August in an effort to force the Sabbath closing of a major
Jerusalem thoroughfare. Joel Greenberg of The New York Times was
outside Al Aqsa after Friday prayers on Sept. 27 when a few teenagers
began throwing stones at a line of Israeli police. "Almost
immediately," he wrote, "scores of helmeted riot police
stormed into the mosque pavilion, lobbing stun grenades and firing
at the young Palestinians." Three Palestinians were killed
and 50 wounded. Greenberg recalled that "no more than a few
stones from the Palestinians" had brought on the massive Israeli
attack.
When Palestinian police in Ramallah saw Israelis shoot
point blank at a crowd of protestors, they fired back, and the resulting
two-hour gunfight cost several casualties on both sides. Israel
then went on a virtual war footing, sealing off an entire valley
between Ramallah and Nablus and paralyzing life in scores of communities.
Tanks surrounded all major Palestinian cities, their guns pointed
inward, while helicopter gunships hovered overhead and sometimes
fired at Palestinians below. Israeli roadblocks prevented the inhabitants
from traveling from one place to another. The siege was not lifted
until several days after Palestinian police had restored calm. By
then 62 Palestinians, 14 Israelis, and 1 Egyptian had been killed,
and more than a thousand injured.
At the U.N. both Arab and European delegates condemned
Israel for failing to implement the Oslo agreements and thereby
creating what British Foreign Minister Malcolm Rifkind called "a
conflagration." Although King Hussein and President Clinton
urged Netanyahu to close the new tunnel opening at least temporarily,
he refused to make any conciliatory gesture. Instead he harshly
accused Arafat of inciting the violence with "malicious lies,"
and vowed that the tunnel "will always be open."
When the two leaders came to Washington on Oct. 2
at Clinton's invitation, they confronted each other through a veil
of hostility and mistrust. Making reconciliation even more difficult
was the fact that Netanyahu's right-wing supporters fiercely oppose
any compromise with the Palestinians, while Arafat needed to come
away with at least some tangible benefits for the Palestinians in
order to maintain credibility as a leader.
Given the disparity of power between the two sides,
and warnings to Clinton from Bob Dole and other Republican leaders
not to put pressure on Israel, the results were predictable. Netanyahu
agreed to resume negotiations with the Palestinians on Oct. 6 but
said no to administration requests that he accept a 60-day deadline
for an agreement on Hebron, set a date for talks on Jerusalem, and
close the second entrance to the tunnel. Instead, like Yitzhak Shamir
before him, he promised only "to continue negotiations until
completed."
Divided Israelis
The Israeli people were deeply divided over Netanyahu's
handling of the crisis, with 54 percent believing the second tunnel
opening was a mistake, according to a Ma'ariv poll. A respected
rabbi, Yitzhak Kadourie, said the decision had been made by "crazies
who want to enrage the whole world against us." Arabs, on the
other hand, were united in their anger over Israel's actions. Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak, leader of the first Arab country to make
peace with Israel, refused to attend the Washington meeting and
bitterly accused Netanyahu of "obstinate acts." King Hussein,
Israel's closest Arab ally, said the tunnel violated the 1994 peace
treaty between the two countries and accused Netanyahu of "arrogance."
Meanwhile, tensions continued to escalate between
Israel and Syria because of Netanyahu's declared opposition to Israeli
withdrawal from the Golan Heights. In late August, after Israel
tested a new weapons system designed to intercept and destroy ballistic
missiles, the Syrian press accused Israel of "beating the drums
of war." Two weeks later, Syria moved a commando unit to the
base of Mount Hermon, where Israel has a surveillance post, and
a mechanized division from near Beirut to Lebanon's Bekka region,
closer to Israel. Shortly afterwards the head of the Jaffe Center
for Strategic Studies, Zetev Maoz, told Israeli radio that Netanyahu's
position on Israeli-Syrian negotiations had dangerously increased
the probability of war.
Netanyahu has said publicly that he is willing to
lose U.S. support rather than soften any of his positions, and he
has been true to his word. Long after the protests over the tunnel
opening ended, his government continued to impose harsh conditions
on the Palestinians, as if its intent was to provoke further violence.
For nearly two weeks the army maintained a round-the-clock curfew
in Hebron and nearby refugee camps, the most volatile areas of the
West Bank. Palestinians in Hebron were forced to remain indoors
while Jewish settlers carrying automatic weapons were free to walk
the streets.
On Sept. 10 settlers had looted Palestinian shops
in the Hebron market place, which had been sealed shut since American-born
Jewish settler Dr. Baruch Goldstein killed 29 Palestinian worshippers
at the Ibrahimi mosque in 1994. Two days later settlers vandalized
the Palestinian Authority's Information Office. On each of these
occasions Israeli soldiers stood by and did nothing. Israel has
delayed any troop withdrawals from Hebron, insisting on changes
to the existing agreement that would leave the city under the overall
control of Israeli security forces. It is no wonder that a resident
of a refugee camp near Hebron told a New York Times reporter that
"There is a terrible fury brewing here. There is a whole generation
with nothing more to lose. They want only vengeance and blood."
To Netanyahu and his colleagues, a violent confrontation
may be an acceptable price to pay for sticking by their hard-line
positions. Netanyahu's critics charge him with having no clearly
defined policies. Tom Segev, a liberal Israeli writer and commentator
said after the meeting in Washington, "If we knew there was
some kind of plan, some logic to his behavior, it would be reassuring.
But there is no plan, it's all makeshift." According to David
Landau of the Jewish Telegraph Agency, Israelis and Arabs are "all
wondering what peace with security' really means."
But given Netanyahu's public record, his policies
are only too clear. They are contained in the Likud Party platform,
which opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state and declares
the "fulfillment of Zionism" to be the top priority. Consequently
"the decision to freeze settlements will be rescinded."
On two of the issues still to be negotiated, the platform is unequivocal:
"Israel will keep its vital water resources in Judea and Samaria,"
with "no infringement" on Israel's use of these resources,
and "A united and undivided Jerusalem is the capital of the
state of Israel. Activities which undermine the status of Jerusalem
will be banned and therefore - Orient House will be closed."
Netanyahu ran for election on this platform and he
also believes that granting concessions to an adversary is a sign
of weakness, so he is not likely to show flexibility in the current
negotiations. On the contrary, after they began he proposed delaying
scheduled Israeli troop withdrawals from areas of the West Bank
until a final peace agreement is reached, which would be May 1999
at the earliest. There is no doubt that given his way he would emulate
Shamir by dragging out the talks indefinitely, while filling up
the occupied territories with Jewish settlers.
This time, however, the tactic may not work. After
the November elections the Clinton administration is almost certain
to step up efforts to persuade Israel to carry out its previous
agreements. But since Congress behaves "more like Israelis
than the Israelis," according to one Palestinian negotiator,
more effective pressure is likely to come from the Arab League and
the European community, whose members have become increasingly critical
of Israel. Arab leaders will be unwilling to cooperate with Israel
on economic issues and resource development as long as Israel continues
to expand settlements at the expense of Palestinians and their land.
Qatar recently suspended contacts with Israel and put off opening
a trade office in Tel Aviv because of Netanyahu's policies. There
could conceivably come a time when Israel's loss of trade and investment
opportunities abroad makes the policy of continued intransigence
seem too costly to an already divided Israeli public.
But Israel faces more dangerous pressures closer to
home. If the negotiations resumed in October produce no positive
results for the Palestinians, violence is certain to break out againand
this time it will be more difficult to control. The scenes in late
September of young Palestinians roving the streets dodging and charging
Israeli soldiers were further evidence that one of Israel's worst
crimes against the Palestinian people was to turn their children
into guerrilla fighters who have nothing to lose. Israel's occupation
has left thousands of young Palestinians without adequate schooling,
without jobs, without a future, knowing only bitterness and despair.
Unless the government takes credible steps to restore their hope
and improve their lives, Netanyahu's apparent triumph in Washington
last October could turn out to have been the costliest mistake in
Israel's history. |