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Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November/December 1996, pages 11, 109,110

Special Report

Netanyahu's Resumption of Shamir's Stalling Will Be Israel's Mistake

by Rachelle Marshall

On Oct. 31, 1991, the second day of the Madrid peace conference, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir assured the Arab delegates that among Israelis "There is an almost total consensus for the need for peace." But he warned that the talks would reach an impasse if they focused primarily on territory. Shamir had come to the peace conference still determined to keep the West Bank and Gaza forever under Israel's control. A year later, after the Likud Party lost the election to Labor and Yitzhak Rabin became prime minister, Shamir admitted to a reporter for the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv that he had never intended to bargain seriously over the occupied territories, but instead planned to drag out negotiations for 10 years. "In the meantime," he said, "we would have settled half a million souls in Judea and Samaria."

After hearing Shamir's speech in Madrid, Palestinian delegate Saeb Erekat asked, "If we are not going to negotiate for an end to Israeli occupation of our lands then why are we here?" Today, five years later, Erekat is chief negotiator for the Palestinians and he could reasonably ask the same question. Although the intervening years raised hopes that Palestinians might regain at least a portion of their land, last May's elections brought the return of Shamir's policy of intransigence, this time in more sophisticated wrapping.

Shamir's chief press spokesman in Madrid was the Westernized, smooth talking Binyamin Netanyahu, who declared to reporters that Israel's goal was "peace for peace." It was a phrase as empty of meaning as his 1996 campaign slogan, "peace with security," designed to paper over his intent to maintain permanent Israeli control over Palestinian land and water. By the end of his first hundred days as prime minister Netanyahu had destroyed any hope that he would carry out the promises made by Labor prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres.

Like vindictive schoolboys, members of the new government took every opportunity to show their contempt for Yasser Arafat and disregard for Palestinian concerns. In the short space of three months, by means of verbal insults and heavy-handed actions, they had left the Palestinians feeling robbed, humiliated, and betrayed. During that time, the Likud government seized land for new roads and settlements on the West Bank and demolished scores of Palestinian homes. Settlers in Hebron intensified their attacks on Arab residents and Jewish fundamentalists in Jerusalem took over houses belonging to Palestinians, with no interference by Israeli authorities. On the contrary, Netanyahu added to the provocations by insisting that Jews had a right to live anywhere in "Judea and Samaria."

The Likud government's actions did not in fact depart radically from those of the previous government. Rabin and Peres increased the number of Israeli settlers on the West Bank by 40 percent and launched construction of a road network designed to fragment the Palestinian population into isolated cantons. For Netanyahu, however, the new roads and settlements were an expression of ideology, the means of achieving the extremists' vision of a Greater Israel. "Settlement is one of the things that determine the map of the country," he said after his election. "Therefore if we stop settlement activity in one place or another it means we have surrendered that place."

The prime minister proved his commitment by appointing Ariel Sharon to be minister of infrastructure, with control over the roads, utilities, water resources and much of the land in the West Bank and Gaza. Sharon, who is one of Israel's most ruthless advocates of a Greater Israel, now has the power to implement this vision. Israeli authorities have already approved his plans to build thousands of new homes for Jews in the West Bank and at least two multi-lane highways that will bisect the area. Israeli Peace Now leader Musi Raz called the decision to build new settlements "really madness." The Palestinians saw it as the end of the peace process. At a meeting last fall of the joint steering committee to oversee implementation of the Oslo agreements, Palestinian delegate Jamil Tarifi declared, "Israel now speaks of ‘no peace without security,' so we are adding, no peace with settlements."

Threats to Peace

The government has posed several other threats to peace as well by failing to withdraw from Hebron, and refusing to release Palestinian prisoners or reopen the borders, and by continuing to confiscate Palestinian land. The most potentially explosive issue, however, is Israel's effort to assert sovereignty over all of Jerusalem, including areas sacred to Muslims. Although negotiations are yet to be held on the city's future status, Israeli authorities have attempted to alter the face of East Jerusalem by withdrawing IDs from Palestinian residents and carrying out a series of what The Washington Post called "military-style operations," including the demolition of a center for disabled youths and dozens of Palestinian homes.

It was not surprising, therefore, that long-simmering Palestinian anger erupted into violence on Sept. 23 when Israel opened an exit to an archeological tunnel for tourists near the site of Al Aqsa and other mosques. Netanyahu, who acknowledged that the project was intended to "express our sovereignty over Jerusalem," was aware that the action would arouse a passionate response. The Israelis began breaking through the final wall in the dead of night, with heavily armed guards on hand to seal off the area.

The next day Palestinian youths in Gaza and the West Bank responded by pelting Israeli soldiers with stones, only to be driven back by tear gas and live bullets. The lethal response by Israeli soldiers was in sharp contrast to the treatment given ultra-Orthodox Jews who threw rocks and garbage at Israeli police last August in an effort to force the Sabbath closing of a major Jerusalem thoroughfare. Joel Greenberg of The New York Times was outside Al Aqsa after Friday prayers on Sept. 27 when a few teenagers began throwing stones at a line of Israeli police. "Almost immediately," he wrote, "scores of helmeted riot police stormed into the mosque pavilion, lobbing stun grenades and firing at the young Palestinians." Three Palestinians were killed and 50 wounded. Greenberg recalled that "no more than a few stones from the Palestinians" had brought on the massive Israeli attack.

When Palestinian police in Ramallah saw Israelis shoot point blank at a crowd of protestors, they fired back, and the resulting two-hour gunfight cost several casualties on both sides. Israel then went on a virtual war footing, sealing off an entire valley between Ramallah and Nablus and paralyzing life in scores of communities. Tanks surrounded all major Palestinian cities, their guns pointed inward, while helicopter gunships hovered overhead and sometimes fired at Palestinians below. Israeli roadblocks prevented the inhabitants from traveling from one place to another. The siege was not lifted until several days after Palestinian police had restored calm. By then 62 Palestinians, 14 Israelis, and 1 Egyptian had been killed, and more than a thousand injured.

At the U.N. both Arab and European delegates condemned Israel for failing to implement the Oslo agreements and thereby creating what British Foreign Minister Malcolm Rifkind called "a conflagration." Although King Hussein and President Clinton urged Netanyahu to close the new tunnel opening at least temporarily, he refused to make any conciliatory gesture. Instead he harshly accused Arafat of inciting the violence with "malicious lies," and vowed that the tunnel "will always be open."

When the two leaders came to Washington on Oct. 2 at Clinton's invitation, they confronted each other through a veil of hostility and mistrust. Making reconciliation even more difficult was the fact that Netanyahu's right-wing supporters fiercely oppose any compromise with the Palestinians, while Arafat needed to come away with at least some tangible benefits for the Palestinians in order to maintain credibility as a leader.

Given the disparity of power between the two sides, and warnings to Clinton from Bob Dole and other Republican leaders not to put pressure on Israel, the results were predictable. Netanyahu agreed to resume negotiations with the Palestinians on Oct. 6 but said no to administration requests that he accept a 60-day deadline for an agreement on Hebron, set a date for talks on Jerusalem, and close the second entrance to the tunnel. Instead, like Yitzhak Shamir before him, he promised only "to continue negotiations until completed."

Divided Israelis

The Israeli people were deeply divided over Netanyahu's handling of the crisis, with 54 percent believing the second tunnel opening was a mistake, according to a Ma'ariv poll. A respected rabbi, Yitzhak Kadourie, said the decision had been made by "crazies who want to enrage the whole world against us." Arabs, on the other hand, were united in their anger over Israel's actions. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, leader of the first Arab country to make peace with Israel, refused to attend the Washington meeting and bitterly accused Netanyahu of "obstinate acts." King Hussein, Israel's closest Arab ally, said the tunnel violated the 1994 peace treaty between the two countries and accused Netanyahu of "arrogance."

Meanwhile, tensions continued to escalate between Israel and Syria because of Netanyahu's declared opposition to Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. In late August, after Israel tested a new weapons system designed to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles, the Syrian press accused Israel of "beating the drums of war." Two weeks later, Syria moved a commando unit to the base of Mount Hermon, where Israel has a surveillance post, and a mechanized division from near Beirut to Lebanon's Bekka region, closer to Israel. Shortly afterwards the head of the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, Zetev Maoz, told Israeli radio that Netanyahu's position on Israeli-Syrian negotiations had dangerously increased the probability of war.

Netanyahu has said publicly that he is willing to lose U.S. support rather than soften any of his positions, and he has been true to his word. Long after the protests over the tunnel opening ended, his government continued to impose harsh conditions on the Palestinians, as if its intent was to provoke further violence. For nearly two weeks the army maintained a round-the-clock curfew in Hebron and nearby refugee camps, the most volatile areas of the West Bank. Palestinians in Hebron were forced to remain indoors while Jewish settlers carrying automatic weapons were free to walk the streets.

On Sept. 10 settlers had looted Palestinian shops in the Hebron market place, which had been sealed shut since American-born Jewish settler Dr. Baruch Goldstein killed 29 Palestinian worshippers at the Ibrahimi mosque in 1994. Two days later settlers vandalized the Palestinian Authority's Information Office. On each of these occasions Israeli soldiers stood by and did nothing. Israel has delayed any troop withdrawals from Hebron, insisting on changes to the existing agreement that would leave the city under the overall control of Israeli security forces. It is no wonder that a resident of a refugee camp near Hebron told a New York Times reporter that "There is a terrible fury brewing here. There is a whole generation with nothing more to lose. They want only vengeance and blood."

To Netanyahu and his colleagues, a violent confrontation may be an acceptable price to pay for sticking by their hard-line positions. Netanyahu's critics charge him with having no clearly defined policies. Tom Segev, a liberal Israeli writer and commentator said after the meeting in Washington, "If we knew there was some kind of plan, some logic to his behavior, it would be reassuring. But there is no plan, it's all makeshift." According to David Landau of the Jewish Telegraph Agency, Israelis and Arabs are "all wondering what ‘peace with security' really means."

But given Netanyahu's public record, his policies are only too clear. They are contained in the Likud Party platform, which opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state and declares the "fulfillment of Zionism" to be the top priority. Consequently "the decision to freeze settlements will be rescinded." On two of the issues still to be negotiated, the platform is unequivocal: "Israel will keep its vital water resources in Judea and Samaria," with "no infringement" on Israel's use of these resources, and "A united and undivided Jerusalem is the capital of the state of Israel. Activities which undermine the status of Jerusalem will be banned and therefore - Orient House will be closed."

Netanyahu ran for election on this platform and he also believes that granting concessions to an adversary is a sign of weakness, so he is not likely to show flexibility in the current negotiations. On the contrary, after they began he proposed delaying scheduled Israeli troop withdrawals from areas of the West Bank until a final peace agreement is reached, which would be May 1999 at the earliest. There is no doubt that given his way he would emulate Shamir by dragging out the talks indefinitely, while filling up the occupied territories with Jewish settlers.

This time, however, the tactic may not work. After the November elections the Clinton administration is almost certain to step up efforts to persuade Israel to carry out its previous agreements. But since Congress behaves "more like Israelis than the Israelis," according to one Palestinian negotiator, more effective pressure is likely to come from the Arab League and the European community, whose members have become increasingly critical of Israel. Arab leaders will be unwilling to cooperate with Israel on economic issues and resource development as long as Israel continues to expand settlements at the expense of Palestinians and their land. Qatar recently suspended contacts with Israel and put off opening a trade office in Tel Aviv because of Netanyahu's policies. There could conceivably come a time when Israel's loss of trade and investment opportunities abroad makes the policy of continued intransigence seem too costly to an already divided Israeli public.

But Israel faces more dangerous pressures closer to home. If the negotiations resumed in October produce no positive results for the Palestinians, violence is certain to break out againand this time it will be more difficult to control. The scenes in late September of young Palestinians roving the streets dodging and charging Israeli soldiers were further evidence that one of Israel's worst crimes against the Palestinian people was to turn their children into guerrilla fighters who have nothing to lose. Israel's occupation has left thousands of young Palestinians without adequate schooling, without jobs, without a future, knowing only bitterness and despair. Unless the government takes credible steps to restore their hope and improve their lives, Netanyahu's apparent triumph in Washington last October could turn out to have been the costliest mistake in Israel's history.