December 2011, Page 60

Waging Peace

The State of the Egyptian Revolution

George Washington University's Elliot School of International Affairs hosted a Sept. 21 panel of leading political scientists to discuss and offer their perspectives on the revolution in Egypt and its new political situation.

Rabab El-Mahdi, professor of political science at the American University in Cairo, began by explaining that the revolution in Egypt is far from being over. While it took only 18 days to depose President Hosni Mubarak, the same elites, including those from Egypt's media and universities, are still running the country today. This, according to El-Mahdi, is because Egypt is a politicized state "where there is no real distinction between the state institutions and those who rule." Those who hold positions in different government bureaucracies and ministries are interrelated with certain institutions, meaning that restructuring the political apparatus would extend to other sectors of society—making it very difficult for meaningful change to occur.

Joshua Stacher, professor of political science at Kent State University, elaborated on the inherent continuity of Egypt's government after the overthrow of Mubarak by examining the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the power and privilege it has retained since Mubarak's fall. According to Stacher, "SCAF is disproportionately in charge, and therefore they are disproportionately to blame" for the current state of the revolution seven months in. Moreover, he added, "their actions and their practices leave no doubt to their culpability."

Although Mubarak is gone, the parallel executive structures have remained, allowing the former regime's same repressive rule to operate. One important element of this is that SCAF maintains veto power over political structures, such as who gets appointed as a member of the constitutional delegation. SCAF has also pushed for November elections—knowing that, as an incumbent with an unorganized opposition, it will win the stability vote and retain its power. In addition to maintaining its power while remaining in the shadows, "SCAF will get the legitimacy vote for holding the elections," Stacher observed.

In contrast to her fellow panelists, Mona El-Ghobashy, political science professor at Barnard College, explained that for the first time since the 1900s—right before the WAFD party took control of the political system—Egypt is experiencing a "free movement" that consists of fragmented political groups. Since the revolution, she went on to explain, there are four vehicles of interest represented in Egypt. The first are political parties which are "a dime a dozen" and still in the early stages of development. Associations, who "have a set membership base and don't have to do the leg work that political parties have to do," constitute the second group. Because political parties faced repression under Mubarak, El-Ghobashy elaborated, associations were the main channel for interest representation and, she predicted, will remain that way for the next five to ten years. Other important channels for interest representation in Egypt are independent trade unions—whose struggles and demonstrations in Cairo were a preview of the revolution. The inherent variety of these groups, as well as the previous distrust and ineffectiveness of political parties, creates a natural tendency for them to avoid uniting into major federations and possibly being controlled by executive powers such as the SCAF. The fourth influential channel, according to El-Ghobashy, is localized street politics. The daily actions by small groups who organize on street corners for specific demands are the base of Egyptian politics, she said, and will also be around for several years.

As the revolution continues, El-Ghobashy argued, the presence of diverse fragmented groups in political society will work to remove the personalization of power in Egypt. This will also prevent a corrupt and unresponsive executive from reconstituting its power.

Egypt's upcoming elections have also brought the role of Islamists to the forefront of discussions. In El-Mahdi's opinion, there is too much media focus on the dividing line between the secular and religious. In reality, she said, the issues that launched the revolution, such as economic justice and corruption, are not being focused on. Indeed, she noted, the division between Islamist groups can sometimes be greater than that between the secular and religious groups. While Mubarak's rule artificially consolidated these groups, El-Ghobashy added, today they are "naturally fragmenting into their natural tendencies" no longer kept together by "the glue of repression."

—Jean-Pascal Deillon